CAPE is holding regular lectures inviting various researchers from all over the world. These lectures aim to introduce the latest research trend regarding applied philosophy and ethics. Also, CAPE Lectures, as well as CAPE Workshops, are open to public. We are promoting international exchanges and collaborative studies among researchers and human resource cultivation through these lectures.

The 56^th Lecture (2014/12/04)

Prof. Alan Baker (Swarthmore College)

タイトル：Games, Meta-Games, and Emergence

場所：京都大学吉田キャンパス総合研究棟２号館（下記の建物34）１階第10演習室
http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/downlodemap/documents/2014/main-j.pdf

日時：2014年12月4日（木）18:00 – 19:30

Abstract：The concept of emergence has been applied by philosophers to cases in which a whole system has properties that are qualitatively different from its parts, for example the flocking behavior of large groups of birds, or the consciousness of large groups of neurons. The concept of emergence has also been applied to cases in which novelty arises in a system at some later time. In this talk, I focus on this second concept of emergence and in particular how constraints function in systems to create new possibilities. Using formal games as a template, I investigate how the iteration of simple, mutually interacting rules can lead to surprisingly complex emergent behavior.

The 55^th Lecture (2014/12/03)

Dr. Andreas Kapsner （University of Muenchen)

タイトル：The Proper Logical Treatment of True-and-False Statements

場所：京都大学吉田キャンパス総合研究棟２号館（下記の建物34）１階第10演習室
http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/ja/access/downlodemap/documents/2014/main-j.pdf

日時：2014年12月3日（水）18:00 – 19:30

Abstract：Statements that are both true and false, also known as truth value gluts, have proved useful in many areas of philosophy. They promise solutions for semantic and other paradoxa, offer news ways to conceptualize vagueness, change and information, and they help in the analysis of puzzling views of Buddhist and other Asian philosophers. There are even mathematical indispensbility arguments in favour of them.
In this talk, I want to explore the following idea: In view of these successful applications, truth value gluts should be allowed in the semantics of logical systems, as they are in many non-classical systems. However, unlike what is standard in such systems, these gluts should be treated as undesignated values. I shall give my reasons for taking this to be a view worth exploring and discuss its effects on such topics as dialetheism, paraconsistency and relevance logic.

The 54^th Lecture (2014/12/02)

Otávio Bueno氏 (University of Miami)

タイトル：Epistemic Structural Realism: Some Troubles

場所： 文学部新館地下大会議室

日時：2014年12月2日（火）15:30－17:00

アブストラクトはこちら

The 53^th Lecture (2014/11/27)

講演1

Alessandro Salice, Center for Subjectivity Research, University of
Copenhagen

講演タイトル：Collective Commitments: Instrumental vs Communal

場所：文学部1階会議室

日時：11月27日18:00~19:10

Abstract:This talk tackles the notion of collective commitment. One influential view about collective commitments maintains that these commitments come only in one kind: if you and I are committed to a goal so that my commitment is conditional on yours and yours is conditional on mine, then there is a collective commitment at place. In the present paper, I intend to resist this view and to defend the claim that collective commitments ome in, at least, two different forms.
The first occurs when two or more individuals decide to join their forces based on instrumental considerations. If I intend to reach a goal by means of a specific strategy in which you figure as a contributor and if you intend to reach the same goal by means of a strategy in which I figure as a contributor, then each of us has a
‘strategic’ commitment to reach that goal.
A different kind of collective commitment (call this a ‘communal’ or a ‘we-’ commitment) is created when a we-group (i.e., a group with a social identity or a we-perspective) is committed to a given goal. In contrast to the first scenario, where the goal is distributively shared, here the goal is collectively shared. Once the we-group
commits to the goal, individual commitments arise for all the persons involved in virtue of the fact that they belong to the we-group at stake, i.e., that they are members of this we-group.
After distinguishing, describing and elucidating these two kinds of commitments in the first part of the talk, in its second and last part some conclusions for social ontology and the theory of collective intentionality will be drawn.

講演2

John Michael, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

講演タイトル（共著者）：A Minimal Approach to Commitment (co-authored with Günther Knoblich & Natalie Sebanz)

場所：文学部1階会議室(講演1と同じ)

日時：11月27日19:20~20:30

Abstract:This paper sets out a theoretical framework for understanding interpersonal commitment. We begin by formulating three desiderata: to identify the motivational factors that lead agents to honor commitments and which thereby make commitments credible, to pick out the cognitive mechanisms and situational factors that lead agents to sense that implicit commitments are in place, and to illuminate the onto- and phylogenetic origins of commitment. In order to satisfy these three desiderata, we conceptualize a broad category of phenomena of which commitment in the strict sense is a special case, and introduce the term ‘minimal commitment’ to designate this broad category.

