

The Second Conference on **Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia**

August 28 - 29, 2014

Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan

Organizer

Center for Applied Philosophy & Ethics
Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University

Co-Organizer

Kyoto University Asian Studies Unit

Sponsors

Interchange Association, Japan
The Kyoto University Foundation
Kyoto University



Center for Applied Philosophy & Ethics
Graduate School of Letters
Kyoto University

The 2nd Conference on Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia

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Conference Description and Objectives

The 2nd CCPEA is a platform for scholars and students of contemporary philosophy in East Asia and anyone who is interested in what is going on with the discipline in this region. It follows the spirit of the 1st CCPEA that was held at Academia Sinica, Taipei, in 2012. Topics to be discussed in the 2nd CCPEA covers those of contemporary philosophy in a broad sense: philosophy of language, mind, action, society, art, law, logic, mathematics, science, technology, and religion; applied philosophy and ethics; analytic Asian philosophy, comparative philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology and so on so forth. Though we are open-minded to other approaches, analytic ones to those topics will be our main focus.

We have five distinguished keynote speakers and nearly one hundred talks are scheduled during in this two-day conference. The organizers are deeply grateful to all the participants for their interest in and cooperation for fruitful interactions among philosophers in East Asia.

Organizer

Center for Applied Philosophy and Ethics
Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University
Masahiko Mizutani (Conference Chair)
Sadamichi Ashina
Yasuo Deguchi
Tetsuji Iseda
Satoshi Kodama
Daisuke Kaida
Secretariat
Saki Miki

Co-Organizer

Kyoto University Asian Studies Unit

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
Interchange Association, Japan
The Kyoto University Foundation
Kyoto University

Organizing Committee

Daihyun Chung
Bo Chen
Szu-Ting Chen
Kai-Yuan Cheng
In-Rae Cho
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Tetsuya Kono
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Chienkuo Mi
Yasuo Nakayama
Kiyotaka Naoe
Yukihiro Nobuhara
Kazuhisa Todayama
Rong-Lin Wang
Shiu-Ching Wu
Sang Wook Yi
Bosuk Yoon

Access

Kansai International Airport to Kyoto Station



Airport Limousin is also available between Kansai Airport and Kyoto Station.

URL: http://www.okkbus.co.jp/en/timetable/kix/f_kyt.html

Kyoto Station to Kyoto University

To take a taxi

The journey will take about 20 minutes and cost approx. 1,800 yen.


To take the bus: Kyoto City Bus

The bus ride will take approx. 30-35 minutes and cost 230 yen.

206: Bound for Kitaoji Bus Terminal via Higashiyama St.
Get off at "Kyodai Seimon-mae".

17: Bound for Ginkaku-ji via Kawaramachi St.
Get off at "Hyakumanben".

Area Map



From the Kyoto Royal Hotel and Spa to Kyoto University

【By Kyoto City Bus】 Fare: 230yen (One way)

3: Bound for "Kyoto Gaidai Mae (京都外大前)"

Kawaramachi-Sanjo (河原町三条) ⇄ Hyakumanben (百万遍) : approx. 13 min

17: Bound for "Kinrin Shako Mae (錦林車庫前)"

Kawaramachi-Sanjo (河原町三条) ⇄ Hyakumanben (百万遍) : approx. 13 min

From Seifu-Kaikan to Kyoto University

Approximately 10-minute walk


From Shiran-Kaikan Annex to Kyoto University

Approximately 10-minute walk

Kyoto University Main Campus



Faculty of Letters Main Bldg. 2nd Floor



- インフォメーションセンター
Information Center
- 食堂 Cafeteria
- 生協店舗
Cooperative Store
- 京大ショップ Co-op Gift Shop
- ミュージアムショップ Museum Shop
- カフェ Cafe
- 建設工事中
Under Construction
- 改修工事中
Under Repair
- バス停 Bus Stop

* Main Room and Registration Desk are in the Research Bldg. No.3 (Map 35).
Please come to Registration Desk first to get your name tag.

本部構内 Main Campus

- 1 正門 / インフォメーションセンター
Main Gate/Information Center
- 2 カフェレストラン「カンフォーラ」
Café-Restaurant "Camphora"
- 3 百周年時計台記念館
Clock Tower Centennial Hall
歴史展示室
Historical Exhibition Room
レストラン「ラ・トゥール」
Restaurant "La Tour"
カフェ「タリーズコーヒー」
Tully's Coffe(Café)
- 4 法経済学部本館
Faculty of Law and Faculty of Economics Main Bldg.
- 5 法経済学部東館
Faculty of Law and Faculty of Economics East Bldg.
- 6 法経済学部北館
Faculty of Law and Faculty of Economics North Bldg.
- 7 文系学部校舎
Faculty of Arts Bldg.
- 8 文学部校舎
Faculty of Letters Main Bldg.
- 11 保健診療所
Kyoto University Infirmary
- 12 国際交流センター講義室
Lecture Room of the International Center
- 13 留学生ラウンジ「きすな」※ 2013 年 3 月まで改修工事中
Student Lounge 'Ki-ZU-NA'
- 14 本部棟
University Head Office
- 15 国際交流セミナーハウス
International Seminar House
- 16 旧石油化学教室本館
Former Main Building of the Petrochemistry Course
学務部
Academic Affairs Department
研究国際部留学生課
Foreign Student Division, Research and International
Affairs Department
国際交流センター
International Center
カウンセリングセンター
Counseling Center
スポーツ指導・相談室
Consultation Office on Health and Sports
健康科学センター
Kyoto University Health Service
- 17 経済研究所本館・書庫 ※ 2013 年 3 月まで改修工事中
Institute of Economic Research Main Bldg.
- 18 附属図書館
University Library (Central Library)
- 19 経済研究所北館
Institute of Economic Research North Bldg.
- 20 尊攘堂
Sonjo-do
- 21 教育学部本館
Faculty of Education Main Bldg.
- 22 総合博物館
The Kyoto University Museum
- 23 文学部陳列館
Faculty of Letters Exhibition Hall
- 31 物質—細胞統合システム拠点研究棟
Institute for Integrated Cell-Material Sciences (iCeMS)
Research Bldg.
- 32 総合研究 1 号館・プロジェクトラボ
Research Bldg. No.1/Project Lab.
- 33 総合研究 1 号館別館
Research Bldg. No.1 Annex
- 34 総合研究 2 号館
Research Bldg. No.2
学術研究支援室
Research Administration Office

- 環境科学センター
Environment Preservation Research Center
文化財総合研究センター
Center for Cultural Heritage Studies
- 35 総合研究 3 号館
Research Bldg. No.3
 - 36 総合研究 2 号館別館
Research Bldg. No.2 Annex
 - 37 工学部土木工学教室本館
Faculty of Engineering Department of Civil
Engineering Historic Bldg.
 - 38 人文科学研究所本館・総合研究 4 号館
Institute for Research in Humanities Main Bldg. /
Research Bldg. No.4
 - 39 工学部建築学教室本館
Faculty of Engineering Department of Architecture
Historic Bldg.
 - 40 総合研究 5 号館
Research Bldg. No.5
地球環境学堂・学舎
Graduate School of Global Environmental Studies
低温物質科学研究センター
Research Center for Low Temperature and Materials
Sciences
 - 41 工学部坂記念館
Dr.Ban Commemorative Laboratory
 - 42 学術情報メディアセンター（北館）
※ 2013 年 9 月まで改修工事中
Academic Center for Computing and Media Studies
(North Bldg.)
 - 51 京大生協本部（花谷会館）
Cooperative Store Head Office
 - 52 工学部 11 号館
Faculty of Engineering Bldg. No.11
 - 53 工学部総合校舎
Faculty of Engineering Integrated Research Bldg.
 - 54 工学部 2 号館
Faculty of Engineering Bldg. No.2
 - 55 工学部RI研究実験棟
Faculty of Engineering Radioisotope Research
Laboratory
 - 56 工学部 6 号館
Faculty of Engineering Bldg. No.6
 - 57 工学部物理系校舎
Faculty of Engineering Engineering Science Depts
Bldg.
 - 58 工学部研究実験棟
Faculty of Engineering Research Laboratory
 - 59 総合研究 8 号館
Research Bldg. No.8
情報学研究科
Graduate School of Informatics
エネルギー科学研究科
Graduate School of Energy Science
キャリアサポートセンター
Career Support Center
中央食堂
Central Cafeteria
 - 60 工学部1号館
Faculty of Engineering Bldg. No.1
 - 61 文学部東館
Faculty of Letters East Bldg.
障害学生支援室
Office for Students with Physical Disabilities
産官学連携本部
Office of Society-Academia Collaboration for
Innovation
研究国際部産官学連携課
Industry-Academia Collaboration Division, Research
and International Affairs Department
 - 62 工学部 3 号館
Faculty of Engineering Bldg. No.3
工学部（事務室）
Faculty of Engineering Administrative Office

- 63 工学部 3 号館A棟
Faculty of Engineering Bldg. No.3-A
 - 64 工学部 3 号館B棟
Faculty of Engineering Bldg. No.3-B
 - 65 総合研究 6 号館
Research Bldg. No.6
 - 66 工学部電気総合館 ※ 2013 年 3 月まで改修工事中
Faculty of Engineering Bldg. No.3 (Lecture Hall)
 - 67 工学部 10 号館 ※ 2013 年 3 月まで改修工事中
Faculty of Engineering Bldg. No.10
- ## 西部構内 West Campus
- 68 総合体育館
Sports Gymnasium
 - 69 吉田泉殿
Yoshida Izumidono
 - 70 物質—細胞統合システム拠点本館
Institute for Integrated Cell-Material Sciences (iCeMS)
Main Bldg.
 - 71 物質—細胞統合システム拠点西館
Institute for Integrated Cell-Material Sciences (iCeMS)
West Bldg.
白眉センター
Hakubi Center for Advanced Research

Restaurants

University COOP restaurants



① CENTRAL CAFETERIA

TYPE: University COOP restaurant
PLACE: Main Campus
OPEN: 8:00–21:00
CLOSED: Saturday & Sunday
BUDGET: JPY – 1,000
TEL: 075-752-0832
Snacks are in the COOP shop in the clock tower.



② CAFETERIA RENAIS

TYPE: University COOP restaurant
PLACE: 2F, Higashi-Oji Street
OPEN: 11:00–22:00
(Saturday: –19:30, Sunday: –14:00)
BUDGET: JPY – 1,000
TEL: 075-753-7650
URL(Japanese):
http://www.s-coop.net/shop_info/yoshida_west/cafeteria/
Bookstore and electronic shop are in 1F.



