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CAPEレクチャー

CAPEでは、世界中から多数の研究者を迎え、定期的にレクチャーを開いています。応用哲学・専門職倫理に関する最新の研究動向を紹介し、意見交換することを目的に企画されました。また、CAPEレクチャーは、CAPEワークショップともに、外部に公開しています。CAPEは研究者間の国際交流と共同研究、そして人材育成を推進してゆきます。

第117回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Peter Dietsch (2017/10/31)

Speaker: Prof. Peter Dietsch (Université de Montréal)
Date:October 31st, Tuesday, 2017
Time: 17:00-18:30
Venue: Meeting room , 1st floor of Faculty of Letters Main Building, Yoshida Campus, Kyoto University. (No. 8  http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/)

Title:
Money creation, debt, and distributive justice

Abstract:
Theories of justice appeal to a variety of criteria to determine what social arrangements should be considered just. For most theories, the distribution of financial resources matters. However, they take the existence of money as given and tend to ignore the way in which the creation of money impacts distributive justice.
Those with access to collateral are favoured in the process of credit creation. Building on a preliminary section that lays out a typology of money in modern economies, this paper identifies four sources of bias stemming from the creation of different kinds of credit: loans from commercial banks to individuals and corporations; interbank lending; lending from central banks to commercial banks; the fourth source of bias stems from credit “destruction” rather than credit creation: selective bail-outs by central banks during financial crisis once again favour some economic agents over others.
What legitimates the claim that these biases are injustices rather than mere inequalities? The final section of the paper argues that since alternative designs of the financial architecture of our society are available that significantly reduce these forms of bias, we can indeed qualify them as unjust.

Biography:
Peter Dietsch is a philosopher and economist working on questions of economic ethics at the Université de Montréal. His research focuses on analysing the economic dimensions of social justice as well as on assessing economic policies from an ethical perspective. In the latter context, he has published extensively on the ethics of tax competition and of monetary policy. Dietsch is the author of ‘Catching Capital – The Ethics of Tax Competition’ (Oxford University Press, 2015) and co-editor (with Thomas Rixen) of ‘Global Tax Governance – What is Wrong With It and How to Fix It’ (ECPR Press, 2016). He is a member of the College of New Scholars of the Royal Society of Canada and received a fellowship for experienced researchers from the Humboldt Foundation in 2011.

第116回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Carol Lin (2017/10/20)

Speaker: Professor Chih-Chieh (Carol ) Lin 林志潔 (Associate Dean, National Chiao Tung University School of Law, Taiwan)
Date: October 20th Friday 2017
Time: 17:00-18:30
Venue: Meeting room , 1st floor of Faculty of Letters Main Building, Yoshida Campus, Kyoto University. (No. 8  http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/)

Title:
Aged Society in Asia – Die with Dignity and Patient’s Self-Determination Act

第115回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Hanti Lin (2017/9/20)

Speaker: Prof. Hanti Lin (UC Davis)
Date: September 20th 2017
Time: 16:30-18:00
Venue: Seminar room No.9, 1st floor of Research Building No.2  (No. 34  http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/)

Title:
Hume’s Dilemma and the Normative Turn—Or How It Is Possible to Justify at Least Some Kind of Induction

Abstract:
Is it possible to justify at least some kind of induction? Hume’s dilemma tries to answer in the negative; a simple version goes like this: “To justify an arbitrary kind of induction, the *empirical* thesis that it will (always or often) lead to a true conclusion has to be argued for, either demonstratively or inductively; the demonstrative route is impossible, while the inductive route is circular.” I want to resolve this dilemma by defending a quite general escape route. Here is the idea: (i) to justify induction of a certain kind, we can argue for a non-empirical, *normative* thesis instead, a norm that guides some inductive practices; (ii) unlike empirical theses, normative theses might be justified a priori and demonstratively, without relying on empirical studies or inductive inferences. Call this the normative turn, which has been implemented in various ways by some (formal) epistemologists, such as Bayesians, learning theorists, and Reichenbach (who is probably the earliest pioneer of the normative turn). Unfortunately, those people tend to set aside Hume’s dilemma quickly and rush to develop their own implementations of the normative turn. In their hands, the normative turn is mostly practiced but not really defended. So I want to defend the normative turn—to consider possible ways Hume’s dilemma might be thought to strike back, and to address those worries by reference to the general features of the normative turn, without commitment to any particular implementation.

A note on the mathematical prerequisite: I will keep it to a minimum. You only need to have propositional logic in mind, and I will prepare all the others for you, pictorially.

第114回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Julianne Chung  (2017/8/1)

SpeakerJulianne Chung (Assistant Professor, University of Louisville)
Date: August 1st 2017
Time: 15:00-18:00
Venue: Seminar room No.10, 1st floor of Research Building No.2 (No. 34  http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/)

Title:
Taking Skepticism Seriously: How the Zhuangzi can Inform Contemporary Epistemology
Abstract:
This paper explores a few of the ways that the Zhuangzi can inform contemporary analytic epistemology. However, to accomplish this, I must first give some account of what the Zhuangzi does. Because it is controversial as to how to interpret the positive philosophical project proposed in the Zhuangzi, I begin by briefly outlining and summarizing the case for my fictionalist interpretation of the text. Then I use this interpretation as a springboard for discussing how the Zhuangzi can be brought into productive dialogue with a perennial philosophical question: namely, the question of how we should respond to skeptical arguments (and similar). Specifically, I argue that the Zhuangzi can be reasonably interpreted as exemplifying an approach that is different from dominant contemporary responses to skeptical arguments in at least three significant ways: i) It is fictionalist, ii) It motivates a skeptical perspective rather than a claim, and iii) It accomplishes its aims in a stylistically and substantively atypical, but nonetheless contextually savvy way. However, there are also at least three significant ways in which it is relevant to contemporary debates about skeptical arguments: i) It can be used to respond to the same sorts of skeptical arguments that occupy contemporary commentators, ii) It can be used to address a number of questions, influential in contemporary epistemology, that arise in connection with such arguments, and iii) It can be used to suggest important new questions for epistemologists to pursue going forward―questions that promise to considerably advance epistemology (and philosophy more broadly).

Title:
Skepticism, Metaphor, and Epistemic Feelings
Abstract:
One feature of debates about skeptical arguments that has largely been overlooked by contemporary analytic philosophers is that disputes about them are pervasive across a number of philosophical traditions. Some of the most general and powerful skeptical arguments—arguments from regress, arguments from circularity, and arguments from skeptical hypotheses—have been defended, and attacked, by Euroamerican, Indian, and Chinese philosophers alike. In other words, skepticism—as well as resistance to it—is in some sense a cross-cultural phenomenon. Because of this, it cries out for a cross-cultural explanation: that is, an account of why this is so. In this paper, I argue that the view that believing is knowing is a primary conceptual metaphor (which I characterize as a form of epistemic fictionalism) promises to provide at least the beginnings of such an explanation. I proceed by first briefly explaining what primary conceptual metaphors are before going on to explain why believing is knowing is plausibly among them, drawing on recent literature on epistemic feelings. Following that, I show how this account can be used to offer a unified (if partial) response to these three particularly pressing philosophical questions: i) Why are skeptical arguments appealing? ii) Why are skeptical arguments difficult to accept? and iii) Why are these features of skeptical arguments widespread? In other words, why is skepticism—as well as resistance to it—in some sense a cross-cultural phenomenon?

Acknowledgement:
This workshop is supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B), JSPS: Dialetheism and Asian Philosophy: Construction of international research basis for Analytic Asian Philosophy (16H03344).

第113回CAPEレクチャー Mr. Kai Tanter (University of Melbourne) (2017/7/21)

Title:
Inferentialist Semantics for Atomics, Predicates, and Names

Abstract:
Inferentialism is a theory in the philosophy of language which claims that the meaning of expressions ought to be understood in terms of their inferential roles or relations, rather than truth and reference. It naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics, where meaning is understood in terms of inference rules applied within proofs, instead of more traditional model-theoretic semantics. Most work in proof theory has been focused on logical constants, with relatively little work on the semantics of atomic sentences and subatomic terms. Drawing on Robert Brandom’s idea of material inference and Greg Restall’s bilateralist interpretation of the multiple conclusion sequent calculus, I present a compositional proof-theoretic semantics for atomic sentences and their component names and predicates. Brandom’s notion of material inference applies to those inference which are good in virtue of their non-logical vocabulary. For example, from ‘Paula is a platypus’ to ‘Paula is a monotreme’. Applied to “parts” of sentences, Brandom’s claim is that predicates are governed by asymmetric and names by symmetric inferences rules. Based on Brandom’s ideas I set out general rule forms for atomic sentences, predicates, and names within the multiple conclusion sequent calculus. This system has several interesting features: (1) the rules for atomic sentences are determined by those for their component predicates names; (2) cut elimination for the system can be proved; (3) model theoretic extensions can be interpreted as idealisations derived from the more fundamental inference rules.

第112回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Yoriyuki Yamagata(2017/7/6)

Title:
Validity of bilateral classical logic and its application

Abstract:
In this talk, we report an ongoing work to define a notion of validity on Rumfitt’s bilateral classical logic. In particular, we define validity over the implicational fragment of the propositional bilateral classical logic, following Prawitz’s article “Ideas and Results in Proof Theory”. As an application, we prove strong normalization of such system under normalization rules, which reduce all introduction/elimination, reductio-ad-absurdum/elimination and reduction-ad-absurdum/contradiction-rules pairs on main branches of derivations. Further, we discuss the relation of our notion of validity and Dummett’s verificationist semantics. Although our definition of validity is hopelessly non-constructive, we argue that there is a way in which verificationists accept our notion of validity, by showing that the notion of decidability can be multiply interpreted.

第111回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Yumiko Inukai (2017/7/4,6)

Title:
The contemporary notion of the minimal self with reference to early modern philosophers like Descartes, Locke, Berkeley & Hume

Abstract:
In recent years, some philosophers have begun to pay more attention to the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity in their investigation of the self again.  Instead of settling the question regarding the existence and the nature of the self first, they attempt to illuminate the structure of experience in which a sense of the self as a subject of experience arises in the first place, as phenomenologists would do.  This approach has proven to be quite fruitful: it has yielded a basic, yet critical, and popular notion of the self –  “the minimal self.” It is a self at the most fundamental level, which is intimately connected with the character of first-personal perspective of conscious states.  In this seminar, we will first explore, in particular, Dan Zahavi’s account of the minimal self.  Then, unlike Zahavi who often draws his inspirations from phenomenologists like Husserl and Sartre (for good reasons), we will look at some Early Modern philosophers’ views of the self (Descartes, Berkeley, Locke and Hume) to see if they already recognized the aspect of subjectivity in our conscious experience and used it in their accounts in some way.

