第235回CAPEレクチャー

Date: 2025年05月13日(火) 1700-1830
Place:京都大学吉田キャンパス文学部校舎 地下大会議室(map8番の建物)
Speaker: Chen Hai (East China Normal University, Shanghai, China)
Title: Why Strength Argument is not a Good Defense for Moral Intuition
Abstract: Dario Cecchini claims that moral intuitions are experienced with different levels of strength and agents accept only strong intuitions, not vulnerable to bias under realistic circumstances. I labeled his defense for moral intuition with intuitive confidence as “strength argument”. Although I belong to the camp of moral intuition supporters, I believe that Cechini’s strength argument is not a good justification for moral intuition from the reliability challenge. First of all, strength argument will lead us to subjectivism, psychologism, and, most importantly, such argument will fail to withstand the reliability challenge. Furthermore, it is an impossible mission to distinguish the strength of people’s different moral intuitions. Last but not least, it is unnecessary to classify the strength of moral intuitions as well. Intuition can be strong or weak, but different strengths of intuition are merely phenomena, not and should not be viewed as the essence of intuition. Instead, I will address reliability challenge by analyzing the structure of moral intuition.