③ CAMPHORA

TYPE: Cafe-Restaurant
PLACE: near Clock Tower
OPEN: 9:00–22:00
(Saturday/Sunday: 11:00–15:30)
BUDGET: JPY – 1,000
TEL: 075-753-7628
URL(partially English):
http://www.s-coop.net/shop_info/yoshida_had/camphora

Noodles



④ Matsuyoshi

TYPE: SOBA (buckwheat noodle)
PLACE: Hyakumanben
OPEN: 11:30–15:00, 17:00–21:00
CLOSED: Sunday
BUDGET: JPY 1,000 – 2,000
TEL: 075-705-0008
URL(Japanese):
<http://tabelog.com/kyoto/A2603/A260302/004281/>



⑤ MINORI

TYPE: SOBA (buckwheat noodle)
PLACE: Imadegawa Street
OPEN: 12:00–14:00, 18:00–21:00
CLOSED: Sunday
BUDGET: JPY 1,000 – 2,000
TEL: 075-722-3735
URL(Japanese):
<http://www.soba-minori.com/>
CARD: Cash only.



⑥ SHINMASU

TYPE: RAMEN (Chinese noodle)
PLACE: Higashi-Oji Street
OPEN: 11:00–15:00
CLOSED: Wednesday
BUDGET: JPY – 1,000
TEL: 075-721-8080
URL(Japanese):
<http://www.taru8.com/cgi-bin/taru8/siteup.cgi?category=5&page=0>
CARD: Payable.



⑦ TENKA IPPIN

TYPE: RAMEN (Chinese noodle)
PLACE: Imadegawa Street
OPEN: 11:00–24:30
CLOSED: Tuesday
BUDGET: JPY – 1,000
TEL: 075-722-0793
URL(Japanese):
<http://tabelog.com/kyoto/A2603/A260302/002476>



⑧ SHINASOBA YOSHIDAYA

TYPE: RAMEN (Chinese noodle)
PLACE: Imadegawa Street
OPEN: 11:00–14:30, 17:30–24:00
CLOSED: Thursday
BUDGET: JPY – 1,000
TEL: 075-723-2456
URL(Japanese):
<http://tabelog.com/kyoto/A2603/A260302/002157/>

Kansai Specialty



⑨ MATSUO

TYPE: SARA UDON (fried noodle)
PLACE: Imadegawa Street
OPEN: 11:30–14:30, 17:00–20:30
CLOSED: Friday
BUDGET: JPY – 1,000
TEL: 075-771-6345
URL(Japanese):
<http://tabelog.com/kyoto/A2603/A260302/001096/>



⑩ FUJI

TYPE: Okonomiyaki (Japanese Pancake)
PLACE: Demachi-Yanagi
OPEN: 11:50–14:30, 17:00–23:00
CLOSED: Tuesday
BUDGET: JPY – 1,500
TEL: 075-711-5089



⑪ NISHIKI WARAI

TYPE: Okonomiyaki (Japanese Pancake)
PLACE: Hyakumanben
OPEN: 17:00–1:00
(Sat. & Sun.: 11:30–15:00, 17:00–1:00)
BUDGET: JPY – 2,000
TEL: 075-712-7111
URL(Japanese):
http://www.nishikiwarai.com/tenpo/kyoto/k_08.html
CARD: Payable



⑫ MADOI

TYPE: YOSHOKU (Japanese "western food")
PLACE: 2F, Hyakumanben
OPEN: 11:30–14:30, 17:30–21:30
CLOSED: Saturday, Sunday
BUDGET: JPY – 1,000
TEL: 075-761-5690
URL(Japanese):
<http://www.madoi-co.com/food/madoi/>

Chinese



⑬ LA TOUR

TYPE: French
PLACE: near Clock Tower
OPEN: 11:00–15:00, 17:00–22:00
BUDGET: JPY 4,000 –
TEL: 075-753-7623
URL(Japanese):
<http://www.madoi-co.com/food/la-tour/>



⑭ OMURAHOUSE

TYPE: OMURICE (Japanese Omelette of rice)
PLACE: Demachi-Yanagi
OPEN: 11:00–15:30, 17:00–22:00
CLOSED: Monday
BUDGET: JPY – 1,000
TEL: 075-712-0671
URL(Japanese):
<http://www.omurahouse.com/>



⑮ KOHSHIN

TYPE: Chinese
PLACE: Imadegawa Street
OPEN: 11:30–14:30, 17:00–23:00
BUDGET: JPY 2,000 – 3,000
TEL: 075-721-8530
URL(Japanese):
<http://tabelog.com/kyoto/A2603/A260302/004228/>
CARD: Cash only.



⑯ RYUMON

TYPE: SHISEN (spicy Chinese)
PLACE: Imadegawa Street
OPEN: 11:00–14:00, 17:00–24:00
BUDGET: JPY 1,000 – 2,000
TEL: 075-752-8181
URL(Japanese):
<http://tabelog.com/kyoto/A2603/A260302/003984/>
CARD: Payable.

Curry



17 KOANOSUKE

TYPE: Thai Curry
PLACE: Hyakumanben *2nd Floor
OPEN: 11:00-15:00, 17:30-22:30
BUDGET: JPY - 1,000
TEL: 075-702-2611
URL(Japanese): <http://tabelog.com/kyoto/A2603/A260302/26001845/>
CARD: Cash only.



18 AOZORA

TYPE: Thai Curry
PLACE: Hyakumanben
OPEN: 12:00-15:00, 17:30-21:00
BUDGET: JPY - 1,000-2,000
TEL: 075-722-0737
URL(Japanese): <http://kyo-mi.com/aozora/>
CARD: Cash Only

Vegetarian Food Available



19 RAJU

TYPE: Indian
PLACE: Imadegawa Street
OPEN: 11:00-15:00, 17:00-23:00
BUDGET: JPY 1,000 - 2,000
TEL: 075-712-6688
URL(Japanese): <http://www.raju.jp/>
CARD: Cash only.



20 FALAFEL GARDEN

TYPE: Israeli Food
PLACE: Demachi-Yanagi
OPEN: 11:00-21:30
BUDGET: JPY - 1,000
TEL: 075-712-1856
URL(English): <http://www.falafelgarden.com/english/index.html>



21 PADMA

TYPE: Zen Food (Vegetable diet)
PLACE: Imadegawa St.
OPEN: 11:30-15:00, 17:00-23:00
CLOSED: Thu. and Sun.
BUDGET: JPY 1,500 - 2,000
TEL: 075-708-7707



22 Vege Café & Dining TOSCA

TYPE: Vegetarian diet
PLACE: Imadegawa St.
OPEN: 11:30-15:00, 17:30-22:00
*Dinner is only Thu, Fri, and Sat.
BUDGET: JPY - 1,000-2,000
TEL: 075-721-7779
URL(Japanese only): <http://tosca-kyoto.com/>



23 SHINSHINDO

TYPE: Cafe
PLACE: Imadegawa Street
OPEN: 8:00-18:00
CLOSED: Tuesday
BUDGET: JPY - 1,000
TEL: 075-701-4121
URL(Japanese): <http://tabelog.com/kyoto/A2603/A260302/26001845/>
CARD: Cash only.



24 CAFE COLLECTION

TYPE: Cafe
PLACE: Imadegawa Street
OPEN: 11:00-22:00
BUDGET: JPY - 1,000
TEL: 075-722-0737
URL(Japanese): <http://tabelog.com/kyoto/A2603/A260302/26001056/>



Schedule

The 2nd Conference on Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia (the 2nd CCPEA)						
Day 1 August 28, 2014						
9:30	Welcome Address: Akihiko AKAMATSU (Executive Vice-President for Student Affairs, Kyoto University, Japan)					
9:40	Keynote Lecture 1 Masahiko MIZUTANI (Kyoto University, Japan)					
10:25	Coffee Break					
10:35	Keynote Lecture 2 In-Rae CHO (Seoul National University, Korea)					
11:20	Coffee Break					
11:30	Keynote Lecture 3 Saranindranath TAGORE (National University of Singapore, Singapore)					
12:15	Photo Opportunity (After Keynote Lecture3)					
	Lunch					
	Room A	Room B	Room C	Room D	Room E	Room F
Moderator	Minao KUKITA	In-Rae CHO	Daisuke KAIDA	Koji OTA	Yasuo DUGUCHI	Michael CAMPBELL
14:00	1A1 Chi-Yen LIU (National Chung Cheng University) Linton WANG (National Chung Cheng University)	1B1 Jinho KANG (Seoul National University)	1C1 Szu-Ting CHEN (National Tsing Hua University) Hsiang-Ke CHAO (National Tsing Hua University)	1D1 Karen YAN (National Yang-Ming University)	1E1 Colin R. CARET (Yonsei University)	1F1 Peter Shiu-Hwa TSU (Chung Cheng University)
14:30	1A2 Satoru SUZUKI (Komazawa University)	1B2 Jeremy WYATT (Yonsei University)	1C2 Daihyun CHUNG (Ewha Womans University)	1D2 Kai-Yuan CHENG (National Yang-Ming University)	1E2 Steven Lee MARSH (Chang Jung Christian University)	1F2 Shiu-ching WU (National Chung Cheng University)
15:00	1A3 Yosuke NASU (Nagoya University)	1B3 Jingxian LIU (Liaoning University)	1C3 Masaki ICHINOSE (The University of Tokyo)	1D3 Tzu-Wei HUNG (Academia Sinica)	1E3 Su-an LIN (National Chengchi University)	1F3 Man-Him IP (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
15:30	Coffee Break					
Moderator	Leon HORSTEN	Tsuyoshi MATSUDA	Masaki ICHINOSE	Kai-Yuan CHENG	Chen-quo LIN	Satoshi KODAMA
15:40	1A4 Yuta TAKAHASHI (Keio University)	1B4 Minao KUKITA (Nagoya University)	1C4 Takeshi SAKON (Kyoto University)	1D4 Makoto KUREHA (Rikkyo University)	1E4 David A. BRUBAKER (Wuhan Textile University)	1F4 Konstantin V. AZAROV (National Chengchi University)
16:10	1A5 Ryota AKIYOSHI (Kyoto University)	1B5 Junhyo LEE (Seoul National University)	1C5 Linton WANG (National Chung Cheng University) Richard HOU (National Chung Cheng University)	1D5 Itaru TAKESHITA (Doho University)	1E5 Miao Kun TSAI (National University of Singapore)	1F5 Jordanco SEKULOVSKI (Kobe University/ Kyoto University)
16:40	1A6 Shunsuke YATABE (Kyoto University)	1B6 Yoshihiro MARUYAMA (University of Oxford)	1C6 Sungil HAN (Seoul National University)	1D6 Chun-ming CHEN (National Chung Cheng University)	1E6 Samuel GATES (University of Louisville)	
17:10	Coffee Break					
Moderator	Szu-Ting CHEN	Yasuo NAKAYAMA	Takeshi SAKON	Nobutsugu KANZAKI	Colin R. CARET	Taku SASAKI
17:20	1A7 Tsuyoshi MATSUDA (Kobe University)	1B7 Shigeyuki AOKI (University of Aizu)	1C7 Reina SAIJO	1D7 Chienkuo MI (Soochow University)	1E7 Filippo CASATI (University of St. Andrews) Naoya FUJIKAWA (Kyoto University)	1F7 Ukyo SHIMIZU (Nagoya University)
17:50	1A8 Sukjae LEE (Seoul National University)		1C8 Ming-Yuan HSIAO (National Chung Cheng University) Linton WANG (National Chung Cheng University)	1D8 Tora KOYAMA (Osaka University) Masashi KASAKI (JSPS/Kyoto University)	1E8 Ryosuke IGARASHI (Kyoto University)	1F8 Nobuo KAZASHI (Kobe University)
18:20	Closed					
19:00	Welcome Dinner Party Restaurant Camphora (Buffet Style)					
21:00						