第110回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Itsuki Hayashi (2017/6/29)

Title:
The Secret Lives of Evanescents: A Critical Analysis of the Buddhist Argument for Rebirth

Abstract:
In the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti famously argues for the possibility of rebirth. By rebirth, however, Dharmakīrti does not mean transmigration of the soul, for the idea of enduring souls is rejected as an illusion; instead, he means evanescent minds make up a causal series (cittasantāna) that extends beyond the duration of a physical life. While contemporary physicalists might object to this view, John Taber (2003) argues that the Buddhist can advance an Occam’s Razor argument to show that rebirth is at least not impossible. In this presentation, I show that later Buddhists, particularly Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (8th century), develop the argument in such a way that Occam’s Razor is no longer applicable. What is more, the argument appeals to a criterion of ontological dependence that resembles supervenience to show that mind does not depend on body, which renders the Buddhist doctrine even more suspect vis-à-vis contemporary metaphysics. Having clarified the challenges, I will suggest that the Buddhist can evade the challenges if karma is real (or ideal) and if ‘mind’ is to be understood as a karmic rather than cognitive entity.

Key words: persistence, rebirth, supervenience, causation, physicalism

第109回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Kevin Kelly (2017/6/28)

Title:
Deduction and Induction in Statistics

Abstract:
The distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning is among the most basic in philosophy.  But where, exactly, should one draw it?  The logical positivists drew it in terms of logic—deductive inferences are those in which the conclusion follows by first-order logic from the premises.   By that standard, all statistical inference is inductive, because the proposition that a sample was received never logically entails the intended conclusion.  We propose, instead, to characterize deductive inference in terms of guaranteed, arbitrarily low chance of error.  We present three arguments in favor of the proposal.  (1) It reflects the situation of real, as opposed to mathematically formalized, deduction.  (2) Unlike the received view, it allows one  to transfer logical insights from epistemology and the philosophy of science to issues that arise in advanced statistical data analysis.  (3) Finally, it rests on a deep, topological  analogy between the logical and statistical cases.  Time permitting, we illustrate the idea with a statistical application of tremendous practical and ethical consequence: the inference of causal connections from non-experimental data.

第108回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Wen-fang Wang (2017/6/13)

Title:
On Pritchard’s Solutions to Radical Skeptical Paradoxes

Abstract:
D. Pritchard (2016) has recently analyzed what he called “radical skeptical paradoxes” and offered his solutions to them. According to Pritchard, there are two kinds of skeptical paradoxes that ground on two intuitively plausible principles: one grounds on a version of epistemic closure principle, while the other grounds on what he calls ‘underdetermination principle’. Pritchard further argues that there is no unified undercutting solution to both paradoxes, so he appeals to two different ideas – Wittgenstein’s hinge commitment and McDowell’s disjunctivism – to solve these paradoxes. I argue in the talk that Pritchard’s solutions to radical skeptical paradoxes do not succeed. I explain in the first part what these radical skeptical paradoxes and their presuppositions are. In sections two and three, I explain Pritchard’s solutions to these paradoxes and argue that his solutions are not satisfactory.

第107回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Georg Northoff (2017/6/12,13)

Talk I: World-brain Problem I: Spatiotemporal model of consciousness
From 14:00 to 16:00 on 12th June 2017

Talk II: World-brain problem II: Spatiotemporal ontology of consciousness
From 14:00 to 16:00 on 13th June 2017

With Profs. Szu Ting Cheng (National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan) and Kai Yuan Cheng (National Yang Ming University, Taiwan) as discussants.

Abstract:
There is much debate about consciousness and mental features in general in both neuroscience and philosophy. However, despite intense debates, both empirical mechanisms and ontological characterization of mental features remain unclear. I here suggest a novel approach to mental features, namely a spatiotemporal approach that can account for both empirical mechanisms and ontological characteristics of mental features. My main argument for both talks is that the mind-body problem can be replaced by what I describe as world-brain problem.

The first talk will focus on developing a spatiotemporal model of consciousness as based on recent empirical findings in neuroscience. Empirically, consciousness can be related to the capacity of the brain’s spontaneous activity to construct its own “inner time and space”. I will present various empirical examples which also connect well with existential and phenomenological approaches to consciousness and especially “inner time consciousness”. Moreover, this aligns well with the concept of time in ancient Chinese philosophy as by Zhuangzhe.

The second talk will focus on the ontology of consciousness. The spatiotemporal model of consciousness presupposes an ontology that focuses on relation and structure as constructed in spatiotemporal terms. This leads to ontic Structural realism (OSR) of mental features which must be distinguished from the traditional property-based ontology with the assumption of mental and/or physical properties. OSR of mental features considers the relation between world and brain in spatiotemporal terms which makes it possible to establish necessary connection between world-bran relation and mental features. I therefore consider world-brain relation including its spatiotemporal features as necessary condition of possible consciousness, i.e., ontological predisposition of consciousness (OPC). I conclude that the question for mental features can ontologically be addressed in terms of world-brain relation rather than mind-body relation – the mind-body problem may consecutively be replaced by what I describe as “world-brain problem”.

第106回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Javier Perez-Jara (2017/6/2)

題目:
World, God, and Being in Heidegger’s Ontological Phenomenology

要旨:
Heidegger insisted from Being and Time to the end of his life in the correlativity of man and being, understood as the meaningful presence of things through time. In order to prove this point, I will pay attention to the development of Heidegger’s theological positions. Until 1928, Heidegger maintained that true philosophy has to be methodologically a-theistic, and that his own thinking denied the ontic existence of God. Nevertheless, after being unable to write the projected second part of Being and Time due to the insufficiencies of traditional metaphysical language, Heidegger started to use poetic and prophetic language around the concept of being. In Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger, influenced by Hölderlin, talked about a future and mysterious “last god” linked to a new understanding of being in general, hidden now in the epoch of planetary technology. In his Letter on Humanism, Heidegger rejected Sartre’s consideration of his own philosophy as atheistic, and in other texts Heidegger divided the world into earth, sky, mortals, and the god(s). Finally, in his Der Spiegel interview from 1966, but which was only allowed to be published posthumously, Heidegger famously held that only a god can save us.

Simultaneously, Heidegger presented his thinking as a Destruktion of onto-theo-logy, understood as the worldview that considers God as the Supreme Being that explains all the other beings. With the death of the ontotheological God, mankind’s technological prowess has generated the dangerous illusion of man as the new Lord of beings. Using the language of prophecy, Heidegger held that the only salvation from this situation was to wait for the future coming or absence of the last god. Moving away from some known scholars’ perspectives, my paper will investigate who this enigmatic god is, and why Heidegger decided to combine the language of philosophy, poetry, and prophecy in order to lead towards a deeper understanding of existence.

第105回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Filippo Casati & Prof. Ricki Bliss (2017/6/1)

Filippo Casati
題目:
Heidegger and the paradox of Being

要旨:
The vast majority of analytic philosophers have considered Heidegger both obscure and incomprehensible. The main reason is that, especially in the late part of his philosophical trajectory, he intentionally challenges the principle of non-contradiction, endorsing inconsistent positions. Of course, this was enough for the faint of heart – at least, hearts in thrall to Aristotle – to condemn him to the realm of the nonsensical. In my talk, I will show that one possible way to make sense of Heidegger is to interpret him as a dialetheist. I will also briefly show how my interpretation can help us to better understand Nishitani – one of the most important thinkers of the Kyoto School.

Ricki Bliss
題目:
Priest, One, and Svabhava: Bringing own-being back

要旨:
In his One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness Graham Priest argues for, amongst many other things, an account of the structure of reality according to which everything is empty.  The view that he develops is, in fact, consistent with that of the Chinese Buddhist Hua-Yen tradition, where, crucially, everything depends on everything else.  To understand why one would want to argue for the emptiness of all things, one first needs to understand what it is that these things are empty of.  Translated variously as `own-being’, `essence’, `intrinsic nature’, and `substance’, the Sanskrit term `svabhava’ is what picks out that thing that the Buddhist analysis is supposed to show us everything, it turns out, is lacking.

According to Priest’s view, everything is empty, it lacks `own-being’, and, thereby, has purely relational quiddity. Everything is empty, on Priest’s view, because everything has its nature in dependence upon something, in fact, everything, else.  Interestingly, though, it is also a feature of Priest’s view that everything is also self-dependent.  In this paper, I suggest that self-dependence looks dangerously close to smuggling back in the kind of `own-being’ that the Buddhist analysis, and Priest’s with it, is designed to avoid; and therewith, that Priest’s attempt at developing a Hua-Yen account of the structure of the world fails by its own lights.

第104回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Joe Morrison (2017/5/26)

題目:
Second Philosophy and logical contingentism

要旨:
Penelope Maddy argues that logical truths are only contingently true. Her premises include: (1) logical truths are truths about stable features of the world, (2) while humans may struggle to detect worldly features which don’t exhibit such structuring (and struggle to reason non-classically about the world), this is not because such structures necessarily obtain, but because (3) our cognitive abilities have developed in response to these (relatively abundant) structures in our environments.  However, (4) not all parts of the world exhibit the kinds of stable structures which would ground classical reasoning, but instead possess structures which might ground non-classical reasoning. (5) It’s possible that an organism could reliably detect and infer on the basis of those kinds of structures instead, in a way which might count as knowledge, and so (6) might evolve to exhibit and exploit non-classical reasoning. It follows that such organisms could come to know non-classical logical truths.

My line of response to Maddy’s argument concerns the issue of how she conceives of the link between inferential abilities (reasoning) and the domain of logical facts (worldly structures). I argue that the relationships between the types of inferential habits that organisms might in fact adopt and the kinds of structures that might exist in the world is weaker than Maddy requires for her argument for logical contingentism to work.

第103回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Carina Pape  (2017/5/19)

題目:
Attitudes

要旨:
Attitudes describe my position towards the world, including my knowledge and beliefs, my feelings, and my ideological point of view. I will combine Strawson’s reactive attitudes (indignation) with John Turri’s remarks on the need for “factive attitudes” and interpret this need as a feature of the natural attitude (Husserl). I will employ a thought experiment and describe the perspective of a person who experiences the attitude of indignation and compare it to the perspective of the person who is blamed.

Knowledge first epistemology is useful here, because in this case a false belief constitutes a moral knowledge. This can be explained with our need for factive attitudes. The need for factive attitudes is related to a need for objectivity, but no human endeavor is objective, but always biased. Bias includes presumptions and prejudice, but also intuition.

Through intuition it is related to the phenomenological idea of the “life world” (Lebenswelt). The need for factive attitudes is a feature of the natural attitude, the attitude towards the life world, which only becomes conscious when it is challenged.

I argue that we live within our moral attitudes just as we live within our natural attitude. We tend to transform our moral values into seemingly universal facts. Phenomenology questions objectivity and can lead to a bias-sensitive approach. Intersubjectivity is also helpful, because it reaches beyond subjective statements and complies with our need for factive attitudes.

The need for factive attitudes also shows up in the attitude of indignation, because to experience this attitude I have to be positive about it. Through intersubjective verification or falsification either the attitude’s norms can turn out to be wrong or the ‘facts’ it is built upon.

If two persons share the same normative context and the same definition of “norm violation” and act accordingly to that, only the opposed propositions upon which they build their attitudes can be the cause of (a flashback of) indignation. Such a flashback is an intersubjective falsification, which makes one of those reflections possible that can modify an indignant attitude according to Strawson.