The 52^th Lecture (2014/10/17)

Prof.Matthias Schirn(Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (LMU))

タイトル： Frege’s philosophy of geometry

場所：京都大学文学部校舎第3演習室

日時：10月17日18時～

Abstract:My talk is in five sections. I begin with introductory remarks. In the second section, I cast a glance at Frege’s early views on geometry and arithmetic, while in the third I comment on the relationship between Frege’s and Kant’s views of geometrical knowledge. In the fourth section, I examine, in a critical way, Frege’s remarks on space, spatial intuition, and geometrical axioms in a key passage of The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884, §26). I conclude with critical remarks on the topic “Frege and non-Euclidean geometry” and a short overall assessment of Frege’s philosophy of geometry.

The 51^th Lecture (2014/10/14)

Prof. Ruth Kastner(University of Maryland)

タイトル：The Transactional Interpretation, the Growing Universe, and Free Will

場所：京都大学文学研究科第七講義室

日時：2014年１０月１４日　１６：３０－１８：００

講演者について：Ruth Kastner 先生は量子力学の哲学、とりわけ近年注目される交流解釈(transaction interpretation)を専門としています。 The Transaction Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: The Reality of Possibility (Cambridge University Press, 2013) という著書があります。

Speaker: Ruth Kastner (University of Maryland)
Title: The Transactional Interpretation, the Growing Universe, and Free Will
Place: Lecture Room 7, Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University
Date: October 14, 2014, 16:30-18:00ABSTRACT:
It is often supposed that physics rules out free will. However, this assumption is not necessary. In this talk, I introduce the latest version of the Transactional Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which involves a dynamic growing universe. In the transactional world, time has a natural direction because the future is open, consisting of dynamic possibilities. This, in turn, allows for genuine volition to enter the domain of action in which change occurs: that is, the present moment.

The 50^th Lecture （2014/9/30）

Prof. Samuel C. Wheeler III (University of Connecticut, USA)

タイトル：Relative Essentialism: How Davidson, Aristotle and Kripke are all partly right

場所：京都大学文学部校舎、第３演習室
（地図の8番の建物です。http://www.kyoto-u.ac.jp/en/access/campus/main.htm ）

日時：2014年9月30日（火）、16:30-18:00

講演者について：Samuel C. Wheeler III氏は、コネティカット大学哲学科の教授。専門は、言語哲学、形而上学、倫理学、古代哲学など。詳しくは以下のウェブページを参照してください。
https://uconn.academia.edu/SamuelWheeler
http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/davidson-and-derrida/

CAPE Lecture“Relative Essentialism: How Davidson, Aristotle and Kripke are all partly right”
Samuel C. Wheeler III (University Connecticut, USA)
Time: 16:30-18:00 September 30th (Tuesday) 2014
Venue: Seminar Room 3, Faculty of Letters Main Bldg., Kyoto UniversityAbstract:
Donald Davidson said nothing about modality. However, by his principle that nearly universally held beliefs are largely true, he is implicitly committed to accepting modal truths. Those modal truths must be de re, that is, about the entities, not conceptual. Given his externalism about truth-conditions, the truth of a sentence such as “A cow is necessarily an animal” cannot depend on contents of the concept cow, but rather on what “is a cow” is actually true of.Davidson also thought that sameness is always relative to a predicate. This seems to deny the point of view of essentialist accounts of de re necessity, such as those of Kripke and Aristotle, which depend on there being a single entity, with an essence, underlying all descriptions of what is in a location. In Aristotle’s terms, there is at most one substance at a given location.This paper develops an account of de re necessities that allows of a plurality of articulations into kinds of objects. I call the account “relative essentialism.”The fundamental idea of relative essentialism is that the articulation of the world into beings and properties is a requirement of thought that we impose, not an intrinsic articulation of reality. The idea is akin to Kant’s ideas. Just as for Kant that experience must be spatio-temporal is a feature of us, and not the world, so the articulation of the world into beings and properties is a requirement of thought, rather than an intrinsic feature of reality. We must think in terms of properties and objects in order to make inferences which depend on sub-sentential structure. There are therefore multiple different articulations we make, all of which are ontologically on a par and all of which articulate reality into real beings.For each entity-constituting predicate in an articulation, there are de re necessities about those posited objects. Thus for instance, the Battle of Stalingrad could have involved one fewer soldiers, but the space-time worm coinciding with that battle would be a different worm without that component.