The 2nd Conference on Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia (the 2nd CCPEA)						
Day 2 August 29, 2014						
9:30	Keynote Lecture 4 Leon HORSTEN (University of Bristol, UK)					Moderator Yasuo Deguchi (Kyoto University)
10:15	Coffee Break					
10:25	Keynote Lecture 5 Wan-Chuan FANG (Soochow University, Taipei / Academia Sinica, Taiwan)					
11:10	Coffee Break					
	Room A	Room B	Room C	Room D	Room E	Room F
Moderator	Shigeyuki AOKI	Yuko MURAKAMI	Daihyun CHUNG	Naozumi MITANI	Nobuo KAZASHI	Taku SASAKI
11:30	2A1 Hidenori SUZUKI (Nanzan University)	2B1 Mana SUZUKI (Kyoto University)	2C1 Huiming REN (Shandong University of China)	2D1 Bosuk YOON (Ewha Womans University)	2E1 SangHyong SHIN (Andong National University)	2F1 Benedict S. B. CHAN (Hang Seng Management College)
12:00	2A2 Ruey-Lin CHEN (National Chung Cheng University)	2B2 Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding PEDERSEN (Underwood International College Yonsei University)	2C2 Taeryang KIM (Soongsil University)	2D2 Ryo CHONABAYASHI	2E2 Fuchuan YAO (Chinese Culture University)	2F2 Michael CAMPBELL (Kyoto University)
12:30	Lunch					
Moderator	Kazuhisa TODAYAMA	Masashi KASAKI	Tetsuya KONO	Kazunobu NARITA	Yasuo DEGUCHI	Satoshi KODAMA
14:00	2A3 Bo-Chi G. LAI (Da-Yeh University)	2B3 Yohan JOO (Yonsei University)	2C3 Masahiro MORIOKA (Osaka Prefecture University)	2D3 Makoto SUZUKI (Nanzan University)	2E3 Ick Hee KOO (Sogang University)	2F3 Bo CHEN (Peking University)
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15:00	2A5 Jonathon HRICKO (Academia Sinica)	2B5 Toshihiro SUZUKI (Sophia University)	2C5 Kristjan LAASIK (Shandong University)	2D5 Ralf M. BADER (Merton College, University of Oxford)		
15:30	Coffee Break					
Moderator	Ruey-Lin CHEN	Nobutsugu KANZAKI	Sho YAMAGUCHI	Shunsuke SUGIMOTO	Yasuo DEGUCHI	Michael CAMPBELL
15:40	2A6 Hitoshi HIYAGON (The Institution of Professional Engineers, Japan) Kazuhisa TODAYAMA (Nagoya University)	2B6 Gerard VONG (Fordham University/ Australian National University)	2C6 Chiwook WON (Korea Institute for Advanced Study)	2D6 Yoshiyuki YOKORO (Keio University)	2E6 Jong Ui LEE (Sogang University)	2F6 Motohiro KUMASAKA (The University of Tokushima)
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Moderator	Shunsuke YATABE		Tora KOYAMA	Makoto SUZUKI		
16:50	2A8 Yasuo NAKAYAMA (Osaka University)		2C8 Steven Michael JAMES (Japan University of Economics)	2D8 Naozumi MITANI (Shinshu University)		
17:20	2A9 Inkyo CHUNG (Korea University)		2C9 Tetsuya KONO (Rikkyo University)	2D9 Chih-chiang HU (National Chengchi University)		
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18:00	Closing Remarks: Masahiko MIZUTANI (Kyoto University, Japan) In-Rae CHO (Seoul National University, Korea)					
18:10	Closed					

Speaker Notes

Presentation time:

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Oral presentations: 30 minutes (including Q&A sessions)

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Proof-Theoretic Analysis of Brouwer's Argument of the Bar Induction

AKIYOSHI, Ryota

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In a series of papers, Brouwer had developed “intuitionism” based on his conception of set. The fan theorem was a key theorem used to prove the uniform continuity theorem ([Brouwer27]). Brouwer proved the fan theorem from a stronger theorem called the bar induction, which is an induction principle on a well-founded tree.

Let us formulate the bar induction. Let B be the set of “barred” nodes. Roughly speaking, B is the set of nodes in the tree at which the tree is well-founded. Suppose that P is a property (or a predicate).

Bar Induction (BI): Assume that

$$A1 \quad \forall \alpha \quad \exists x(\bar{\alpha} (x) \in B),$$

$$A2 \quad \forall n \forall y (n \in B \rightarrow n * \langle y \rangle \in B),$$

$$A3 \quad \forall n (n \in B \rightarrow n \in P),$$

$$A4 \quad \forall n (\forall y (n * \langle y \rangle \in P) \rightarrow n \in P).$$

Then $\langle \rangle \in P$.

Brouwer's argument in [Brouwer27] aimed to give a constructive justification of this theorem based on the BHK-reading of the statement of BI. Suppose that the assumption A1 is given. Under the conditions A2-A4, we can transform all possible canonical proofs of A1 into another proofs of the conclusion. In this argument, Brouwer supposed an assumption saying that such proofs of A1 contain only few elementary inference rules.

Brouwer's assumption has been controversial and received different evaluations. For example, van Atten and Sundholm regard this assumption as a transcendental requirement in the sense of Kant ([Sundholm and van Atten08]). Logicians such as van Dalen, Kleene, and Troelstra have believed that the assumption is not mathematically well-motivated.

In this talk, we sketch a novel approach to understanding Brouwer's argument via a tool called the Ω -rule in infinitary proof theory. The Ω -rule was introduced by Buchholz in 1970's for ordinal analysis of iterated inductive definitions and subsystems of second-order arithmetic ([Buchholz81]). We compare Buchholz's embedding of the induction axiom in the theory of non-iterated inductive definition with Brouwer's argument for BI and claim that the embedding via the Ω -rule is really close to Brouwer's argument. According to our interpretation, Brouwer implicitly introduced an infinitary rule being a version of the Ω -rule, and Brouwer's assumption is a quite natural mathematical restriction on proofs for the quantification over proofs used in the argument to work. This implies that Brouwer's argument should be a mathematically well-motivated argument.

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Dialectical Modification of Toulmin's Model of Argument for Educational Debate

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Since the publication of *The Uses of Argument* (1958), Toulmin's Model of Argument (henceforth TMA) has gained popularity and been heavily used in various fields, especially in the field of speech communication, or educational debate. As Toulmin himself says, "I was amazed to find out that it[*The Uses of Argument*] continued to sell, ... and discovered that it was being used up and down the Mississippi Valley as a theory of communication. (Toulmin 2006, p. 26)." After the 1960s, TMA has become so popular that "textbooks on argumentation now include an obligatory chapter on the Toulmin model of micro-arguments. (Hitchcock and Verheij 2006, p. 3.)" In this sense TMA is one of the finest examples of applied philosophy.

TMA says that an argument consists of claim (C), data (D), warrant (W), backing (B), qualifier (Q) and rebuttal (R). An example which Toulmin introduced in *The Uses of Argument*, and so has been quoted many times, is the following. D: Harry was born in Bermuda. W: Since a man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject, B: On account of the following statutes and other legal provisions, Q: So, presumably, R: Unless both his parents were aliens / he has become a naturalized American / ... , C: Harry is a British subject.

The first and often mentioned problem with this original format is that TMA is too complex to be taught to the beginners. They have great difficulty in identifying which is D, W, and B in a given argument. They often confuse W with D (Klumpp 2006, p. 104.), and try to find B, Q, and R in vain even when they are missing in the given argument. Another problem with TMA is that it is applicable to only "easy" cases, even in the legal field for which TMA was originally designed (Tans 2006, p. 221.) In the field of educational debate, another serious problem with TMA is that it is quite inadequate for dealing with comparisons of arguments put forward by the affirmative / negative sides, on a particular proposition (i.e. whether smoking is bad for health).

Thus we need a simplified version of TMA, which is much more widely applicable and can deal with dialectical nature of an advocacy. In this talk, I will propose to adopt a simple Claim-Ground model of argument instead of the original TMA, for the use in educational debate. This C-G model itself is already in use (for example, Scriven 1976 p. 42.; Fisher 2004, p. 19.) but has seldom been utilized or tested for educational debate. I will argue that the superiority/inferiority of C-G model rests on the actual applicability of this model and the effect it has on the learners – so the choice of argument model needs assessment by/on the learners.

**Aesthetic strategy of Suprematism through Taiwanese eyes: video art
Suprematist Kapital by Zukunftsmusik**

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Video art *Suprematist Kapital* (2006) created by Taiwan-based art group Zukunftsmusik put Suprematism in the unique context of Asian contemporary art. Video provided not only new cultural background to Suprematism, already more than hundred years old art movement of Russian origin, but also found a new way to re-think and re-shape the same questions which bothered artists for centuries. Hence *Suprematist Kapital* provides an interesting opportunity for research in comparative aesthetics.