態度は世界に対する私の立場を記述しており、私の知識、信念、感情、イデオロギー的な見方を含んでいる。私は、ストローソンの反応的態度(憤りなど)をジョン・トゥリ(John Turri)の「叙実的態度」(factive attitudes)の必要性への着目と結びつけ、この必要性を自然的態度(フッサール)の特徴として解釈するつもりである。そして私は、ある思考実験を行い、憤りの態度を経験している人のパースペクティヴを記述し、それを、非難されている人のパースペクティヴと比較してみたい。

ここでは、知識を第一のものとする認識論(knowledge first epistemology)が有用である。なぜなら上の事例においては、誤った信念が道徳的知識を構成しているからだ。このことは、私たちが叙実的態度を必要としているということと関連づけて説明されうる。叙実的態度が必要であることは、客観性が必要であることと関わっている。とはいえどんな人間の努力も決して客観的ではなく、常にバイアスがかけられている。バイアスは、推定や先入見のみならず、直観をも含んでいる。

直観をつうじて、バイアスは「生活世界」(Lebenswelt)という現象学的な考えと関連づけられる。叙実的態度の必要性は、自然的態度、すなわち生活世界に向かう態度の特徴である。ただしこの生活世界は、それに異議が申し立てられるときにのみ意識されるのである。

私が論じるのは、私たちが自分たちの自然的態度の中で生きているのと同じように、自分たちの道徳的態度の中で生きているということである。私たちは、自分たちの道徳的価値を、普遍的な事実のように見えるものにしようとする。現象学は客観性に疑義を唱え、そして、バイアスを考慮できるようなアプローチに至りうる。間主観性(Intersubjektivity)もまた有用である。なぜならそれは、主観的な言明を越えており、私たちが叙実的態度を必要していることと折り合うからだ。

叙実的態度の必要性は、憤りという態度においても露わになる。なぜなら、この態度を経験するためには、私はそれを確信していなければならないからだ。間主観的な検証あるいは反証をつうじて、態度の規範、あるいは態度が立脚している「事実」のどちらかが誤っていることが判明するかもしれない。

二人のひとが同じ規範的なコンテクストと、同じ「規範への違反」(norm violation)の定義を共有しており、それに従って行為しているとしよう。その場合には、二人が自分たちの態度を立脚させている命題が対立していることだけが、憤りの原因(憤りのフラッシュバック)でありうる。そのようなフラッシュバックは、間主観的な反証である。そしてこの間主観的な反証は、ストローソンによれば、憤りの態度を変更しうる諸々の可能的な反省のうちのひとつをなす。

第102回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Christian Coseru, Prof. Sheridan Hough (2017/5/17)

  • 講師:Prof. Christian Coseru (College of Charlton), Prof. Sheridan Hough (College of Charlton)
  • 日時:2017年5月17日(水)  15:00–18:00
  • 場所:京都大学 文学部校舎 1階 会議室
  • 地図:(京大MAP8番の校舎:http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/
  • 言語:英語

Christian Coseru, “Consciousness and Causation”
Abstract:
Does consciousness cause behavior? Can causal accounts of generation for material bodies explain how conscious awareness comes to have the structural features and phenomenal properties that it does? In this presentation, I first consider various arguments against reductive physicalism. I then review arguments about the structure of phenomenal consciousness that do not eschew causal-explanatory reasoning. Finally, I entertain the question whether the Buddhist principle of dependent arising, which underscores a dynamic conception of efficient causality, allows for elements defined primarily in terms of their capacity for sentience and agency to be causally efficacious.

Sheridan Hough, “Nietzsche on Consciousness: Epiphenomenalism, Genealogy and Archaeology”
Abstract:
Is Nietzsche an epiphenomenalist? No. But—why does he occasionally make remarks that tempt the reader to think of his theory of mind in this way? A number of commentators argue that Nietzsche does endorse epiphenomenalism. On the other hand, Nietzsche makes many complex and original remarks about consciousness, and for every passage that casts doubts on the causal efficacy of conscious states there are always a number of counterexamples ready to hand—for example: if conscious states don’t cause anything, then why does Nietzsche occasionally claim that consciousness is dangerous? It seems clear that one of Nietzsche’s complaints about consciousness has more to do with reifying ‘Consciousness’ as a substantive faculty, rather than treating it as a kind of mental state that we can and do have. But what is it about conscious states that Nietzsche finds ‘superfluous’, ‘false’, ‘corrupt’, ‘superficial’? Why is Nietzsche such a critic of consciousness? Nietzsche’s ‘theory of consciousness’ is clearly up to much more than the epiphenomenalist is willing to admit: but why does Nietzsche make these kinds of remarks? What concerns might he have in common with the epiphenomenal approach? I will argue that the conscious, scrupulous examination of our lives is a crucial element in improving them, but that careful examination must be as clear-eyed as possible about the impossibility of obtaining a clear and unbiased view of the human terrain. If what humans say about themselves, their culture, and their environment, can indeed diminish, reduce and distort human possibilities, then the epiphenomenalist’s dismissal of conscious states as a chimera is no remedy; however, the epistemologist’s cheerful confidence in our reflective powers will not save us, either. We must consciously reflect on ourselves with a cannier eye, one that is able, as Nietzsche puts it, to ‘see into the depths’: we must do ‘genealogy’ to discover how we have developed, and in order to make sense of that developmental process. Nietzsche also wants us to become good ‘archaeologists,’ able to reflectively dig into the millennia of habit and custom that shore up our ‘inherited’ ways of seeing the world.

第101回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Hsun-Mei Chen (2017/4/17)

題目:
Is Vimalakīrti’s Silence a Denial of Language Expression?

要旨:
This paper presents an English translation and a novel philosophical interpretation of the original Sanskrit text of the Entrance into Non-daulity (Advayadharmamukhapraveśaparivarta), a core fascicle in Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra. Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra, an influential Mahayana Buddhist sūtra in East Asian, is well known for its profound explanation of emptiness (śūnyatā) and non-duality (advaya), especially in chapter on the Entrance into Non-duality. In this chapter, thirty-one Bodhisattvas expound how one should enter the gate of non-duality by examining the deluded differentiations made by sentient beings, and then Mañjuśrī Bodhisattvas concludes that all the previous explanation are still in the realm of duality and the non-duality should transcend all language proliferation. Finally, Vimalakīrti, a lay Buddhist practitioner, demonstrates the ultimate understanding of non-duality by keeping silence in front all bodhisattvas in the end of this chapter. Traditionally, this important silence is understood as a denial of any language expression of the truth. However, in this paper, I will argue that Vimalakīrti’s silence is not a denial but rather a non-dual embrace of all language expression.

第100回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Damian Szmuc (2017/4/4)

題目:
Infectious Logics and Their Philosophy

要旨:
Infectious logics are a family of peculiar non-classical logics which count with a truth-value that acts infectiously. By this, it is understood that every compound sentence which receives this value, has a component that is assigned this very same value. Thus, these values behave according to the motto “one bad apple spoils the whole barrel”. But infectiousness not necessarily has to be a bad feature. In fact, in this talk I present a plethora of philosophical motivations for embracing infectious logics, going from Buddhist philosophy to computational errors, and from meaninglessness to analytic logical relations of various kinds.

第99回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Jochen Vollmann (2017/4/3)

題目:
Ethical issues at the end of life. European perspectives.
(終末期医療の倫理的問題:欧州のパースペクティブ)

*講演は英語で行なわれますが、質疑応答は必要に応じて通訳いたします。
多くの方のご参加を心よりお待ちしております。

第98回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Nancy S. Jecker (2017/3/20)

  • 講師:Nancy S. Jecker, Ph.D., Professor (University of Washington School of Medicine, Department of Bioethics and Humanities)
  • 日時:2017年3月20日(月) 16時〜18時
  • 場所:京都大学文学部校舎2F 第3演習室
  • 地図:(京大MAP8番の校舎:http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/
  • 言語:使用言語は英語になりますが、質疑応答は適宜通訳が入る予定です

題目:
Age-related Inequalities in Health and Healthcare: The Life Stages Approach
(健康と医療における年齢関連の不平等:ライフステージアプローチ)

要旨:
How should healthcare systems prepare to care for growing numbers and proportions of older people? Older people generally suffer worse health than younger people do. Should societies take steps to reduce age-related health inequalities? Some express concern that doing so would increase age-related inequalities in healthcare. This paper addresses this debate by (1) presenting a prima facie argument in support of three principles for distributing scarce resources between age groups; (2) framing these principles of age group justice in terms of life stages; and (3) indicating policy implications that merit further attention in light of rapidly aging societies.
Key Words: Justice, Age Group, Resource Allocation, Population Health, Equality.

なお、本CAPEレクチャーは、科学研究費(挑戦的萌芽研究)「医療と健康の分配的正義」(研究代表者:宇佐美誠・京都大学)との共催によって行われます。

第97回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Stephen Jenkins  (2017/3/17)

題目:
Once the Buddha was a Warrior: Compassionate Killing, Torture and Warfare in Indian Buddhist Scriptures and Commentaries

要旨:
Buddhist traditions offer a richly nuanced ethic for compassionate warfare and punishment that supported regimes of vast geographical and cultural diversity for millennia. The Euro-American concept of Buddhist pacifism undermines the ability of cultures to engage their own ethical resources in times of crisis and to understand their history. Mainstream, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and tantric traditions validate harsh use of force to rehabilitate criminals, overthrow tyrants, kill enemies of the Dharma, recover what is wrongly taken, or prevent greater harm etc. The theory of compassionate killing is rooted in hypothetical situations presented through narrative tales, which allows attention to the complex ambiguity of lived reality. A complex array of concerns is evident that resist the constraints of Western ethical categories. For instance, to kill one’s own mother leads straight to hell, but killing someone else’s mother does not. Historiography and narrative offer many examples of kings waging war for Buddhist motivations or committing mass violence against religious “outsiders.” Buddha’s past lives include snipers, war ministers, martial artists, soldiers, warhorses, war elephants, kings etc., who often heroically die in battle. The touchstone commentarial example of Buddha killing in a past life, deployed in many cultures and times, parallels modern terrorist situations. There is also concern for avoiding armed conflict [including maintaining an intimidating and well paid military], humane treatment of prisoners, limits to punishment and torture, minimizing enemy casualties, spiritual harm to warriors, economic exploitation, ending multigenerational cycles of violence, damage to infrastructure and natural environment, and postwar reconciliation. Warfare should only be pursued when all alternatives have failed; compassion is a state’s first defense [and literally makes an individual arrow-proof]; kings must question their own culpability for exploitation that creates enemies; physical punishment, even torture and killing, must benefit the recipient; the destruction of infrastructure and the natural environment is forbidden. Superficially selfish policies of economic exploitation and conquest undermine national security. A nation will thrive or fail based on its capacity for compassion, rather than on the ethics of self or national interest. A broad range of past research will be summarized and issues from Aśokan edicts to tantric sādhanas for killing may be addressed.