I argue that Davidson ought to accept a number of views that he either never said anything about or which he denied in print. I argue that he should accept that mental events, while having the same causes and effects, are different from the coinciding physical events. I argue that there are true de re modal truths about many kinds of objects.

The 49^th Lecture （2014/9/1）

Prof. Saranindranath Tagore (National University of Singapore)

タイトル：On the Concept of World Philosophy

場所：京都大学文学部校舎、1階会議室

日時：2014年9月1日（月）14：00‐16:00

The 48^th Lecture （2014/7/23）

Prof. Masahiro Yamada (Claremont Graduate University)

タイトル：Against Conditionalization

場所：未定

日時：2014年7月23日（水）16:00 〜17:30

アブストラクト：

The Bayesian approach to probability theory holds that mathematical probablity theory suitably interpreted gives us a powerful tool for understanding reasoning under uncertainty. This talk’s primary focus is on a particular version of this Bayesian approach that I will call ‘Laplacean’. On this view, standard probability theory as handed down to us by Laplace gives us a complete account of reasoning under uncertainty. In particular, one must conditionalize in updating one’s beliefs: the updated degree of credence for A given new evidence B is given by the conditional probability of A given B. A powerful argument in favor of the Laplacean view is given by a mathematical result known as Cox’s Theorem which proves that one can accepts some seemingly unproblematic assumptions about an idealized reasoner if and only if one also accepts that standard probability theory is the only possible account of reasoning under uncertainty. I argue that one of the assumptions, which I call the Dependence Thesis, must be rejected. This means that the Laplacean view and in particular its view on how to update in the face of new evidence must be rejected, too. I will end with some diagnostic remarks and some suggestions for future directions for the general Bayesian approach.

The 47^th Lecture 回（2014/7/22）

Tamra Lysaght (Senior Research Fellow : Science and Technology in Society Cluster Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore)

タイトル：At what risk? The duties of physicians in public emergencies.

場所：京都大学文学部校舎、大会議室(地下1階)

日時：7月22日16:30-18:00

アブストラクト：

Major disasters are public emergencies that tend to demand significant medical resources and expertise. These demands may be greatest in situations where medical professionals are unable to access their workplace or are unwilling to remain in an affected area. This situation may result in hospital facilities being understaffed and unable to cope with the influx of patients requiring assistance. While physicians who work outside the affected area may wish to offer their assistance, the lack of reliable information and uncertainty that often follows a disaster can make it difficult to assess whether it is safe enough to enter an affected area to provide medical assistance. These challenges are compounded when the immediate risks are unknown but the need for medical care may be critical.
In this essay, we discuss the legal and moral obligations of physicians to provide medical care to patients affected by disasters. As doctors may have existing fiduciary duties towards patients under their care, and specialist training may be required to diagnose and treat those affected by the emergency, physicians may be legally and ethically required to remain in or around disaster zones despite the risks of harm to themselves. To help understand these duties, we consider two scenarios: 1) where a physician works in or near a disaster zone, 2) where a physician works away from the disaster zone. Specifically, we consider these obligations within the context of Japan and the partial meltdown of the Diiachi Nuclear Power Plant that followed the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2010. We find that while physicians in Japan do not necessarily have legal obligations to assist in public emergencies, they may be ethically required to do so. We conclude with suggestions for future inquiries to better understand and articulate the ethical justifications that underpin these obligations.

The 46^th Lecture （2014/7/17）

Dr. Ricki Bliss (University of Otago)

タイトル：Dependent Entities and Ultimate Explanations’

場所：未定

日時：2014年7月17日（木）18:00 〜19:30

アブストラクト：

We are so often told that there is, or has to be, something fundamental. But why is this? One way of reconstructing arguments from vicious infinite regress to the existence of something fundamental requires the inclusion of an assumption that stipulates that what we wish to explain is why there are any dependent entities whatsoever; along with the inclusion of another assumption that stipulates that no dependent entity is up to this explanatory task. The success of this argument relies crucially, and mistakenly, on the idea that the terms `dependent fact’ and `dependent thing’ behave like terms such as `flamingo’. I argue that the terms `dependent fact’ and `dependent thing’ are, in fact, dummy sortals and that ultimate existence questions framed in terms of them are semantically defective. The kinds of questions we can ask about dependent entities can be answered perfectly well in terms of other dependent entities. Dependent entities explain everything for which we could reasonably hope to have an explanation.