Zukunftsmusik clarified their artworks through the text of the manifesto, named 'Ideology' and Malevich, founder of Suprematism, also spent a lot of time explaining his art. Thus, it is possible to analyze the position of Malevich on problems concerned in *Suprematist Kapital*. Therefore, besides comparative aesthetics, *Suprematist Kapital* granted an opportunity of implicit aesthetic analysis. It can be understood through the intertextuality, created by text and art by both Malevich and Zukunftsmusik.

Main subjects in video art by Zukunftsmusik are politics and economy, just as in the case with some classical Malevich works on the theory of art. Video *Suprematist Kapital* in pictographic form tried to show relations between ecology, natural resources and war. Artists of Zukunftsmusik also expressed powerful anti-militaristic sentiment, just as K. Malevich was very particular to separate his 'aesthetic revolution' against old culture and real war, a witness of which he was.

Zukunftsmusik in their text and in their work dealt with important economic and moral problems. It is quite similar to K. Malevich's interpretation of the relations between art and society in his understanding of economics and politics. Malevich understood art as a system, somehow similar to economics in his theory of surplus value in the paintings. But the interpretation of the main feature of economy by Zukunftsmusik is something entirely different than it was to Malevich. He was concerned with the question of human relations in the process of production which was a common way of thinking for his time. In fact, Artist's interest in the economy was expressed in imitations of K. Marx thought, like Malevich's theory of surplus value in the art. Possibly, it is a sign of paradigm shift in the artist's perception – what was multidimensional and systematic (socio-economic relations) is just a substance (oil) today.

Conception of propaganda occupied an important part of Zukunftsmusik's 'Ideology.' Russian avant-garde was unaware of its threats. Contemporary philosophy, the thought of Gadamer, Sloterdijk, Deleuze and others, serves Zukunftsmusik well to create an awareness of politicized art. Therefore the art group armoured against temptations of political involvement as it should be in the age of new media.

Suprematism was originally closely related to the utopism of early XX century. It was an ideal of the complete emancipation of art, society and personality. Malevich's conception of emancipation of art is especially important. For Malevich it means a creation of ultimate art form. This is an impossible ambition for the contemporary art theory. Consequently, Zukunftsmusik sees Suprematism as a personal emancipation only.

Hyperintensionality and the supervenience argument

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The supervenience argument against non-reductionist moral realism is based on the fact that the strong supervenience of normative properties on non-normative properties implies that for every normative property there is a corresponding non-normative property that is necessarily co-extensive with it, given that certain closure conditions apply to the set of non-normative properties (cf. Kim: 1993, chapter 3; Jackson: 1998; Streumer: 2008). This fact puts pressure on non-reductionist versions of moral realism, since normative properties would seem to end up being identical to non-normative base properties, thereby ruling out the existence of irreducibly normative properties.

The standard response to this argument consists in rejecting the idea that intensional equivalence, i.e. having the same extension across modal space, suffices for identity (cf. Shafer-Landau: 2003; Majors: 2005; Suikkanen 2010). By instead adopting a hyperintensional account of properties that allows necessarily co-extensive properties to be distinct, one would seem to avoid the commitment to reducibility and open up room for the possibility that normative properties are distinct from non-normative properties despite being necessarily co-extensive.

Yet, in order for this line of response to be substantiated, one needs to provide a fine-grained theory of properties that specifies the identity conditions of properties and explains how hyperintensional differences can arise, whilst also satisfying the requirement that it tracks worldly differences rather than simply identifying differences in how we pick out properties and represent the world.

This paper establishes that rejecting necessary co-extension as the criterion for property identity does not suffice for defending non-reductionist views of the normative. In particular, there is the problem that one can run an analogous grounding argument that functions as the hyperintensional analogue of the supervenience argument. If one accepts that normative properties not only supervene on non-normative properties but are grounded therein, then every normative property will be such that one can form a disjunctive property that is grounded in precisely the same non-normative properties, thereby threatening non-reductionism even within a hyperintensional setting.

It is then argued that this problem can be resolved by distinguishing the different grounding relations that are involved in grounding the normative property and the corresponding non-normative property and thereby making it the case that the two properties turn out to be hyperintensionally inequivalent after all. Whilst one can neither distinguish them in terms of extensions across modal space, nor in terms of their grounds, one can nonetheless distinguish them in terms of the respective grounding relations that they involve. In particular, whereas the normative property is normatively grounded, the disjunctive non-normative property is metaphysically grounded. As such, non-reductionist versions of moral realism are committed to there being irreducibly different grounding relations.

The Traditional Aesthetic of Qiyun and Union with Nature: Jing Hao, Jizi and Contemporary Chinese Ink Painting

BRUBAKER, David A.

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Can Chinese ink painters use traditional Chinese aesthetics to make contemporary contributions to global art? With the globalization of Chinese art, Chinese artists seek what is called “Chineseness” or authenticity in expressing culture indigenous to China. Chinese artists and critics call on philosophers to interpret traditional Chinese aesthetics so it can be used to assess authenticity. This question is this: How can an ink painting be both contemporary and authentic in a traditional sense? I answer by studying the paintings of Jizi, an ink artist in Beijing, who claims to satisfy a spiritual need (basic to all religions) through paintings that show self in union with nature, others and a larger universe. He claims to add dimensions absent from the art of Jing Hao, Guo Xi and Shitao; he joins intermediate dimensions of physical phenomena with micro-level dimensions of personal observation and macro-level dimensions of a universe linked to the spirit of Dao. Jizi acknowledges the influence of the writings and paintings of Jing Hao (c. 855- c. 907). Can we interpret and use Jing Hao’s aesthetic to assess Jizi’s success in representing self in union with nature and universe?

With the paper, I interpret and use Jing Hao’s text *Bi fa ji* (*Notes on Brushwork*) to explain how Jizi succeeds in expressing a union of self with nature that is neglected in Euro-American art. This requires discussion of principles that Jing Hao outlines: “vitality” (*qi* 氣) and “resonance” (*yun* 韻) are satisfied only by images that are “authentic” (*zhen* 真); and an image is authentic only after the painter passes vitality or spirit through “substance” (*zhi* 質). Reference or formal resemblance to physical events fails to qualify an image as authentic. What does the key term “substance” mean in *Bi Fa Ji*? I answer by evaluating commentaries and terms from Li Zehou, Ames and Hall, Stanley Murashige, Stephen Owen and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I suggest: *zhi* (substance) denotes the animating texture or general atmosphere of visible space that is a display of *both* one’s own private field of sensuous existence (i.e. one’s *own nature*, Buddha nature, or *tathata*) as a sentient being and also appearances of natural phenomena. The outcome is an aesthetic for a privileged element of embodied union with nature that some Asian artworks are about. Liu Yuedi is correct: Danto’s analytic philosophy of art cannot express this aboutness.

Using this interpretation and electronic images, I show that Jizi experimental and synthesizing paintings represent the visible field that is one’s own evidence of inseparability from nature, others and a larger universe. Since East Asian art depicts space in a way that Euro-American artworks do not, Asian art has its own history and is not a Euro-American project. Traditional Chinese aesthetics can guide the creation of images that express a meditative awakening to the preciousness of life – to embodied union with visible nature – that can be valued by individuals in China, Japan, East Asia, and audiences throughout the world.

Being-for and Being-with in the Philosophy of Watsuji Tetsuro

CAMPBELL, Michael
Kyoto University, Japan

Watsuji defines human nature in terms of the relationships that individuals stand in to one another within the nexus of the 'practical interconnections of acts'. (Rinrigaku, ch.1 and *passim*.) In so doing, he consciously both adopts and adapts a Heideggerian thought. He agrees with Heidegger that individuals are to be understood in terms of their "being-with-another" (Being and Time *passim*, esp. p.163). However, he parts company with Heidegger's understanding of others as determining the subject through the ways in which they shape an individual's projects. For Watsuji (as for Lowith by whom he was influenced), individuals are constituted in interpersonal relationships which are prior to instrumental considerations.

However, precisely how we are to understand this 'betweenness' remains fraught. Two different possible interpretations present themselves. On the first, subjects are characterised by a fundamental incompleteness; an individual is defined by the fact that they aim at various forms of communion with others. On this interpretation, relatedness to others forms the ontological ground of the subject. Thus, the nature of an individual is to be fundamentally incomplete; to aim at a state whose realisation would simultaneously be their own destruction. Practical self-understanding is achieved in clarifying the varying forms which this demand for communion take. (We might summarise this reading of Watsuji in the slogan that all being is being-for, with the stress falling equally on both sides of the hyphenate.) On the second interpretation, the relations which subjects stand in to others do not impart a fundamental incompleteness into the nature of the individual. Rather, an individual's perspective is characterised by the identities which they attain by virtue of their standing with respect to others. On this view, relationships are not something to be aimed at, but are prior to the setting of goals entirely. And thus, the subject attains a practical understanding of themselves by coming to see how they appear in the eyes of others, and by acting in conformity with the expectations that this appearance brings with it.

In this paper I will discuss these two interpretations; whether they are consistent and, if not, which we ought to endorse.

Form as Substance in the Zhuangzi

CARET, Colin R.

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The Zhuangzi is a famously difficult text to interpret. The style is chaotic and parodical. The author frequently mocks those who have the audacity to pursue the answer to any question. A successful reading of the text should explain why it has this tone. It is common to see Zhuangzi as a naive relativist, but this is an uncharitable treatment of a highly sophisticated text. On my interpretation, Zhuangzi subscribes to a novel brand of skepticism. He regards all assertions—including his own—as unassertible because the practice of assertion itself is defective. He arrives at this thesis from two different directions. First, he regards divergent perspectives as incommensurable. Without a metric of comparison, no point of view has a greater claim to objectivity than any other. Second, he thinks that every perspective is irredeemably partial. Every point of view imperfectly grasps the Dao and disagreement is merely a byproduct of this imperfection. Assertion presupposes that one is in a position to justify belief in one's claim over any alternative, but no one is ever in such a position, hence nothing is assertible, including this very thesis. This skeptical attitude not only motivates what Zhuangzi says, it naturally shapes how he expresses himself. Some philosophers contend that Zhuangzi cannot be a skeptic, for the simple reason that such unrestricted skepticism is incoherent. My reading gives the lie to this criticism: as I understand it, Zhuangzi's skepticism is internally coherent, because nothing can (correctly) contradict it. This reading has the virtue that it explains not only the philosophical content of the text, but also the reason for its disconcerting form. Since the central thesis is an unassertible truth, the most one can do is to 'show' this truth by undermining the practice of assertion. This is exactly what Zhuangzi aims to do through the use of wordplay and paradox.