なお、本CAPEレクチャーは、グローバル展開プログラム(グローバル人文学:日本文学・芸術・思想の普遍性の探求;道元の思想圏:分析アジア哲学的アプローチ(研究代表者:出口康夫・京都大学))との共催によって行われます。

第96回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Andreas Kapsner (2017/2/24)

題目:
The End of Means Paternalism

要旨:
In this piece, I will analyze the idea of means paternalism, which is the idea that a government can act paternalistically without altering the goals or ends of citizens. Rather, it can recognize the ends of the citizens and affect their behavior in such a way that they choose better means to reach those ends. The government, that is, brings you to do what you truly want to do, not what it itself thinks is best for you. Several modern defenses of governmental paternalism rest on the assumption that means paternalism can be justified. In fact, they argue that means paternalism is the only form of paternalism that is justifiable and restrict their endorsement of paternalism accordingly. For this to amount to a relevant defense of paternalism, of course, one needs to assume that means paternalism is possible in the first place. The literature acknowledges that it is in fact very hard to achieve pure means paternalism, but there is a certain optimism that through progress in technology and technique we will get closer and closer to pure means paternalism and may eventually be able to reach it. In this essay, I show that in fact this hope is in vain, and that pure means paternalism is virtually impossible. I then analyze what consequences that finding has for the new defenses of paternalism.

第95回CAPEレクチャー 桂 紹隆 教授 (2017/1/18)

    • 講師:桂 紹隆(龍谷大学名誉教授)
    • 日時:2017年1月18日(水)16:30-18:00
    • 場所:京都大学総合研究2号館地下1階教育学部第7演習室
    • 地図:(京大MAP34番の校舎:http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/
    • 言語:英語

題目:
Two Meanings of Negation in Indian Philosophy

要旨:
Indian grammarians developed two meanings of negative particle naÑ (=na or a-); namely, when it is attached to a noun phrase, it is called paryudāsa ‘limitation’ negation and when it is attached to a verb, it is called prasajya-pratiṣedha ‘negation (subsequent to tentatively) applying’. Indian philosophers interpreted them as ‘implicative negation’ and ‘non-implicative negation’ respectively; in other words, the former negation (of an item A) implies affirmation (of non-A), while the latter negation (of a proposition A) does not imply affirmation (of any other proposition). I shall discuss some basic meanings and uses of those two kinds of negation as well as Indian Buddhist concept of ‘contradiction’ (virodha). I would also like to discuss whether Indian philosophers were aware of Law of Non-contradiction/Excluded Middle and Law of Double Negation. My conclusion is: when paryudāsa negation is used, those two laws should be applied but when prasajya-pratiṣedha is used, they cannot be applied.

第94回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Catherine Mills (2016/11/17)

題目:
Moral responsibility in pregnancy: reactive attitudes and embodiment

要旨:
Despite its importance within discussions of the concept of responsibility in moral philosophy, Strawson’s account of reactive attitudes has had little influence in reproductive ethics and specifically in attempts to articulate the kinds of responsibilities that might be entailed in pregnancy. Given its emphasis on the interpersonal and emotional aspects of responsibility, though, it would at first blush seem a potentially useful theoretical approach for throwing light on responsibility in the course of pregnancy. This is also suggested by recent references to the concept of reactive attitudes in discussions of antenatal phenomena such as miscarriage (eg. Miller) and abortion (eg. Little). In this paper, I consider whether the framework of reactive attitudes is useful more generally for considering responsibility in pregnancy and reproduction. With reference to theories of pregnant embodiment, I argue that while its emphasis on interpersonal or social dimensions of responsibility is valuable, there are nevertheless significant problems for this approach in reproductive ethics.

第93回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Zach Weber (2016/11/14)

題目:
Paraconsistent set theory and inconsistent mathematics

要旨:
Paraconsistent set theory takes as axiomatic the `naive’ comprehension principle that every collection forms a set. The infamous paradoxes are then just theorems. The background logic that makes this coherently possible is substantially weaker than classical logic; but the expressive power of the theory is substantially stronger than classical set theory.
With these competing forces in the background, we will look at two interrelated goals:

Recapture — reassurance that nothing too important mathematically is lost
Expansion — where new insights and results are gained, studying novel mathematical objects not visible with any other theory

I will survey the development of paraconsistent set theory, showing how the basic properties of ordinal and cardinal numbers can be established, along with new perspectives on `proper classes’, the axiom of choice, and the continuum hypothesis. With this foundation, I will mention some further work in inconsistent mathematics: from computability theory, arithmetic,
analysis, and topology. Throughout I will call attention to the challenges that this research program faces.

第92回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Chin-Mu Yang(楊金穆) (2016/11/11)

題目:
Semantic Considerations on Contingentist Quantified Modal Logic

要旨:
Timothy Williamson has defended necessitism, the thesis that necessarily
everything is necessarily something: ‘(NE) - □∀x□∃y x = y’. By contrast,
contingentism, a negation of necessitism, accepts the contingency of being
- there are things which exist contingently. Williamson rightly remarks
that ‘common sense has no authority to decide between necessitism and
contingentism; it is a more theoretical dispute’. And so, he claims that
necessitism can be justified in a framework for quantificational, or
higher-order, modal logic, which originated from the proof theoretic work
of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Typically, the well-known Barcan Formula (BF) -
∀x□φ(x)→□∀x φ(x), and its converse (CBF) - □∀xφ(x) →∀x□φ(x), have been
taken as the characteristic formulas for the necessitist quantified modal
logic. In contrast, the contingentist’s quantified modal logics by and
large repudiate BF and CBF.

I will examine some intrinsic semantic problems with the contingentist’s
treatments in the framework of possible worlds semantics. Special attention
will be paid to the difficulties with variable domains. I show that
sticking to the legitimacy of the Being Constraints, the use of names as
rigid designators in modal contexts will render truth value gaps in
variable domains and by the same reasoning we may not have appropriate
assignments of free variables in de re modal contexts. However, I show that
this can be solved if we opt for a mid-way, i.e. equinumerous domains. We
will not appeal to constant domains, nor will we accept variable domains,
but simply assume that all domains have the same cardinality, though not
the same set of objects. A semantic treatment will be proposed so that both
BF and CBF can be validated, but the thesis of necessitism will no longer
hold.

A genuine threat will be noted, that is, the intended interpretation of de
re sentences may not express the imposed de re modality. Two options to
deal with this problem will be suggested. (i) The appeal to the rigidity of
names based on a substitutional interpretation of quantifiers in
alphabetical-expansion models However, when modal contexts are involved, we
may be forced to rephrase universal sentences in terms of a conjunction
with an infinite number of conjuncts and to re-interpret a formula with an
existence quantifier in terms of an infinitary conjunction. We then need an
infinitary language and take as the required underlying system a certain
version of infinitary logic. Alternatively, we may suspense with names and
put forth some special semantic treatment to express the rigidity of
variables. We would have a much more complicated, or even ad hoc,
semantics, and the price could be too high to pay.

Clearly, for the contingentist, the moral is: there is no loyal road to the
theorization of metaphysical modality in terms of quantified modal logic.
Perhaps, Williamson is right when he points out that the contingentist
‘must take a more instrumental attitude to the model theory’. (2014: 714).
Then why not accept the necessitist’s quantaified modal logic?

第91回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Robert Sparrow (2016/11/7)

題目:
Robots, rape, and representation

要旨:
Sex robots are likely to play an important role in shaping public understandings of sex and of relations between the sexes in the future. This paper contributes to the larger project of understanding how they will do so by examining the ethics of the “rape” of robots. I argue that the design of realistic female robots that could explicitly refuse consent to sex in order to facilitate rape fantasy would be unethical because sex with robots in these circumstances is a representation of the rape of a woman, which may increase the rate of rape, expresses disrespect for women, and demonstrates a significant character defect. Even when the intention is not to facilitate rape, the design of robots that can explicitly refuse consent is problematic due to the likelihood that some users will experiment with raping them. Designing robots that lack the capacity to explicitly refuse consent may be morally problematic depending on which of two accounts of the representational content of sex with realistic humanoid robots is correct. If sex with a robot that fails to explicitly consent is a representation of rape then the design of such robots will most likely be morally wrong for the same reasons. If, on the other hand, sex with such robots is never a representation of rape – and especially if that’s because they have been designed so as always to consent to sex — then the design of sex robots may well be unethical for what it expresses about the sexuality of women.

About the lecturer:
Prof. Rob Sparrow is a Professor in the Philosophy Program, a Chief Investigator in the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science, and an adjunct Professor in the Centre for Human Bioethics, at Monash University, where he works on ethical issues raised by new technologies. He is the author of some 70 refereed papers and book
chapters on topics as diverse as the ethics of military robotics, human enhancement, artificial gametes, cloning, and nanotechnology. A list of his publications and research interests may be found at: http://profiles.arts.monash.edu.au/rob-sparrow/

第90回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Yuri Cath (2016/10/27)

題目:
Knowing What It Is Like, Choice, and Consent

要旨:
Can I know what it is like to deliver a stand-up comedy routine, give birth to a child, or go to war, without having had those experiences myself? Is it possible to gain this ‘what it is like’ (WIL)-knowledge by reading stories or talking with the experienced? Philosophers often hold a pessimistic attitude towards this possibility on the grounds that one can only know what it is like to have an experience if one has had an experience of that same type oneself (Lewis 1998, Paul 2014). And endorsements of this pessimistic attitude can also be found in novels, films, and pop music. But, I shall argue, a puzzle now arises because there are also countless examples of everyday practices and judgments that testify to our holding an optimistic attitude towards this same possibility. In this paper I discuss how this puzzle can be illuminated and potentially dissolved by appealing to recent work in epistemology on knowledge-wh and in the philosophy of mind on empathy. I also show how my solution to this puzzle can help us to evaluate recent arguments by Paul (2014, 2015) concerning WIL-knowledge and transformative choices, and discussions in applied ethics concerning WIL-knowledge and informed consent (Bayne and Levy 2005, Dodds and Jones 1989, Oakley 1992).

 

第89回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Catherine Mills (2016/10/21)

題目:
Seeing, feeling, doing: Mandatory ultrasound laws, empathy and the politics of abortion

要旨:
In recent years, a number of states in the USA have adopted laws that require pregnant women to have an ultrasound examination, and be shown images of their fetus, prior to undergoing a pregnancy termination. While there is a growing critical literature on such laws, there has been little attempt in bioethics or philosophy to unpack one of the basic presumptions of them: that seeing one’s fetus changes the ways in which one might act in regards to it, including in terms of the (ethical) decision about whether to allow it to live or not. However, this presumption raises significant questions about the relation between visibility, emotion and ethics that bioethicists would do well to analyze.

I address these questions to yield insight into the role of emotion in ethics, which seems to underlie mandatory ultrasound laws. First, I consider the theory of maternal bonding and its use in these attempts to limit access to abortion. Second, I elaborate notions of maternal bonding in terms of recent philosophy of empathy, with particular reference to comments by moral sentimentalist, Michael Slote, on the relevance of empathy to the ethics of abortion. I argue that while it may not be technically possible to empathize with a fetus, ultrasound laws nevertheless seek to elicit this empathic relation, while simultaneously suppressing empathy with pregnant women. The approach I develop ultimately gives rise to a new account of the politics of emotion in relation to abortion – not in terms of grief and shame, but in those of a critical analysis of the (variable) mobilization of empathy and care.

第88回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Franz Berto (2016/10/12)

題目:
Dialetheism and the Exclusion-Expressing Device

要旨:
Dialetheism is the view that, against the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), some A’s are true together with their negation, not-A. Hence a famous anti-dialetheic objection, which I will cal the “Exclusion Problem”: dialetheists cannot rule out anything, or express disagreement, for their dialetheic negation of A is compatible with A. In this talk I propose a strategy to address the problem, which starts by assuming a primitive notion of exclusion and defines via it a notion of contradiction, rhetorically called *absolute*, such that no contradiction of this kind is acceptable for a dialetheist. Via such a notion we can express in a non-question-begging way what the opposition between dialetheists and non-dialetheists consists in, and we can give to the dialetheist a non-pragmatic exclusion-expressing device. The big issue is whether such a device is free from dialetheically intractable revenge paradoxes. I have no answer to this, but I’m curious to hear what my audience thinks!