The 45^th Lecture （2014/7/16）

Prof. Koji Tanaka (University of Auckland)

タイトル：Empirical Arguments for Paraconsistency

場所：未定

日時：2014年7月16日（水）18:00 〜19:30

アブストラクト：

The late Robert Meyer and Graham Priest have (independently) presented the following line of arguments for the invalidity of the classical inference ex contradiction quodlibet (A, ~A |= B for any A and B): according to classical logic anything follows from a contradiction, but it would be ludicrous to reason, and we just wouldn’t reason, to an arbitrary claim from a contradiction; therefore, the classical inference is wrong. Their arguments rely on empirical methodology for determining validity/invalidity of logical principles. In this paper, I will examine their empirical arguments and defend their empirical methodology. I will demonstrate that logical principles can be thought to be an empirical matter.

The 44^th Lecture （2014/7/15）

Prof. Bronwyn Finnigan (Australian National University)

タイトル：Knowing-how and the practical mode of presenting a proposition

場所：未定

日時：2014年7月15日（火）18:00 〜19:30

アブストラクト：

Stanley and Williamson (2001) challenge Ryle’s view that knowing how can be defined in terms of knowing that. They argue that Ryle inadequately establishes his view and they provide an alternative account, according to which ascriptions of know-how are always ascriptions of propositional knowledge. A condition for the latter is that the relevant propositional knowledge be entertained under a ‘practical mode of presentation’. In this paper, I will critically engage this notion. Ryle’s proper target, I shall argue, concerns whether the exercise of know-how in intelligent actions can be sufficiently analysed in terms of knowing-that. Stanley and Williamson’s notion of a ‘practical mode of presentation’ is, however, intended to denote the fact of a causal relation between the relevant propositional knowledge and the actions in which it is instantiated. While this may well provide an acceptable semantics of know-how ascriptions, I will challenge the idea that their assumed notion of propositional content can explain intelligent action. I will conclude by raising some general issues about the intersection of semantic theories of meaning with action theoretic philosophies of mind.

The 43^th Lecture （2014/7/2）

David Hilbert (University of Illinois at Chicago)

Perceivers, circumstances, seeing color

7月2日水曜日に京都大学大学院文学研究科・文学部にてDavid Hilbert教授が講演を行います。Hilbert教授はアメリカのUniversity of Illinois at Chicago哲学科の教授であり、色の哲学、知覚の哲学、近世哲学史（G. Berkeley）の研究をなさっております。

場所：10演（総合2号館1階）

時間：18:00-20:00

Abstract: The fact that perceived color varies with both the circumstances of perception and with the characteristics of the perceiver is often thought to have important consequences for the ontology of color. The precise nature of these consequences is a disputed matter but nearly all agree that the ontological consequences of variability in perceived color are important. All such arguments, however, rely on substantial and controversial assumptions about perception and ontology. Consequently, it is possible to evade the force of these arguments by denying the perceptual and metaphysical assumptions implicit in the argument. In other words, these arguments primarily serve to highlight disagreements about perception in general and metaphysics in general and are only secondarily of significance for color. Facts about perceptual variation should take their place among the many interesting facts about color and color perception that any theory of color should account for and lose the special significance they have had in recent discussions of color.

The 42^th Lecture （2014/6/25）

Prof. Yumiko INUKAI (University of Massachusetts, Boston)

The Self as an Aggregate?: Hume and Nagarjuna on the Self

日時：2014年6月25日（水）18:00-19:30

場所：京都大学文学部校舎、１階会議室

Abstract: The fact that perceived color varies with both the circumstances of perception and with the characteristics of the perceiver is often thought to have important consequences for the ontology of color. The precise nature of these consequences is a disputed matter but nearly all agree that the ontological consequences of variability in perceived color are important. All such arguments, however, rely on substantial and controversial assumptions about perception and ontology. Consequently, it is possible to evade the force of these arguments by denying the perceptual and metaphysical assumptions implicit in the argument. In other words, these arguments primarily serve to highlight disagreements about perception in general and metaphysics in general and are only secondarily of significance for color. Facts about perceptual variation should take their place among the many interesting facts about color and color perception that any theory of color should account for and lose the special significance they have had in recent discussions of color.

The 41^th Lecture （2014/5/20）

アンドリュー・ピッカリング（エクセター大学）

Different Worlds: Cybernetics as a Nonmodern Paradigm

The 40^th Lecture （2014/4/30）

Ruud ter Meulen (Professor of Ethics in Medicine, Bristol University)

How decent is a ‘decent’ minimum of health care?

The 39^th Lecture （2014/4/7-10）

Jay Garfield (National University of Singapore)

Buddhist Epistemology
Buddhist Logic and Philosophy of Language

The 38^th Lecture （2014/4/2）

Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu (National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan)

Reason Holism, Individuation and Embeddedness