The self-grounding nature of Being and Nothingness

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Since Being and Time, Heidegger claims that Being, which makes all objects be, is not an object (a *Seienden*) and he calls this difference the ontological difference. Recently some people propose that Heidegger uses the ontological difference in order to avoid the infinite regress of grounding (cf. Caputo, 1978, *Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*; Braver, 2012, *Groundless Ground. A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger*). Suppose that every object must be grounded by something (must be made be an object by something) and, furthermore, suppose that a is grounded by b. If b is an object, then it must be grounded by something. Let us call it c. If c is an object, then it must be grounded as well. This chain of grounding will end only if objects are grounded by something which is not an object. According to some interpreters, Being is the groundless ground and it stops the infinite regress.

The aim of this paper is not to examine whether this is Heidegger's own position or not. Rather, we examine if, given the ontological difference, the conclusion that Being is a groundless ground is metaphysically inevitable. We will propose that this is not the case: Being can be interpreted as a self-grounding ground. To show this, we will compare Heidegger with Kitaro Nishida. First of all, we will briefly review Nishida's notion of Absolute Nothingness (in particular in his *From That Which Acts to That Which Sees*) to show that it shares basic metaphysical features with Heidegger's Being. Secondly, we will show how Nishida endorses a position according to which Absolute Nothingness not only grounds every objects but it also grounds itself. In addition to this, we will address the question whether the self-grounding ground leads to infinite regress or not and, if it is, whether this infinite regress is vicious or not, by considering recent debate about non-well founded grounding (Bliss, 2013, 'Viciousness and the structure of reality'; 2014, 'Viciousness and circles of ground'; Priest, 2014, *One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness*).

Comparing Utilitarianism, Feminism, and Confucianism in Animal Ethics

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In the West, one of the most famous approaches to animal ethics is the utilitarian approach developed by Peter Singer. Since the first edition of his book *Animal Liberation* was published in 1975, it has become a “canonical text” in animal ethics; many scholars have discussed this utilitarian approach to animal ethics. Among those who disagree with the utilitarian approach, some feminists, such as Josephine Donovan, argue that the utilitarian approach neglects the importance of some feelings and emotions such as compassion, sympathy and empathy. These feminists argue that when we consider how humans should treat animals, we should take these feelings and emotions into account.

On the other side of the world, some scholars discuss what roles East Asian traditions have in animal ethics. Some scholars, such as Tongdong Bai, Donald Blakeley, and Ruiping Fan, especially focus on how Confucianism contributes to animal ethics. They also discuss how we should treat animals based on the ideas of Confucius, Mencius, and other Neo-Confucians. In general, all of these scholars agree that Confucianism supports humane treatments to animals, but they have different ideas on whether Confucianism supports animal rights.

The aim of this paper is to discuss these debates of animal ethics in both the East and the West, and then develop an approach that I call “a compassion approach to animal ethics.” I discuss why we should have humane treatments to animals and how to develop a compassion approach to animal ethics based on Confucianism. I then discuss how Confucianism and this compassion approach contribute to some debates of animal ethics in the West. Although Confucianism and feminism are two different moral theories and they have conflicts in some issues, Confucians concur with feminists that some feelings and emotions (especially compassion) are important in animal ethics. I discuss how Confucianism and feminism can work together in the framework of the compassion approach to animal ethics. I argue that based on such a compassion approach, we can successfully reply to some challenges to feminism on the importance of compassion in animal ethics. I also argue that this compassion approach is an alternative approach to Singer’s utilitarian approach. I argue that there are some advantages of the compassion approach over utilitarian approach. Finally, I also reply to some possible challenges from utilitarian approach to the compassion approach.

Socio-historical Causal Descriptivism An Alternative Theory of Names

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In another paper, I have developed 'Social Constructivism of Language and Meaning' (SCLM for short) in order to systematically answer the following questions: how does language work? Where does linguistic meaning come from? SCLM aims to emphasize the sociality, intentionality, conventionality, publicity, openness, and historicity of language and meaning

In this paper, based on SCLM, I will develop and argue for a new theory of names, which I call 'Socio-historical Causal Descriptivism' (SHCD for short). SHCD is consisted of six theses: (1) Names, including proper names and general ones, originate from some kinds of the initial baptisms of the corresponding objects, which are social and public events. (2) In the causal chain of communication, the descriptive information about a name's bearer is transferred from one person to another and from one generation to another. Only information about the bearer, acknowledged by our linguistic community, constitutes the meaning or partial meaning of the name. (3) The meaning of a name is consisted of the collection of informative descriptions of an object (as the bearer of that name) acknowledged by our linguistic community, which is always open-ended and vague to some extent. (4) Relative to agents' practical needs, there are weights in the collection of the informative descriptions of the referent of a name, that is, some descriptions are more important or central than others. (5) All names have their own referents, including not only actual objects in the real world, but also general objects, fictional entities, and intensional ones. (6) The meaning of a name is the guidance, criteria, measure and route to identify what the name designates. Besides, speaker's intention, Background, and Network should also be taken into account when determining the referent of a name.

In my view, SHCD is a totally new brand of traditional descriptivism about names, and is an alternative competitor of direct reference theory held by Kripke and others.

KEY WORDS: descriptivism, direct reference theory, socio-historical causal descriptivism

Cross-contextual Projection and Generalization: Revising Popper's Solution for Induction Problem via the Problem of Repetitive Experiences

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Scientific laws are traditionally regarded as universal generalizations. Their truth is to be logically supported or verified by way of induction on repetitive occurrences of experiences. David Hume argues that no inductive inference could be logically necessary. So the induction problem in Hume's sense is formulated as this question: Can (scientific) laws be justified by inductive inferences? Hume admits that induction has a great utility and asks why people always use inductive inference to laws. His answer is that people's custom has them believe there are regularities or laws in nature. In other words, Hume rejects the logicity of inductive inference and instead proposes a psychological interpretation.

Karl Popper (1969) agrees for Hume's critique of the logicity of induction but argues against his psychological interpretation. Popper insists that science is not to produce generalizations passively from repetitions of experiences, but rather scientists should actively impose laws upon nature. Scientists should always try to find empirical similarities and invent laws to interpret them as being similar. From a logical point of view, the procedure isn't an induction but a "trial-and-error" or a "conjecture-and-refutation". This is a methodological rule that requires us to assume a particular type of regularities and to impose it on phenomena before more observations will be made. Then we should try to test the assumption by way of observations or experiments providing empirical evidences. Popper's arguments thus redefine Hume's induction problem as: How are scientific laws justified? Popper answers to this question by proposing the methodological rule of falsification.

Popper's solution for the induction problem presupposes the problem of (empirical) repetition. That is, we have to make sure of similarities and repetitions of experiences before we impose laws on them. How do we warrant that two experiences are similar? How do we judge an event is similar to another and thus the former is a repetition of the latter? The problem of repetition raises a deeper question: Are scientific laws still universal if we discover (or impose) them from (or on) similar experiences?

Although Popper claimed that he solved the induction problem by his falsificationist methodology, he kept intact over the problem of repetition presupposed by his approach. The aim of this paper is to propose a revised solution for the induction problem in Popper's sense via attacking the problem of repetition. The revised solution includes two theses: (1) Inductive inference is a sub-kind of cross-contextual projection; (2) Scientific laws are rather cross-contextual than universal generalization.

Keywords: Induction, Karl Popper, Projection, Cross-contextual generalization

Rationality, Mistakes and Luck: a procedural-oriented approach to rationality

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This paper aims to develop a procedural-oriented approach to rationality. By raising two problems to rationality, first the problem of rational mistakes concerning how a rational agent may and would make mistakes, and second the problem of luck concerning how an agent be rational without luck, this paper argues for a procedural-based theory of rationality to account for these two problems. According to the first problem, in some cases an agent may have false beliefs in deliberation and make mistakes or wrong judgments but still thought to be rational. I argue that reason-based theories of rationality like Williams (1981), Parfit (2011), Raz (1999) and Scanlon (1998) have difficulties to account for the problem. This indicates that a procedural-oriented approach to rationality would be a proper theory for rationality. But according to the second problem, given that rationality requires an agent to have true beliefs, and to make the right judgments or to take the right actions, if the mechanisms for making true beliefs, right judgments or right actions are based on luck, then an agent may satisfy the rational requirements but being irrational. Therefore, I argue that an anti-luck procedural requirement is needed. The proposed theory is the view that rationality consists in three parts: (1) the function and value of rationality is action-guiding, and (2) the mechanism for decision-making and rational deliberation is procedural, and (3) this process is anti-luck.

Keywords: Rationality, Reason, Rational Mistakes, Luck, False Belief

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Capacity, Bootstrapping, and Causal Reasoning

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By presenting a case of discovering a causal explanation for a specific social phenomenon, we suggest that what policy makers and their advisors need is a methodology to indicate an empirical way of searching for, first, an appropriate causal role played by a policy in a specific scenario; and, second, with respect to the causal role in this scenario, any background conditions that enable the policy, in its causal role, to produce the desired policy effect in the domain being investigated. By using the bootstrap method described in this paper, we can then check whether the targeted policy effect is to be obtained as a result of the exertion of the causal role played by the policy and the relevant combination of background conditions. In conclusion, we argue that there is no methodological shortcut that can be readily applied to all scenarios. Causal reasoning following the bootstrap procedure is an ongoing process of causal inquiry that we conduct at each specific scenario to check whether the policy's causal role and its corresponding background conditions are the same as those in another scenario.

**On the Methodology of Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy:
from Domain-Pluralism to Cultural-Pluralism**

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The purpose of this paper is to illuminate and evaluate Georg Northoff's Non-reductive neurophilosophy (2014, forthcoming) in a larger context where a contrast between Eastern and Western ways of conceiving of the world is brought into view. Northoff, a leading neuroscientist and philosopher who has done pioneering works on the neuronal-basis of self and consciousness, adopts an innovative methodology which emphasizes an integral treatment of the metaphysical, the epistemological and the empirical domains in his inquiry of the mind-brain relation. A main resulting picture is that body and environment are inseparable elements that constitute self and consciousness with the brain as a mere necessary but insufficient condition.

I shall show how resources and insights from the Asian philosophical traditions can help not only illuminating why and how such a position is innovative in the Western intellectual traditions, but also providing it with a novel perspective where the ethical domain can also be brought into the picture in ways very different from how Northoff would conceive the matter. In the end, I hope to show that Asian intellectual heritages are relevant and conducive to the contemporary brain science in the study of self and consciousness.