第87回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Chun-Ping Yen (2016/10/11)

題目:
How to Be a Semantic Holist?

要旨:
The view that meaning is holistic is highly controversial and is usually not treated as an independent thesis but rather appears as a vital drawback of a theory of meaning in the literature for its not being able to deliver a notion of shared meaning. Such attitude is so prevalent that oftentimes people simply take semantic holism as a reason for the rejection of a theory without further argument. As is often the case, however, there is no agreement among those engaged in the debate what semantic holism is. With the varied definitions of the doctrine, commentators disagree on not only its truth but also its content and intelligibility.
In this paper, I suggest understanding semantic holism as characterizing the determination relation between the meaning of an expression and its determinants and argue that we can best capture the features maintained by the holist by construing semantic holism as the view that the meaning of an expression E is determined by E’s relations to every other expression in the language of individual competent users. It follows from my definition that, firstly, the often alleged worry that if meaning is holistic, any change in one’s language will change the meanings of all the expressions in the very language does not follow. Secondly, it is an inevitable outcome that there is no guaranteed meaning sharing available for semantic holism so understood. This latter fact, however, does not commit us to the rejection of semantic holism. For holistic meanings, like their non-holistic counterparts, are sharable either across individuals or time slices, or so I shall argue.

第86回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Sara M Langston (2016/10/7)

題目:
Reimagining Icarus: Defining the Ethical and Legal Parameters for Human Space Exploration

要旨:
Space exploration and human spaceflight inherently raise numerous practical, ethical and legal issues for consideration, to include medical, scientific and technological implications. In some instances, ethics and law may overlap, this is particularly evident in the area of bioethics. Whereas, in other areas such as risk, ethics and law can be more visibly distinct. This talk will highlight some of the significant and pressing issues facing the space industry today with regard to developing practical ethical and legal frameworks for human space exploration. Topical parameters here can be broadly categorized as: 1) Medical – this includes bioethics, medical uncertainty, spaceflight selection and medical monitoring, and informed consent; 2) Environmental – human implications and planetary protection, and space as the ‘province of all mankind’; 3) Risk Management – appropriately evaluating the risks inherent to human spaceflight is one of the more demanding yet currently underdeveloped areas of moral decision-making frameworks, this includes comprehending the relevant risk culture and geopolitical climate; and 4) Societal conceptions and perceptions on what it means to be an ‘astronaut,’ and the accompanying rights and duties of spacefarers. These overarching topics present a big picture perspective on some of the pertinent interconnected physical, legal and ethical parameters for individuals engaged in human space activities. Yet the global nature of space exploration activities also calls for a wider discussion on appropriate ethical approaches to developing practice and norms, particularly on the questions of risk, uncertainty and understanding in what ways human spaceflight and exploration impact and inform our societal and moral frameworks on Earth.

第85回CAPEレクチャー 牧野英二教授 (2016/10/5)

題目:
ディルタイの「生の哲学」と「歴史的理性批判」の射程 ーカント、ハイデガー、アーレントを手掛かりにしてー

要旨:
敗戦直後の昭和21年(1946年)に生前の西田幾多郎博士等による推薦文付きで、『ディルタイ著作集』(創元社、全15巻+別巻1)が西田門下の多くが編集校閲・翻訳者として加わり刊行を開始した。だが、第四巻一冊を刊行しただけで、この企画は頓挫した。西田幾多郎、和辻哲郎、三木清等、当代の第一級の哲学者によって高く評価されたディルタイ哲学の意義は、その後の流行思想の陰に隠され、長い間忘却されてきた(ちなみに和辻哲郎は、ハイデガーよりもディルタイの解釈学を高く評価した)。ところが、ディルタイの主著『精神科学序説』第一巻(1883年)の遺稿(第二巻)が100年後の1983年に刊行され、それをきっかけにグローバルな規模で「ディルタイ・ルネサンス」が着実に進行してきた。
報告者は、新たな構想の下で刊行を開始した日本語版『ディルタイ全集』(法政大学出版局、全11巻+別巻1)の編集代表として企画・編集校閲・訳者を務めてきた経験に基づいて、ディルタイの生の概念と生の哲学、解釈学の意義とともに、彼の歴史的理性批判のプロジェクトの歴史的・今日的意義を論じる。
特に近年、「生」をめぐる哲学的・倫理学的議論の必要性と深まりだけでなく、生政治学や精神病理学、生命科学や医学など諸学問の広範な展開のなかで、「善き生」と「剥き出しの生」の区別(アーレント、アガンベン等)に関する問題や「人工生命」の課題等に直面する今日、これまで多くの誤解に晒されてきたディルタイ哲学の正確な理解を深めることは、意義のある思想的営為であると思われる。今回の主要な報告内容は、以下の通りである。
①ディルタイ(Wilhelm Dilthey,1833-1911)の「生」(Leben)とは、どのような概念であったか。
②ディルタイの「生の哲学」(Lebensphilosophie)とは、どのような哲学であったか。
③「歴史的理性批判」(Kritik der historischen Vernunft)とは、どのような批判の試みであったか。
④ディルタイの歴史的理性批判によって提起された哲学の課題はなにか。
⑤現代哲学の立場から見て、ディルタイの「生」とその哲学的解釈学の意義はどこにあるか。
上記の主要課題について、まずディルタイ自身の論述に即して、彼の哲学思想の内容理解に努める。次に論文の形式によって、新カント派、ハイデガー、アーレント、ハーバマース等によるディルタイ批判と評価を手掛かりにして、ディルタイの生の概念、歴史的生の解釈学、歴史的理性批判の試みの哲学史的及び今日的意義を論じる予定である。

第84回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Liu Chi Yen (2016/9/21)

題目:
How to escape triviality results?

要旨:
“Adams’ thesis” is often interpreted as the claim that the subjective probability of an indicative conditional A→B equals the corresponding conditional probability P(B|A). Many scholars show that this interpretation will be attacked by triviality results, so they reject Adams’ thesis. I will show what triviality results are and what they have in common. Then I try to give another interpretation of Adams’s thesis to escape triviality results. First, I propose a 3-valued semantics for indicative conditionals and claim that the probability of A→B is equal to probability of A∧B. Second, from the way we bet on indicative conditionals, I distinguish the probability of an indicative conditional from the assertability of an indicative conditional, and interpreted Adams’ thesis as:
The assertability of a simple indicative conditional p→q equals the corresponding conditional probability P(q|p), provided P (p) > 0.
Finally, I will argue that this interpretation can escape all triviality results on the market.

第83回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Yumiko Inukai (2016/7/29)

題目:
Self-reflection in Hume and Locke

要旨:
Locke maintains that the self is a thinking thing who is always aware of itself as a subject of thinking or perceiving; thus he says, “it being impossible for anyone to perceive, without perceiving, that he does
perceive” (Locke 1975: 138). He grants reflexive consciousness as an integral aspect of the self as a subject. Hume, on the other hand, does not seem to be able to allow the self to have such self-reflexivity that Locke does, given his official view of the self merely as a bundle of perceptions, nothing more, nothing less. This difference is clearly reflected in their accounts of personal identity. However, Hume still argues that personal identity arises from consciousness that Hume considers as “a reflected thought” (T App. 20). What sort of reflection does Hume have in mind? How could Hume explain the mind’s act of reflection without introducing a mind as a distinct actor? Is Hume’s “reflected thought” different from Locke’s self-reflexivity in their explanations of personal identity? I will attempt to answer these questions by first considering Locke’s self-consciousness that appears in his account of personal identity, and then discussing Hume’s possible explanation of reflection.

第82回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Paolo Bonardi (2016/7/25)

題目:The Semantic Content of Empty Names and the Logic of Nonexistent Objects

要旨: Millianism is the doctrine according to which the semantic content of a proper name is exhausted by its referent. My talk will be about the so-called empty (proper) names, more specifically: names that belong to fiction/pretense (e.g. “Sherlock Holmes”); and names that are empty because of an error (e.g. “Vulcan”). It will be my goal to outline a Millian account of empty names according to which: names from fiction and error refer to actual and necessarily nonexistent objects; these objects cannot
have ordinary properties (e.g. being a detective), whereas they can have – and in fact have some – non-ordinary properties (e.g. being something such that fictionally, it is a detective). I will argue that the logic of such objects is not positive free logic but a version of classical logic.

第81回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Michael Campbell (2016/7/15)

    • 講師:Dr. Michael Campbell(Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy / Centre for Bioethics, Chinese University of Hong Kong)
    • 日時:2016年7月15日(金) 18:00~19:30
    • 場所:京都大学文学部校舎 地下 大会議室
    • 地図:http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/ (構内MAP8番の建物)
    • 言語:英語

題目:All Life’s a Maze: Bioethical Issues in Daniel Keyes’ Flowers for Algernon

要旨: In this paper I discuss Daniel Keyes’ work Flowers for Algernon, paying particular attention to the bioethical issues raised by the novel in its depiction of the lives of its twin protagonists, Charlie and Algernon, and their treatment at the hands of the medical establishment. Flowers for Algernon depicts a developmentally challenged individual, Charlie, who is given an experimental therapy which dramatically improves his intelligence but with unforeseen side-effects. A central narrative arc is Charlie’s changing relationships with the clinicians who administer the treatment; he gains, and then gradually loses, a sense of fellowship with them, finally concluding that he has more in common with the hyper-intelligent mouse subject, Algernon, than with the researchers. Keyes’ work can be read as an extended criticism of the supposition that human life can be understood through the methods of the ‘life sciences’. Alternatively, from a Marxist perspective, Charlie’s progress can be seen as an instance of the dawning of class-consciousness, and hence as a critique of the bourgeois aspects of the medical sciences.

I elaborate and reconcile these two readings, showing how the deficiencies in the researchers’ understanding of Charlie stem from a source which is at once political and conceptual. I suggest that the urge to treat Charlie and Algernon as objects fit for systematic study represents a value-laden privileging of one kind of understanding over others. As such, the work as a whole dramatises and applies the Platonic belief in the fundamental interdependence of moral, political and epistemological issues.

As well as helping to illuminate issues of perennial concern in research ethics, the paper will address, inter alia, broader methodological issues to do with the relationship between literature and philosophical ethics.

第80回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Kyle Michael James Shuttleworth (2016/7/1)

題目:Authenticity: An Intercultural Ethic?

要旨: In the English translation of Watsuji Tetsuro’s 倫理学, the concept of ‘本来性’ is translated as ‘authenticity’. In Western philosophical thought, however, authenticity is intricately bound to the historical context from which it emerged. One thus ought to question whether authenticity can be abstracted from its historical context, and imported into a foreign culture. In light of this, the primary aim of this investigation will be to explicate precisely that which Watsuji’s concept of ‘authenticity’ entails. This will then enable one to determine whether that which Watsuji advocates is akin to the concept of authenticity as espoused in the West. That which is stake is not merely a linguistic quibble, but rather the search for an intercultural, conceptual ground upon which to conduct ethical
discourse between East and West. The thesis which will be posited in this enquiry then, is whether the ethic of authenticity can provide a conceptual bridge between Eastern and Western philosophical traditions.

第79回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Malcolm Keating (2016/6/10)

    • 講師:Malcolm Keating
(Assistant Professor of Humanities (Philosophy)
      Yale-NUS College, Singapore)
    • 日時:2016年6月10日(金) 18:00〜19:30
    • 場所:京都大学文学部校舎 1F会議室
    • 地図:http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/ (構内MAP8番の建物)
    • 言語:英語

題目:Is Ellipsis Completion Knowledge?  Linguistic Interpretation in Classical Indian Philosophy

要旨:Natural languages vary in how much information they encode into lexemes. Yet speakers can utter subsentential units which are syntactically or otherwise incomplete and still communi- cate successfully. Linguists and philosophers, in analyzing this widespread interpretive prac- tice of completing ellipsis, differ over whether such utterances constitute genuine speech acts, are disguised but complete syntactic/semantic units, as well as how the ellipsis is completed– syntactically, semantically, or pragmatically. The answers to these questions are significant since, for instance, they may challenge the thesis that languages are compositional, that is, with expressions being semantically determined by their syntax and lexical semantics.
Classical Indian philosophers, although committed to the compositionality thesis, gave vary- ing accounts of how interpretive practices allowed for ellipsis completion. The philosophers known as the Bhatta Mimamsa argued that an interpretive process, which they called arthapatti or “postulation,” could yield certain knowledge of what is elided. For instance, since the San- skrit language is highly inflected, someone who hears a speaker say “the door, the door!” can rely on syntactically-encoded information to help them recover a complete sentence, “Close the door, close the door!” In the 16th century, Narayana Bhatta discusses this process in the Manameyodaya, arguing that postulation requires the positing of words in order for there to be anvaya or “connection” within the expression. This argument is posed in response to opponents who argue that only the word meanings, and not the words themselves, must be posited.
I then draw connections between Narayanabhatta and contemporary Anglophone literature on the topic. In particular, I argue that the position of Narayana’s opponent (who is identified as belonging to another school of Mimamsa, the Prabhakara) is roughly analogous to that of pragmatic contextualists. In contrast, the Bhatta view could fruitfully be reconstructed as an abductive completion of lexical underspecification, along the lines of James Pustejovsky’s pro- posal. However, due to the ambiguity in the notion of connection, these reconstructions must be tentative, as Indian proposals maybe consistent with multiple formal analyses. The cru- cial implication to draw from their dialectic is the claim that ellipsis completion rises to the level of knowledge, and that it does so through a rational process grounded in the principle of compositionality.

 

第78回CAPEレクチャー 奥野満里子先生(2016/6/23)

    • 講師:Prof. Mariko Nakano-Okuno(The University of Alabama at Birmingham)
    • 日時:2016年6月23日(木) 16:30-18:00
    • 場所:京都大学文学部校舎 地下 大会議室
    • 地図:http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/ (構内MAP8番の建物)
    • 言語:日本語

題目:ピーター・シンガーの転向について——ヘア指令説から道徳的真理の実在説へ

要旨:ピーター・シンガーの実践倫理の提言は、今なお応用倫理学の圏内で強い影響力をもち、各地の活動家に多大なる刺激を与え続けている。その一方で、シンガーが、自らの基本的立場とする功利主義の理解とその思想的基盤をなす道徳哲学において、ここ数年で根本的な転向を果たしたことは殆ど話題にされず、それが何を意味するかもあまり知られていない。簡単にいえば、彼は、R・M・ヘアの非認知主義・普遍的指令主義の立場を完全に離れ、シンガーによればヘンリー・シジウィックの立場であるところの直観主義・認知主義・客観的道徳的真理の実在説をとるに至ったのである。興味深いことにシンガーの実践的主張にはほぼ何の変更点もないのであるが、道徳哲学を嗜む者としては、彼の思想変化は劇的な転換と見るべきである。

このセミナー(談話会)では、この路線変更の意味するところについて考察する。私がなぜ未だにヘア流の非認知主義・指令説・選好功利主義を支持するかを述べ、シジウィック倫理学から現代に汲み取るべきものは、彼の精緻な分析でこそあれ、客観的真理の実在論である必要は全くないこと、シジウィックの倫理学説を非認知主義指令説の立場から解釈し直すことは十分に可能であることを論じる。しかし私の主張が「客観的にみて」間違っている可能性もあるだろうから、 同好の士と忌憚のない意見を交わすことを心より期待している。

この問題に特にご興味のある方は、事前に以下の文献(いずれも論点は今回の話とは違いますが)をお読みいただければ幸いです。

Mariko Nakano-Okuno, “Universalizability, Impartiality, and the Expanding Circle,” Etica & Politica, vol. 18, no. 1, 2016, pp.151-167. http://www2.units.it/etica/

Peter Singer and Katarzyna De Lazari-Radek, “Doing our Best for Hedonistic Utilitarianism: Reply to Critics,”  Etica & Politica, vol. 18, no. 1, 2016, pp.187-207.

Mariko Nakano-Okuno, Minerva Podcast: Henry Sidgwick, 2015.

http://www.minerva-podcast.com/post/131942883593/sidgw

上記文献にはいずれも以下リンクよりアクセスできます。

http://ua-birmingham.academia.edu/MarikoNakanoOkuno

第77回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Neil Sinhababu (2016/5/10)

Title: Nietzschean’s Humean, all-too-Humean reductionism about agency

Abstract:
I present an interpretation of Nietzsche as a Humean reductionist about agency. On this Humean view, our agency is constituted by the operations of our desires. Humean reductionism conflicts with Kantian views of agency, and threatens arguments for moral theories presented by Christine Korsgaard and other contemporary Kantians. In passages like section 109 of Daybreak, Nietzsche helps Humeans respond to Kantian explanations of the phenomenology of struggling with one’s own desires.While Nietzsche seems never to have known of Hume’s practical philosophy, his opposition to Kant brought him to share many views that Hume presented over a century before.

第76回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Jonathan Ives, Dr. Giles Birchley (2016/4/20)

(1)Title: Interdisciplinary and Empirical Bioethics: An overview (学際的で実証的な生命倫理学:概説)
Dr. Jonathan Ives
(Senior Lecturer in Biomedical Ethics and Law at the University of Bristol)

The premise that underpins interdisciplinary and empirical bioethics is simple: a bioethics that is dominated by theoretical philosophical approaches is ill-suited to the job of engaging with, and prescribing about, complex ethical dilemmas. Instead, these dilemmas require solutions that can be applied and defended in practice, rather than in the pages of an academic journal. A theoretical approach to bioethics provides a perspective that focusses on argument and theoretical consistency – but an approach to ethics that focuses wholly on argument and consistency risks ignoring the human element and sanitising what is, essentially, a very messy, social and human phenomenon. Good applied ethics must, accordingly, be attendant to the realities of moral life as it is practised, not (merely) as it is theorised about, because good applied ethics must have real world purchase; that is, it must be resonant with moral actors in the world, not just those in the academy. The difficulty inherent in this, however, lies in developing and articulating methodologies that can explain and accommodate various philosophical and epistemological challenges which make problematic the integration of empirical and normative research (mostly centring on the logic of normative inference, the nature and scope of moral judgement, and the nature of moral justification). This paper outlines the driving rationale of empirical bioethics before critically describing various methodological approaches.

(2) Title:Best interests in life and death on the children’s intensive care unit: an empirical ethics study
(小児集中治療室における生死と最善の利益:実証倫理的研究)
Dr. Giles Birchley
(Senior Research Associate in Healthcare Ethics at the University of Bristol)

Current law and professional guidelines say that we must make medical decisions about children in their best interests. While children may inform an understanding of these interests in some instances, where they are too young or unwell to contribute, these interests must be agreed by doctors and parents alone. Should doctors and parents be unable to agree on the child’s best interests, then English law says the law courts should be approached for a definitive judgment of the child’s best interests. Yet, while legal records indicate the excoriating nature of such decisions upon all parents, doctors, and above all, children themselves, little is known about the processes by which agreements are produced and disagreements defined, nor the principles that inform them. This talk presents my empirical ethics research, which investigates the experiences and opinions of parents, doctors, nurses and members of clinical ethics committees about the way life and death decisions are made for infants in intensive care. I argue that, within this context, the principles and the processes that are currently employed misconceive the child’s best interests, and insufficiently protect the child from unreasonable detriments to their interests in pursuit of parent-doctor consensus.

講師紹介
Jonathan Ives is a Senior Lecturer in Biomedical Ethics and Law at the University of Bristol. He has published widely on the theory and practice of interdisciplinary and empirical ethics, and he is lead editor of the book ‘Empirical Bioethics: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives’, currently in press with Cambridge University Press. Jon is section editor (methodology) for BMC Medical ethics and associate editor (methodology) for Health Care Analysis. He is a co-opted member of the Uk’s Royal College of General Practitioners Medical Ethics Committee, is an honorary research fellow at the University of Birmingham, and has held visiting positions at the University of Oxford. Jon teaches a variety of subjects related to Bioethics and research methods in the UK and around the world, including Saudi Arabia, South Korea and India.

Giles Birchley is a Senior Research Associate in Healthcare Ethics at the University of Bristol. A registered nurse, Giles gained a prestigious Wellcome Trust fellowship for health professionals in 2011. His PhD, awarded in 2015, examined the way (non)treatment decisions about very young children’s best interests are/should be made in paediatric intensive care. He has published on issues pertaining to this topic, as well as wider investigations into decision-making for patients who are unable to make decisions for themselves. He retains close links with practice and regularly contributes to practitioner teaching, as well as taking part in clinical ethics consultation.