Toward a Coevolutionary Model of Scientific Change

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I attempt to develop what I call a co-evolutionary model of scientific change, which I expect to afford a more balanced view on both the continuous and discontinuous aspects of scientific change. Supposing that scientific goals, methods and theories constitute the main components of scientific inquiry, I focus on the relationships among these components and their changing patterns. First of all, I identify explanatory power and empirical adequacy as primary goals of science and explore the possibility of evaluating scientific goals. Then I try to bring out the major features of how the main components of scientific inquiry are related to each other. One major feature is that they mutually constrain each other, and as such each main component operates as a selective force on the other components. Another major feature is that the main components of scientific inquiry induce changes reciprocally, but with certain intervals. Other important features are the modes and tempos of changes in the main components of scientific inquiry. All these features together, I conclude, suggest that scientific change is evolutionary (rather than revolutionary), as well as coevolutionary. Finally I argue that this coevolutionary model of scientific change affords positive prospects for resolving what I call the problems of circularity and scientific progress.

Normative Explanations and Reductive Explanation Problem

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We offer such explanations, ‘Jack’s behavior was wrong because it made his partner suffer’, ‘one of the recent policies the government issued was unjust because it generated inequality among the people’. These normative explanations require the thesis that moral facts (hereafter ‘Ms’) are somehow dependent on non-moral facts (hereafter, ‘Ns’). This dependence is not brutal: there must be some explanation of why some Ms depend on some Ns. Call this idea ‘the Dependence Thesis’.

How can the Dependence Thesis be explained? One popular approach to this issue was appealing to the idea of ‘supervenience’, but there are some doubts about this approach (Sturgeon 2009, Rosen 2010, c.f., Fine 1994, Wilson 2005).

Another recent suggestion is appealing to the idea of ‘grounding’ (Väyrynen 2013). The idea of grounding is employed to explicate the hierarchical relations between higher order properties and lower order properties, such as the relation between the fragility of a glass jar and the jar’s molecular structure. The idea that Ms depend on Ns in a similar way the fragility of a jar depends on the jar’s molecular structure may explicate the Dependence Thesis, but the suggestion faces the following problem.

Suppose the Dependence Thesis is explained by appealing to grounding: Ns explain Ms because Ns ground Ms. One might think that if Ns ground Ms, Ms are reducible to Ns (c.f., Rosen 2010). One might also think that something is reducible to another thing because the former is identical with the latter. If so, Ms are identical with Ns. But if so, it appears to be incoherent to say that Ns explain Ms: Ms are just Ns, so how can Ms which are in fact Ns be explained by Ns? (Kim 2008). The following case from philosophy of mind illustrates the issue. We may ask, ‘why does pain, not itch or tickle, correlate with N1 (a neurophysiological event)?’. We may also suppose the following identity: pain occurs = some neurophysiological event occurs. But if so, there is no explanatory gap between the fact about pain and the fact about the neurophysiological event, as Block and Stalnaker remark: “once we realize that heat is molecular kinetic energy, questions like this can be seen as wrongheaded” (1999). Obviously we may explain why Ms are Ns (if there are such identity relations), but explaining the identity between A and B is different from explaining A by B. What the Dependence Thesis needs is the latter. Call this issue ‘Reductive Explanation Problem’.

One solution is taking the Ms-Ns relations as grounding but not identical and reducible: Ns ground Ms, but there is no reductive relation between them. This view of grounding may be not popular, but there are some supporters for this view (Audi 2012), so the suggestion seems to be a defensible option. The upshot is that if one wants to take the Dependence Thesis seriously, one should be non-reductivists about the relations between Ms and Ns.

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Can reference be naturalized?
-notes toward an integrational causality

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The philosophy of language has helped to reach the evolution of the notion of reference last one hundred years or so. The notion of reference made a contribution to our understanding of the relation between language and world. And this traditional notion of reference can be characterized as having a one-way (subject-to-object) relation when it is discussed in the context like Fregean sense, Russellian denotation, Quinean opacity, or Kripkean designation. One may call it 'reference1'. But there are those areas of the phenomena or experience which are left out of the context of reference1, and which may be characterized as holding a two-way (subject-to-subject) relation. Then, those neglected areas may require some basic kind of notion of reference in order that those areas may remain as they are when they relate themselves to each other. Let's call it 'reference2'.

Consider a causal statement of type of reference1: John's throwing a baseball caused the breaking of a window of Mary's room. Here, two events of John's throwing a baseball and the breaking of Mary's window are related in such a way that one is a subject as an agent and the other is an object as a recipient. The whole state of affairs is described in terms of a one-way perspective. Then, one may look into a contrasted statement of type of reference2: Paul's glass of water is cooled by one ice cube. It is possible to take this statement as a one-way causal statement, but a better way to approach the statement is to read it as a two-way causal statement. That is, the ice cube's cooling the water and water's melting the ice cube cause each other at the same time. Here two events act both as agents as well as objects, referring parts of each other and integrating each other. So is the notion of integrational(誠) causality possibly to be emerged.

I will try to argue for the thesis that the notion of integrational causality can hold a referential relation between parts of relevant two events. This thesis does not have to depend on language in order to maintain the referential relation, which is what I mean by 'reference naturalized'. And the thesis does not exclude the roles which the linear causality can play. Since the integrational causality is the basic notion, it rather helps to clarify how the notion of the linear causality is to be understood. In order to advance my thesis, I will clarify hypotheses of the following sort: two events under consideration can interact as subject-to-subject in that they are modularly informational; these events don't owe to a linguistic description in order to inter-refer to parts of each other because they exhibit de re innateness, not intensional structure; they can be claimed to maintain characteristics which the notions of modularly information and de re innateness contain by investigating the grammar of their dispositions counter-factually.

Validity of arguments: Proof-theoretic accounts

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Intuitionists object to the Tarskian account of logical consequence for several reasons. A prominent reason is that the account depends upon a verification-transcendent notion of truth. As a result, they argue, the account fails to explain epistemically justificatory force of valid arguments. The validity of arguments, intuitionists claim, should be explained in terms of constructive proof rather than in terms of verification-transcendent truth. Such a proof-theoretic account of validity has been pursued by Dag Prawitz since 1970's. Michael Dummett gave a related account of proof-theoretic validity based on the verificationist theory of meaning. I shall support the need for a proof-theoretic account of the validity of arguments and examine their accounts. Some serious problems for Dummett's account shall be exhibited. While Prawitz's account overcomes some difficulties inherent in Dummett's account, I shall argue, their accounts face a common problem and do not yet constitute a satisfactory proof-theoretic account of validity of arguments.

Choice and the Analects— On Fingarette's Views

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In his *Confucius: The Secular as Sacred*, a very influential little book first published in 1972, Herbert Fingarette famously claims that "...Confucius...did not possess such a language [of choice and responsibility]" (p. 19). His claim is based roughly on the following considerations. (1) He identifies *Tao* (also *Dao*, 道), or the Way, with *Li* (ritual propriety, 禮): "We may even think of *Li* as the map or the specific road-system which is *Tao*" (p. 20). (2) "*Li*, for Confucius, is the explicit and detailed pattern of that great ceremony which is social intercourse, the human life" (pp. 19-20). (3) He takes Confucius to be committed "to the idea of the cosmos as basically unambiguous, as a single, definite order..." (p. 20). (4) For Fingarette, to correctly follow the Way is rather a matter of appealing to the relevant definite order or the detailed pattern, and an error of moral judgment is for him "a defect of knowledge" (p. 23). To follow the Way would then be a matter of discovery and knowledge, rather than a matter of choice or decision.

The claim that the *Analects* lacks choice thus hinges very much on Fingarette's specific understanding of *Tao* and *Li*. But as pointed out by Benjamin I. Schwartz long ago, *Li* is not comprehensive enough to "...cover' all life situations", so choices have to pick up the slack. I shall try to strengthen this last point and add more details to it by looking carefully into how even a noble man in the *Analects*, or, as Fingarette takes it, "[a] man perfected in *Li*" (p. 21) would go about determining which action or moral judgment is the most suitable in a situation, and into what factors may go into such a determination. And if *Li* cannot be what Fingarette takes it to be, I would argue, neither can *Tao*. I shall also argue that to identify *Tao* with *Li* in the way Fingarette does it is questionable. And Confucius's alleged commitment to a definite and unambiguous cosmic order will also be reconsidered.

It should be clear that Confucius's noble man as a man perfected in *Li* is comparable to Aristotle's practically wise man (*phronimos*), while what the former is specifically capable of is comparable to the latter's possession of practical wisdom (*phronesis*). So in going about assessing Fingarette's views, I shall draw on ideas from some useful discussions of Aristotle's relevant views.

Faultless Disagreement

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Faultless disagreement is such a situation that we disagree with something, while neither of us is making a mistake. Kölbel (2004) says that candidate topics of faultless disagreement include “aesthetic, culinary or moral value, probability, justification of beliefs, and many others”. Relativism endorses the possibility of faultless disagreement by arguing that in some cases the truth-value of a proposition is relative and varies in different perspectives. Kölbel holds that the truth of p is not relative in the sense that it varies in different utterances, but that itself is relative. Another solution is contextualism, holding that the truth of a proposition is dependent upon the context in which the proposition is asserted. Absolutism accommodates faultless disagreement in such a situation that ideal critics fail to converge on both p and not- p . Baker points out that the contextualism case is not faultless disagreement because there is even no apparent conflict. He claims that his proposal of not only respects the possibility of faultless disagreement, but also sets up limits of faultless disagreement. Huvenes (2014) provides an alternative account for faultless disagreement that in some cases disagreement involves “conflicting nondoxastic attitudes” other than belief. I will briefly show their arguments and disputes, and defend my standpoint on dealing with this situation with discussion of disagreement in special cases involved. Both relativism and contextualism are so strong that can even accommodate faultless disagreement in actual matters. However, belief on a factual matter in the world cannot be true or false simultaneously, and those holding false beliefs are making a mistake. Disagreement on objective truth is not faultless. Faultless disagreement is possible only if there are attitudes involved in the conflicting proposition-expressions. Some evaluative words, such as tasty, funny, and interesting, although seemingly descriptive, are actually used for expressions of feelings, emotions, or desires of agents, not something in the world without entangling with mental states of agents.

Yoga Ethics: Being and Indifference

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If philosophy has a rightful claim to ethical questions, rather than simply ceding the territory to social theory, it is because philosophy has access to some meta-ethical realm with which the social sciences cannot engage. I argue that this uniquely philosophical realm is transcendent Being. Twentieth century philosophers of Being, however, failed to propose credible ethical norms. In fact, the opposite is often the case. The values offered by phenomenologists and existentialists have proven either historically contingent or internally inconsistent. Moreover, I would argue that the “linguistic turn” of Heideggerian phenomenology and its resultant prioritizing of hermeneutics is an implicit surrender of Being to contingency. The philosopher is thus reduced to sharpening empirical tools, and even this role is being progressively colonized by critical social theory.