第75回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Jochen Vollmann(2016/3/22)

    • 講師: Prof. Jochen Vollmann(Ruhr-University Bochum)
    • 日時:2016年3月22日(火) 16:30~18:30
    • 場所:京都大学 文学部校舎2階第6講義室
    • 言語:英語

Title: The current debate on physician assisted suicide in Germany.
Ethical, legal and political issues
(ドイツにおける医師による幇助自殺に関する今日の論争:倫理的、法的、政治的諸課題)

*講演は英語で行なわれますが、質疑応答は必要に応じて通訳いたします。
多くの方のご参加を心よりお待ちしております。

第74回CAPEレクチャー Dr.Laurence AZOUX BACRIE(2016/2/13)

    • 講師: Laurence AZOUX BACRIE(パリ控訴院弁護士、生命倫理学博士、メディエーター)
    • 日時:2016年2月13日(土) 14:00~17:00
    • 場所:京都大学 文学部校舎第1講義室
      地図:http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/ (構内MAP8番の建物)
    • 言語:フランス語、通訳あり

Title: CONSENTEMENT ET DIGNITE~DEUX MOTS CLEFS DE LA MEDIATION DANS LE DOMAINE DE LA SANTE~
同意と尊厳~保健分野におけるメディエーションの2つのキーワード~
概要:メディエーションは、人間の尊厳の尊重と社会平和の実現に必須であり、患者の希望と医療の現実の間で調整を図る役割を果たす。他方、医療分野で起こる紛争の大半は、情報と同意の欠如に起因する。それゆえメディエーションが不可欠なのである。メディエーションにおいて、尊厳と同意はいかなる関係にあるのか。一方で、尊厳は、人間に固有なものであり、倫理的、法的、医学的な側面から見れば、基本権の中身を構成する。他方で、同意は、あらゆる医療行為に先立ち必要とされる。尊厳と同意の双方が関わるケースとして、終末期における安楽死の問題が挙げられる。また、ヨーロッパ人権裁判所が、受刑者が十分にケアを受けられなかったことが非人道的な行為を禁ずる3条に反するとした、M.HELHAL 対 フランス事件判決(2015年)も興味深い。同意と情報提供は、ともに人間の意思表示であり、私生活の尊重と医療上の秘密の保護を求める権利に基づく。こうした視点から、医療メディエーションの役割を改めて考えていく必要がある。

第73回CAPEレクチャー Dr.Akiko Frischhut (2015/11/11)

Title: Experiencing the passage of time
Abstract:Does a dynamic theory of time, an ‘A-theory’ of time, have an intuitive advantage over the static ‘B-theory’? Many A-theorists have claimed so, arguing that their theory has a much better explanation for the fact that we all experience the
passage of time: we experience time as passing because time really does pass. In this paper I expose and reject the argument behind the A-theorist’s claim. I argue that all parties have conceded far too easily that there is an experience that needs explaining in the first place. For what exactly is an experience of temporal passage? One natural thought is that we experience passage in virtue of experiencing change, or in virtue of experiencing change as ‘dynamic’.Another is that we experience passage in virtue of experiencing events as (successively) present.None of these experiences, I argue, amounts to an experience of passage. Although there might still be other ways to experience passage, A-theorists would have to provide us with a plausible candidate experience. If there is such an experience at all, it won’t be one that qualifies as what we intuitively take to be an experience of passage. The ‘intuitive advantage’, it seems, has dissolved in any case.

第72回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Philip Gerrans Workshop(2015/11/09)

Title: A PROCESSING ACCOUNT OF EMOTION
Abstract:Planning and decision making, social and moral cognition, reasoning, cognitive development and self-representation depend on emotional processes. Psychologists and neuroscientists in these fields draw on philosophical theories of emotion to interpret their results while, at the same time, the philosophy of emotion is now deeply intertwined with empirical work on emotions, ranging from molecular to psychological levels. Yet there is no established theoretical consensus about the nature of emotional processing and the relationship between emotions (and affective experience) and cognition.
This paper attempts theoretical unification via a method advocated by Dominic Murphy “we arrive at a comprehensive set of positive facts about how the mind works, and then ask which of its products and breakdowns matter for our various projects” . The approach is similar to the way in which philosophical theories of human motivation and the cognitive science of reward processing have mutually informed each other. I explain some specific puzzles about the nature of emotional phenomena: Depersonalisation Disorder, delays in effects of anti-depressant treatment on mood, Social Anxiety Disorder. I also explain how the processing account deals with general questions about the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality of emotional experience that motivate theoretical disagreement.
The main competitors in the theory of emotion: Darwinian, Somatic, Feeling and Representational have all focused on a real and important aspect of emotion. Emotions are adaptations, they have bodily consequences and modes of expression, their felt aspect is essential to their role in human life, and they depend essentially on representational processes. Precisely how these aspects interact and which are causally primary in episodes of emotion cannot be understood in the absence of a processing account. Or so I claim!

第71回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Jochen Vollmann Workshop(2015/11/09)

    • ◆日時 2015年11月9日(月)16.30-18.00(参加費無料、事前登録不要)
    • 場所:京都大学文学部校舎2階 第4講義室
      地図:http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/ (構内MAP8番の建物)
    • ◆講演者 Professor Dr Jochen Vollmann (Ruhr-Universität Bochum),

Title: Personalised medicine”: Priority setting and opportunity costs at an international scale’
司会:藤田みさお(京都大学iPS細胞研究所上廣倫理研究部門准教授)

本講演は、京都大学大学院文研究科 応用哲学・倫理学教育研究センターとの共催で開催いたします。
講演は英語で行なわれますが、質疑応答は必要に応じて通訳いたします。
それでは、多くの方のご参加を心よりお待ちしております。

共催:京都大学iPS細胞研究所上廣倫理研究部門、京都大学大学院文研究科 応用哲学・倫理学教育研究センター

第70回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Seahwa Kim Workshop (2015/10/19)

Title: The Rationality of Emotion toward Fiction

Abstract:
In this article, I will deal with the normative question with respect to our emotional responses to fiction. It is the question of whether our emotional responses to fiction are rational. Many think the charge that our emotional responses to fiction are irrational was mounted by Radford. Consider the following three propositions:

(i) We feel a rational emotion toward someone or something only if we believe that the object of our emotion exists.
(ii) We know characters and situations in fiction do not exist.
(iii) We feel a rational emotion toward fictional characters or situations.

They are jointly inconsistent, and in order to avoid it, we have to reject one of them. Radford’s solution is to reject (iii). So he is taken to claim that when we are frightened by a horror film, our fear is irrational. In this article, against Radford’s charge, I will defend the claim that our emotions toward fiction are rational.

第69回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Wilfried Sieg Workshop (2015/09/14)

    • 講師:Wilfried Sieg (Carnegie Mellon University)
    • 日時:2015年9月14日(月) 16:00〜17:00
    • 場所:京都大学文学部校舎1F会議室
      地図:http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/ (構内MAP8番の建物)
    • 言語:英語

Title: Church without dogma: what is a computation and why does it matter?

Abstract:
Church’s and Turing’s theses assert dogmatically that an informal notion of effective calculability is adequately captured by a particular mathematical concept of computability. I present analyses of calculability that are embedded in a rich historical and philosophical context, lead to precise concepts, and dispense with theses.To investigate effective calculability is to analyze processes on symbolic configurations that can in principle be carried out by human calculators. This is a philosophical lesson we owe to Turing. Drawing on that lesson, I formulate boundedness and locality conditions for human computing agents. Turing’s work is then compared with Post’s, and we will diagnose a remarkable conceptual confluence. The confluence found its expression in overlapping mathematical and methodological work. However, we will also note a dramatic divergence as to the ultimate grounds of Post’s “natural law” for computability; there are deep connections to Gödel’s 1972 note “A philosophical error in Turing’s work”.

第68回CAPEレクチャー Wendell Wallach (2015/07/29)

      • 講師:Wendell Wallach (Yale University ISPS Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics)
      • 日時:2015年7月29日(水), 16:30~18:00
      • 会場:京都大学総合研究2号館第9演習室
        地図:http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/ (構内MAP34番の建物)
      • 使用言語:英語

Title: : A Dangerous Master: How to keep technology from slipping beyond our control
Abstract:
While most of us consider emerging technologies to be a source of both promise and productivity, there is also considerable disquiet about specific fields of research and about the overall trajectory of technological developed. Indeed, in some minds, technology has become the primary determinant of human destiny, and may even reinvent the human species, as we have known it out of existence. Various risks get exacerbated as we become increasingly reliant on complex systems whose actions cannot be fully predicted and therefore not fully controlled. Furthermore, new technological possibilities are appearing at an accelerating rate even as oversight fall far behind. This talk will introduce themes from my new book A Dangerous Master: How to keep technology from slipping beyond our control (Basic Books, June 2015). I will focus upon risks posed by the adoption of new technologies with a particular focus on how those risks might be managed through innovative engineering practices, the reinforcement of core values, and the new approaches to oversight and governance.

第67回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Adrien Barton(2015/07/21)

      • 著者:Adrien Barton (Osaka University) & Till Grüne-Yanoff (KTH University, Stockholm)
      • 日時:2015年7月21日(火)16:30-
      • 会場:京都大学文学部第七講義室
      • 使用言語:英語

Title: From Libertarian Paternalism to Nudging—and Beyond
Abstract:
Nudges, as championed by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, aim to influence people to make better decisions without infringing on their freedom of choice: considering people as organ donors by default, changing the shape of plates to reduce calorie intake, framing risks about medical treatments, reminding people vividly about the health consequences of smoking, arranging canteens so that consumers would chose healthier dishes, using “tough-talking” slogans like “don’t mess with Texas”: all those nudges aim at attaining desirable outcomes without coercion.Since their inception, nudges have raised several philosophical issues. This talk will give an overview of the important problems faced by nudging policies, in the light of a special issue of a Review of Philosophy and Psychology we have been editing. Nudges will first be categorized according to the cognitive process on which they rely, and according to their goals. Libertarian paternalism will then be characterized as a special kind of advocacy of nudges. This advocacy is however weakened in a number of cases in which it purports to apply. But nudges might be justified alternatively by standard paternalistic arguments, the harm principle, or democratic decision processes. Some nudges might be complemented or replaced by alternative policies, like education or boosting, depending on factors like their effect on individual autonomy, or their institutional publicity and transparency. Finally, nudge advocates should provide mechanistic evidence to answer concerns related to both their external validity and normative issues.

第66回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Bongrae Seok WS(2015/07/08-09)

      • 講師:Prof. Bongrae Seok (Alvernia University)
      • 日時: 2015年7月8日(水)・9日(木), 18:00~19:30
      • 会場:京都大学文学部文学部東館2F KUASU 多目的室
        (http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/campus/yoshida/map6r_y/ ) 構内MAP62番の校舎)July 8 (Wed)
        Title : Empathy and Nociceptive Mirror Emotion in Embodied Moral Psychology
        Abstract :
        In recent studies of moral judgments, psychologists analyze the moral mind from the perspectives of Kantian reasoning, Humea n emotion, or Rawlsian principle and identify diverse processes of moral cognition. But the body (i.e., the physical sense a nd activity) of a moral agent are not fully and seriously considered in their analyses. In this presentation, I will develop a moral psychology of the body, i.e., a moral psychology of embodied and other-regarding emotion. How does the body initiat e, influence, and sustain moral judgments and decisions? How does it motivate compassionate actions and other-regarding behaviors? I will explore this relatively uncharted territory of embodied moral psychology by focusing two psychological phenomena. First, I will focus on empathy (particularly its affective resonance and embodied response to others’pain and suffering). I will argue that our embodied nociceptive mirror emotion is the foundation of our empathic concern towards other suffering. At a basic level of moral cognition, our empathy to others’ pain is processed by affective resonance and motivational prep aredness that are supported by brain regions (such as the anterior insula) that sense and react to bodily change. As we obse rve others’ pain, we not only think to relieve their suffering but we also sweat profusely and breathe abruptly. The embodi ed process is a critical element of empathy’s prosocial and moral orientation. Second, I will discuss psychopathy and its lack of full embodiment in moral cognition. Typically psychopathic (dispositional or behavioral) orientations are associated with a deficit in affective processing that integrates specific types of stimuli with visceral and autonomic reactions. It seems that psychopaths suffer from disrupted emotional processes that motivate prosocial behaviors via embodied reactions. They know and recognize others’ pain and suffering but do not react (in their phys iological and behavioral reactions) to them appropriately. Once again the body plays important roles in some aspects of mora l cognition where affective social perception gives rise to prosocial helping behaviors.
        Outline
        (1)Recent Studies in Moral Psychology (Kantian, Humean, Rawlsian Approaches etc.)
        (2)Embodied Approaches to Cognition
        (3)Embodied Approaches to Social Psychology
        (4)My Approach – Embodied Approach to Moral Psychology -Empathy (Nociceptive Mirror Emotion) -Psychopathy (absence of empathic concern due to insufficient bodily response)July 9 (Thu)
        Title : Embodied Space in Psychopathology and Art
        Abstract :
        In this presentation, I will analyze the experience of seemingly non-sensuous or non-sensible things, such as empty spaces ( space gaps, space islands, wide open space, the absence of presence, or the presence of absence). I will argue, quite parado xically, that to experience such non-sensuous things, sensual imagination (tactile, visceral, motor, and holistic somatic se nse) is necessary. Our basic sensory encounter with the world, according to many philosophers such as Merleau Ponty and psyc hologist such as J. J. Gibson, is embodied; it is guided by our tactile and kinetic interaction with the object in the world . That is, we perceive and understand the presence of physical entities and their relations to our bodily in teraction with t hem. What about empty space? Do we experience empty space in this embodied and sensual way? In this presentation, I will foc us on embodied metaphors (embodied spatial distinctions) and psychopathologies (agoraphobia, acrophobia! etc.) of space and u se them as examples to support my embodied interpretation of spatial perception. I will argue that embodied perception is im portant and perhaps necessary in the full experience of space. The body is required for us to experience, understand, and ap preciate the bodiless openness.問い合わせ先
        京都大学文学出口研究室:yamamoto.ayumi.3a@kyoto-u.ac.jp

第65回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Kevin T. Kelly(2015/07/02)

Title : Rhetoric, Reliability, and Inductive Inference
Abstract : Socrates argued to persuade. He also sought the truth. In deductive reasoning, the two go together—valid argumentation leads from true information to true conclusions, and that fact supports or may even boost the rhetorical force of valid deduct ive arguments. Inductive reasoning, by definition, generates conclusions that go beyond the information provided. Such rea soning can be very persuasive, as when scientists prefer simple, unified, sharply tested explanations over complex, diffuse explanations that rely on multiple coincidences—a bias known popularly as Ockham’s razor. But it is harder to say how suc h a bias conduces to true belief. It is tempting to try to make induction look deductive, by adding metaphysical assumption s, such as Leibniz’ view that God is an engineer who likes elegant universes. But that strategy is both rhetorically and e pistemically self-defeating, since the added assumptions are not subject to scientific investigation at all. Instead, we wi ll present a mathematical argument, based on ideas from learning theory, to the effect that Ockham’s is necessary for stayi ng on the straightest path to the truth, even if that path cannot be perfectly straight. Our a rgument singles out Ockham’s razor as the right rhetorical principle for inductive inference, but optimal, inductive truth-conduciveness is so weak that the argument may actually undermine our native credence in simple, unified theories. Inductive skeptics assume that weaker standards of truth conduciveness should be paired with weaker credence in the conclusions. We respond that standards are c ontextually relative to ambitions. High or even full belief is justified by weak standards as long as they are the best sta ndards achievable in the problem at hand.

第64回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Jean-Marc Levy-Leblond Lecture
(2015/06/02)

      • Speaker:Prof. Jean-Marc Levy-Leblond
      • Title: Successes and limits of modern physics
      • Date: Jun. 2 (Tue.) 2015 18:10-19:40
      • Venue:京都大学吉田キャンパス 総合研究棟2号館第10演習室, Seminar Room 10 Rsearch Building No.2, Kyoto University.
        http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/downlodemap/documents/2014/main-j.pdf (No.34)Abstract:
        Are the modern physical sciences on the verge of reaching a complete and final knowledge of the Universe, explaining all natural phenomena, including those studied by other disciplines (biology, psychology, etc.), as some believe, or, as others argue, do they meet unsurpassable limitations due to the very nature of the world according to some fundamental discoveries of the XXth century (impossibility to exceed the velocity of light, quantum uncertainty principle, etc.)?Both these pretenses seem unjustified.For, if no epistemological problem can be interpreted as signaling an intrinsic limitation of our potential knowledge, it remains true that a
        reasonable view of physical science (as for any science) necessarily takes into account its borders and leads to dismiss a too optimistic reductionism. Furthermore, the present concrete conditions which rule modern scientific research (technicisation, industrialisation, etc.) restrict its long term capacities. This is especially true for physics, which, paradoxically, is ever more able to transform the world and less apt to understand it. Is this situation a temporary one? That is the question.
        講師紹介:
        レヴィ=ルブロン名誉教授(ニース大学)は量子力学を主な研究領域とする理論物理学者として著名であるが、同時に「科学を文化に置き入れる」ことを提唱する哲学者としてもフランスでは知られる。*This lecture is sponsored by JSPS Invitation Fellowships for Research in Japan (Short-term) 2015.

第63回CAPEレクチャー Prof.Daniele Macuglia Lecture (2015/05/25)

      • Speaker:Prof.Daniele Macuglia (University of Chicago)
      • Title: Newtonianism and the crisis of European mind
      • Date: May 25 (Mon.) 2015 16:30-
      • Venue:Lecture room 4, Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University. 京都大学文学研究科第4講義室
        http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/downlodemap/documents/2014/main-j.pdf (No. 8)
        Abstract:
        The period that goes from the late-Renaissance to the initial stages of the Enlightenment is characterized by a set of remarkable sociological traumas that determined what we could define as the crisis of the European medieval mind―the set of all of the social, religious, and cultural values that characterized, in a more or less monolithic way, a good portion of the preceding medieval period. In my talk I will focus on the way in which the new cosmology formulated by Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) contributed to such a crisis and on how Newtonianism resonated within the Italian cultural and scientific scenario thorough the Eighteenth century. I will show that, despite its destabilizing effects, it was thanks to Newtonianism that Italian scholars were able to initiate within the Italian peninsula a robust strand of Enlightenment thought.about the speaker:
        Daniele Macuglia is a fifth-year PhD student at the University of Chicago’s Fishbein Center for the History of Science and Medicine. He earned a bachelor’s degree in atomic physics from the University of Pavia in Italy, and a master’s degree in the history of science from the University of Chicago. He won the 13th Italian National Contest for Young Scientists, and received a European Union Contest for Young Scientists Special Prize. Macuglia is a member of the Italian and German Physical Societies, the Italian Society for the History of Physics and Astronomy, and the British Society for the History of Science. In his current dissertation project, he is researching the influence and spread of Newton’s ideas on gravitation and on the nature of light among mathematicians and natural philosophers in 18th-century century Rome―one of the major European hubs for the spread of Newtonian science.

 

第62回CAPEレクチャー Prof. Yingjin Xu Workshop(2015/05/13)

      • Speaker:Prof. Yingjin Xu (Fudan University)
      • Title: Nishida Kitarō’s “Logic of Basho” and Its Political Implications
      • Date: May 13 (Wed.) 2015 18:00-19:30
      • Venue:Kyoto University, Faculty of letters Main Building 1F Conference room.
        Abstract:
        The Kyoto School philosophers’ attitudes towards Japan’ s involvement both in the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific Ocean War are notoriously ambiguous. As for instance, although Nishida Kitarō , the leading philosopher of the whole school, is labeled by some as an “official philosopher” backed by the wartime Japanese government, some historical evidence can also show that he is actually a pacifist and even a dissent of Japanese government’s war policies. The patent incompatibility between these historical data simply requires a plausible explanation, and what is intended to offer in this article is exactly a cognitive linguistic-inspired explanation of it. More specifically, Nishida’s “Logic of Basho”, which addresses the feature of the “fusion both of the subjectivity and objectivity” of cognition, is going to be reconstructed as a theory philosophizing the context-sensitivity features of cognition conducted by native speakers of Japanese. From this point of view, Nishida’s “Logic of Basho” can be further labeled as a theory elaborated “from the bug’s perspective” (a phrase borrowed from Katehiro Kanaya). Hence, the typical Nishida’s way of doing philosophical exploration, which focuses on both ordinary people’s feelings in their linguistic practices and more extraordinary intuitions involved in religions and arts, is by nature indifferent to higher-level speculations required by typical political thinking. So any attempt to relate the core idea of Nishida’s philosophy to militarism or totalitarianism would be farfetched. Moreover, since the Nishida-favored explorations in the artistic and religious dimensions inevitably require minimal space of freedom, it can be even deduced that his philosophy should be more compatible with a democratic constitution which can provide such freedom. By contrast, according to Tanabe Hajime’s “Logic of Species”, the state is assumed to play the role both of the substratum of individuals and of the embodied form of “God”, or in other words, the notion of “state” should be built into his system as the “media” between individuals and the “Absolute Nothingness” from the very beginning. Therefore, it should be more challenging for Tanabe’s readers to distance such a framework from the typical fascist ideology.

第61回CAPEレクチャー Dr. Akiko Frischhut Lecture (2015/05/7)

    • Speaker:Dr. Akiko Frischhut (Université de Genève)
    • Date: 2015年5月7日(木)18:10-19:40
    • Place: 京都大学吉田キャンパス総合研究棟2号館(下記の建物34)総合2号館第10演習室
      http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/downlodemap/documents/2014/main-j.pdf
    • Title: Temporal Passage and Ontological Regress
      Abstract:
      This talk has two objectives. First, I shall present and analyse an entirely novel reconstruction of McTaggart’s infamous regress argument, which was designed to show that the passage of time leads into an infinite vicious regress. Second, I want to use the reconstructed McTaggartian regress as a case study to elucidate more about the nature of ontological regresses. Looking at the regress in its novel form reveals some surprising new insights. Whether or not McTaggart’s regress is vicious depends on the structural features we allow reality to have.
      More specifically, I argue that McTaggart’s argument is a variation of the general problem of change. McTaggart’s conception of temporal passage as qualitative change in terms of pastness, presentness and futurity implies that the change constituting passage must be merely relational. The regress, an infinite chain of ontologically dependent relational changes, ensues from applying the only available solution to the problem of change.
      Ontological regresses come in two broad kinds. Infinitist regresses, non well-founded chains of dependency where each thing asymmetrically depends for its existence on the next, and coherentist regresses, where the dependency structures are circular or symmetrical. The McTaggartian regress, I shall show, is of the latter sort. Although the traditional consensus is that infinitist and coherentist structures are both vicious, this orthodox opinion has recently been challenged by several authors. There is a danger that discussions about these matters are perceived as simply trading on different intuitions, with no progress to be made. This might be particularly salient in the case of metaphysical coherentism. I hope to advance matters by using the McTaggartian regress as a case study, thereby bringing fresh arguments to an important debate that has been neglected for too long. Although most coherentist regresses are probably vicious, McTaggart’s regress,or my interpretation of it, may well be benign. One surprising conclusion to draw from this is that there may not be an answer for or against coherentist regresses that applies across the board. Instead, a more apt methodology requires an individual treatment of ontological regresses on a case by case basis.
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回答者一覧

児玉 聡 ( 京都大学・文学研究科、倫理一般)
佐藤 恵子 ( 京都大学・医学部附属病院、生命倫理)
鈴木 美香 ( 京都大学・iPS 細胞研究所、研究倫理)
長尾 式子 ( 神戸大学・保健学研究科、看護倫理)

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