It is into such a historically intractable problem that Yoga Philosophy might make crucial inroads. As has been repeatedly observed, Yoga examines Being phenomenologically, with direct analogues for most of the key concepts developed by Husserl, Heidegger, et al. Moreover, Yoga concerns itself directly with transcendent Being, viewing any hermeneutical tools as secondary. Finally, Yoga philosophy clearly enunciates the necessary relationship between a meta-ethical framework and Being, asserting, “The beginningless alliance between Consciousness and the object is the cause of the avoidable, i.e., misery.” Highlighting the role of Yoga’s five named manifestations of misery (klesas) which all spring from this meta-ethical misapprehension of reality, I will plot the progression of Yoga from its unique ontological-axiological foundation to its concrete ethical assertions, focusing in particular on the special role of indifference in Yogic ethics. I assert that indifference is, in fact, the key meta-ethical norm for a philosophy rooted in Being, which alone is capable of both orienting the individual towards authenticity and of ordering any “secondary” ethical imperatives (Yoga’s yamas and niyamas, compassion, amity, etc.)

Moreover, I argue that—paralleling Yoga’s concepts of stupefaction (tamas) and mutateness (rajas)—contemporary western philosophers of Being have either freely surrendered the realm of ethics to pragmatists, or prioritize some reactionary value like revolt. On the one hand, the tamas philosophers mistakenly believe that they can pare axiology off from ontology, thus crippling both. On the other hand, the rajas philosophers adopt as primary an implicitly social value, thus turning Being on its head and betraying the individual. I argue that both responses might find the roots of a corrective in Yoga philosophy.

I will conclude by examining the Yogic concept of the “constructed mind,” in which an enlightened individual volunteers to engage a social milieu in some virtuous mode of comportment. What would the key features of such a constructed mind be? Having stated what is ethically primary (the individual) and what is ethically derivative (the social) how might a philosophy true to the axiology-ontology manifold, yet in concert with western social theory, impact the development of ethics?

A defense of a posteriori essentialism: reply to Lowe

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Call the view that essences can be discovered empirically a posteriori essentialism. E. J. Lowe (2007) argues that a posteriori essentialism is questionable. According to Lowe, a posteriori essentialists reach their a posteriori essentialist claim by inferring the claim from an a priori essentialist principle and an a posteriori non-essential truth. Lowe argues that, however, this does not work because the inference is not valid. My aim in this paper is to defend a posteriori essentialism against Lowe's argument. On close reflection, I argue, essentialist principles Lowe assumes do not correctly represent essentialist principles that a posteriori essentialists espouse. And I show that once Lowe's principles are replaced with correct ones that I propose, a posteriori essentialist arguments, contrary to Lowe's claim, can be accepted as valid.

The prospect of professionalization of engineers in Japan

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Engineering ethics is one of the major branches of applied philosophy. It presupposes that we should admit engineers as professionals in order to give real substance to it. This means that engineering ethics education is a part of social movement aiming at introducing a professional system into Japanese engineering scene, although the educators themselves seldom recognize this implication.

Historically seen, in Europe and the United States, the socialization of engineering knowledge has been promoted simultaneously with the professionalization of engineers, by transformation of a part of craftworkers into "engineers". This social change was brought about by the autonomous movement by engineers themselves. In Japan, on the other hand, engineers have been deprived of the occasions to foster their identity as a profession so that they have been lacking any motivation to start movements toward professionalization. This is partly due to the way knowledge and skills of engineering have been taught in Japanese higher education. There has been a sort of division of labor. Universities and colleges provide their students with knowledge of "engineering science" and leave teaching practical skills as an professional engineer to companies their graduates found a job with.

Given such a historical context, it is no surprise that the attempt to introduce engineering ethics into Japan should face with serious difficulties. In short, it is not fully understood that engineering ethics is strongly tied to professionalization of engineers. This is why Japanese engineering ethics education put a more stress on a frame of mind than on practical skills engineers should have. As a result, Japanese engineers have got only "engineering ethics" unrelated to practical skills, which are the basis of being a professional, and neither have they been successful in establishing the autonomy inevitable for professionalization.

Consequently, our most urgent and fundamental question should be like this: how can Japanese engineers forge an identity as profession, form a strong social group and become conscious of their social roles beyond being a part of companies?

Our opinion is that the professionalization needed is possible only through making a qualification system operate more effectively and substantially. We already have a rudimentary qualification system which was introduced in parallel with engineering ethics education. It is closely related to higher education and CPD (continuous professional development) system. In addition, it is strongly supported by the only professional society in Japanese engineering, i.e. The Institution of Professional Engineers, Japan, which has been struggling for professionalization of engineers.

However, in order to advance the professionalization process further, we need to answer basic and sometimes philosophical questions in advance: What is the essence of the expertise engineers have? What is the basis of engineers' identities? In short, what is the definition of engineers? In our presentation, we will address these question from both philosopher's and engineer's points of view.

Absolute Infinity and Reflection Principles

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Modern day set theorists look to strengthenings of their formal theory, as axiomatised in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice, in order to gain further knowledge about, or at least insight into, the universe of all sets of mathematical discourse. Such strong principles of infinity surface as statements in various guises about large cardinal numbers.

In the early days of the subject such strong axioms could intrinsically be justified in part by a process of reflection: the universe itself could not be pinned down by a single sentence. Any attempt to do so would only result in such sentences being valid in a 'small' proper part of the whole. However it is now realised that the kind of strong axioms that are needed to justify most of the known strong principles of infinity go far beyond these traditional methods of sentential reflection upon the whole.

I will contend that strong axioms of infinity of the kind used in modern set theory can nevertheless be motivated by a return to Cantor's original conception which involved both sets and what he called Absolute Infinities, which we would today call proper classes. Indeed strong reflection principles can be motivated against the background of a Cantorian conception of proper classes which views 'collections that are too large to be sets' as mereological parts of the set theoretic universe.

In this context, I will in my lecture give special attention to a special kind of class theoretic reflection principles that are called Global Reflection Principles, and that are due to Philip Welch. These principles state that whole infinite classes of sentences that are true in the set theoretic universe are also true in parts of the universe that are not too large to constitute a set. In a Cantorian setting, these Global Reflection Principles are motivated by arguing that the set theoretic universe is much too rich to be singled out even by an infinite class of sentences.

There are similarities between reflection principles in set and class theory and certain theological views about the nature of the Absolute. In particular, there is a parallelism between Global Reflection Principles and their motivation on the one hand, and Philo of Alexandria's views about the nature and transcendence of the Absolute on the other hand. These relationships between the foundations of set theory and theological views of the Absolute will also be explored in my lecture.

Retail Realism and Wholesale Treatments of Theoretical Entities

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In recent years, many philosophers involved in the scientific realism debate have abandoned wholesale arguments for and against realism, i.e., arguments which purport to show that we ought to be realists or antirealists about theories in general. Instead, they have embraced retail arguments, which purport to show that we ought to take a realist attitude toward some specific theoretical entities, and an antirealist attitude toward others. This position is known as retail realism, and my aim is to argue that there is a further wholesale element that it must avoid in order to qualify as a viable position.

My argument appeals to an example of a theoretical entity from the history of chemistry. In the late eighteenth century, Antoine Lavoisier hypothesized the existence of the muriatic radical, a hypothetical component of a substance known then as 'muriatic acid.' In the early nineteenth century, Humphry Davy determined that muriatic acid is, in fact, hydrochloric acid.

Retail realists may ask whether we ought to be realists or antirealists about the muriatic radical. I argue that such a question is ill-formed. This is because it ignores the possibility that one might adopt an antirealist attitude toward the muriatic radical in the late eighteenth century, and a realist attitude toward the muriatic radical in the aftermath of Davy's work in the nineteenth century. Such a question treats the muriatic radical in a general way that cuts across differences between the state of chemistry in Lavoisier's day and the state of chemistry in Davy's day. This, I suggest, amounts to a wholesale treatment of the muriatic radical that should be avoided.

Retail realists ought instead to opt for a retail treatment that relativizes realist and antirealist attitudes to specific moments in the history of science. Such a treatment allows for the possibility of taking an antirealist attitude toward the pre-Davy muriatic radical, and a realist attitude toward the post-Davy muriatic radical. Retail realism, so understood, would allow for distinctions of finer grain in our realist and antirealist attitudes, and thereby allow for a richer understanding of the relationship between scientific theories and the world.

Finkish Modal Dispositionalism

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Borghini and Williams (2008) promote an actualistic account of metaphysical possibility, called modal dispositionalism. They argue that we can explain modal claims in virtue of dispositions possessed by actual objects, in which cases, our explanation of modal claims is informative, not merely a metaphysical imagination. In this paper, we argue that, as the result of taking the realistic and non-reductive account of dispositions, Borghini and Williams have to face the challenge from the intrinsic finks: they cannot deal with intrinsic finks so that modal dispositionalism loses some explanatory power of modal claims. And this result will lead their theory into a dilemmatic situation: either modal dispositionalism is unsatisfactory for its lack of proper explanatory power, or it will be incompatible with the main tenet of modal actualism for the introduction arbitrary ontological properties.

Key Words: actualism, modal dispositionalism, disposition, intrinsic fink.

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Duty, Supererogation, and Utilitarianism

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Utilitarianism is often criticized, among other things, in its being too demanding and in its failing to give a proper moral significance of supererogation. It is also often claimed that these two criticisms are saliently applicable to the classical formulation of utilitarianism which endorses almost categorically the maximizing principle of utility as the fundamental principle of morality. Many contemporary scholars make efforts to remedy these two alleged, though closely connected, problems. Two strategies are introduced to rescue utilitarianism, though resulting in somewhat compromised modifications to classical utilitarianism. Two particular strategies are well-known in the literature. One is to lower the maximization requirement such that the too-demandingness problem could be eased. The other is to bring in some constraints into calculation of utility such that there will be room for actions that are morally permissible but beyond the call of duty. These two strategies and the resulting versions of modified utilitarianism, however, pay much for fixing these two problems. An important question naturally arises: are such costs worthwhile with regard to securing utilitarianism? For those who adhere to the classical utilitarianism (especially act utilitarianism), to pay such costs is tantamount to giving away central features of morality like impartiality, universality that utilitarianism has claimed. For them this is too high a price to pay, while revisionists see proper. Regarding such debates within utilitarianism, there arises an issue central to moral philosophy: Are impartiality and universality central to morality? Some contemporary scholars wish to defy both. In this paper, I shall explore a possibility that John Stuart Mill's formulation of utilitarianism can give some room for explaining away at least in some cases the problems of too-demandingness and the denial of supererogation. In exploring such a possibility, I also explain but without much argument how the constraints of impartiality and universality figure in Mill's account of the utilitarian morality, or morality, for that matter.

Simultaneous Causation? Some Remarks on the Notion of *Sahabhū-hetu*

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When we talk about the temporal relation between a cause(s) and its effect, there are three possibilities: forward causation (a cause precedes its effect), backward causation (an effect precedes its cause), and simultaneous causation. Accepting one does not necessarily exclude accepting the others, but the first is the most popular one and many people think that it's the only one acceptable. I've dealt with the second in one of my earlier papers, this paper will discuss the third one.

Simultaneous causation means, *prima facie*, not just that a cause(s) and its effect exist at the same moment or period, but there is no time interval between the two events, i.e. it takes no time for the cause(s) to produce its effect so that they co-exist right at the same time. We'll explore the idea of *sahabhū-hetu* (俱有因), one of the six causes in Abhidharma Buddhism, which literally means co-existent cause, and together with another one of the six, *saṃprayuktaka-hetu* (conjoined cause 相應因) which is a subset of the former. *Sahabhū-hetu* is generally regarded as simultaneous causation, but Kenneth Tanaka (1985) argues that it means rather a kind of simultaneous "relation", not simultaneous "causation". Therefore, criticisms against this idea are due to misinterpretations, i.e. we don't have to worry about Buddhists' or philosophers' criticisms of the simultaneous causation. However, KL Dhammajoti (2003) argues that Tanaka misinterpreted the texts and "the *sahabhū-hetu* of the Sarvāstivāda indeed is a doctrine of simultaneous causality". Furthermore, Dhammajoti emphasized that this idea is of fundamental importance to the Sarvāstivāda.

As pointed out by both Tanaka and Dhammajoti, previous studies over-relied on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and ignored other important texts such as Saṃghabhadra's *Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra-sāstra* (abbr. Ny), extant only in Chinese. Mainly based on Ny, this paper will try to clarify the idea and the argument, and if *sahabhū-hetu* means simultaneous causation, as Dhammajoti asserted, we would examine to see if it can counter the criticisms from the Sautrāntika and from the modern philosophers; but if not, as Tanaka asserted, is there anything special with this Buddhist idea? In this case, does *hetu* has a different meaning from cause in modern sense? The goal of this paper is not only to make a contemporary interpretation of *sahabhū-hetu* and to have a better understanding of Buddhist theory of causality, but also to reconsider the concept of cause and even the concept of simultaneity, to which the Buddhist philosophy could contribute in return.

The Sorrow of E. Coli?

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Two separate views, which I call uniqueness thesis and computational thesis, are widely held by philosophers of the mind. The first thesis holds that humans have rationality but simple animals such as unicellular organisms do not. Thus, while *Escherichia coli* (E. Coli) can handle highly complex tasks such as sensory integration, memory, and the control of behavior, these are regarded as merely stimuli-response reactions. Another thesis holds that, given that the computational approach of the mind is correct, human intelligence can be described in terms of a neuron network that processes information in terms of massive logical gates with mathematical rules.

However, I argue that, at least at the functional level, the conjunction of the two theses will result in a cognitive version of the sorites paradox: If an organism with n gates is considered as having rationality, then so do organism with $n-1$ gates, $n-2$ gates, $n-3$ gates, ..., and so on. This will finally lead to the conclusion that an organism with only one gate, like E. Coli, has rationality. To solve this problem, I suggest rejecting the first thesis. I reconsider the difference between human and non-human species and sustain that this difference is not categorical but only in degree. In fact, recent data also support a similar view, such that animals may also have emotions and intelligence.

On Omission-Involving Causation

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Non-existence sometimes, or often, causes something. Something invisible (e.g. darkness, radiation, political power and so on) can cause our fear. Silence, if any, can produce various effects. Someone's absence can give influence to other people in a certain context. Dead people can sometimes stir our soul despite their having already disappeared. Placebo effects are usually understood as not-having medical drugs' making conditions of patients improved. Or, defenders' doing nothing rather than an opponent's scoring in a football match is sometimes counted as responsible for the goal. All those cases seem to represent causal relations at least either of causal relata is non-existence. I focus upon the issue on how to treat such kinds of "omission-involving causation".

I develop my argument in terms of raising two questions. First, is such omission-involving causation reducible to normal causation between positive events? By normal causation I mean cases like, e.g. 'dropping a pen on the table causes a sound'. Likewise, for example, darkness can be reinterpreted as perception of blackness, which is a positive phenomenon rather than non-existence. Someone's absence at the meeting is simply an event for the person to stay somewhere else. Placebo effects eventually derive from physician's psychological suggestions. Then, however, is there anything characteristic in those cases which come up only in terms of non-existence? I want to say, 'yes', to this question, because by definition causal relation is not restricted only to physical phenomena actually occurring in that causation plays an essential role in attributing human responsibility, and legal attributions of responsibility intrinsically involve some kinds of non-existence like negligence, ignorance, omission, non compos mentis, and so on. Omission has dwelled within the concept of causation from the outset.

Second, if that is the case, how should we understand the contrast between normal causation and omission-involving causation? How should we place omission-involving causation in the debates on causation in general? My conclusive suggestion would be that; causal relations in general should be regarded as fundamentally omission-involving, as Hume's analysis of causation has already alluded. Consequently, it turns out that we have to face the problem on ontology of non-existence in order to truly figure out what causation is.

Catuskoti and Two Truths from a point of view of factionalism

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Some commentators think of Mahayana Buddhism as mystic and irrational in a sense. They make reference to *catuskoti* that is the logical category of the traditional logic of the Buddhists, in order to justify their standpoint. For *catuskoti* does not seem compatible with modern classical logic.

However, there are others who are opposed to this view, since they think *catuskoti* can be coherently interpreted by a modern non-classical logic. J. Garfield and G. Priest are the leading proponents of the latter standpoint. In J. Garfield & G. Priest, “Mountains are just mountains” (2009) and G. Priest, “The Logic of Catuskoti” (2010), they attempted to interpret *catuskoti* by using a many-valued logic, i.e., First Degree Entailment (FDE). Their formulation or reconstruction of *catuskoti* is more plausible than former ones. There is, nevertheless, a problem that in the formulation by FDE we cannot use a conditional connective in the usual way. So, what sort of conditional would be appropriate? They didn’t give a thorough answer to this question.

There is another topic that I will address. It should be noted that there is a significant distinction among the different “truths” in Buddhism—conventional truth and ultimate truth. In a recent paper, “Two Truth(s) about Truth,” published in *Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy* (2011), some commentators offer analyses of this distinction. I focus on a fictionalist account of conventional truth in this paper. The main point of this account is that conventional truth is evaluated relative to some fictions that serve as conceptual constructions in our everyday life, whereas ultimate truth corresponds to the ultimate reality.

The main purpose of my paper is to develop this analysis of two truths and to make a more appropriate formulation of *catuskoti*. Firstly, I expand the natural deduction system of FDE by using a concept that is borrowed from fictionalist account of conventional truth, i.e., a *story* or *point of view*. In semantics, each sentence is evaluated relative to points of view. The system I introduce has the so-called *strict conditional*, and is sound and complete in regards to the semantics.

Secondly, I apply this formulation of *catuskoti* to interpretation of two truths. I formulate the distinction between these truths as the difference of *quantification* over points of view. That is, conventional truth is a sentence that is true in *some* points of view. On the other hand, ultimate truth is a sentence that is true in *all* points of view. By this interpretation, we can obtain a better understanding of the distinction between two truths.

Thirdly, I interpret the “four-fold negation,” (otherwise known as negative *catuskoti*) and describe a paradox that Nagarjuna seems to endorse in terms of my formulation of *catuskoti*. In my interpretation, Nagarjuna did not negate truth values, but rejected points of view that evaluate sentences in the “four-fold negation.” Since points of view are the roots of conceptual thought, Nagarjuna’s purpose is to deny our conceptual thoughts. However, this leads him to the paradox.

Rethinking how and why Ethics could be a branch of Philosophy, and a possible epistemological doubt on ethical non-naturalistic realism

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Russ Shafer-Landau provides an interesting argument in defense of ethical non-naturalistic realism in his renowned article "Ethics as Philosophy: A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism"¹. The basic idea of his argument is that ethics should be seen as the genus of inquiry of philosophy. Therefore, ethics inherits some essential traits of philosophy, including "the realistic status of truth" and "status of truth as something other than a natural science". If ethics does share these traits, ethical non-naturalistic realism would be a highly favourable account compared to other meta-ethical theories.

True, it is inspiring to consider the relationship between ethics and philosophy as a feasible approach to investigate ethical and meta-ethical issues. However, I do not think "the Ethics as Philosophy argument" is sound, as I cast doubt on the first premise of the argument, that is, "Ethics is a species of inquiry; philosophy is its genus". I am not trying to argue that one should not investigate ethics philosophically, as I also admit there is a "certain kind and degree of methodological similarity" between ethics and philosophy². Rather, I argue the first premise fails to characterize the relationship between ethics and philosophy thoroughly and accurately simply by reducing it to a genus/species classification. For instance, one can investigate ethics or enjoy an ethical life without doing much philosophical inquiry on what she actually believes and does. If we want to take the relationship between ethics and philosophy as an approach or premise to investigate ethical or meta-ethical issues seriously, like what Shafer-Landau attempts to do, it is reasonable for us to accurately capture what actually happens in ethics (or philosophical ethics).

In this paper, therefore, I start with rethinking the relationship between ethics and philosophy by considering why and how far philosophical inquiries can aid ethics³. By rethinking this relationship, I attempt to show that (1) genus/species classification is not the most accurate way to understand the relationship between ethics and philosophy;

(2) it is not very plausible to think that ethics must share some fundamental principles with other branches of philosophy as Shafer-Landau suggests (especially those principles which favours ethical non-naturalistic realism)⁴;

¹ Russ Shafer-Landau, "Ethics as Philosophy: A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism", in *Foundations of ethics : an anthology*, eds. Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Malden: Blackwell Pub., 2007), 210-222. and in *Metaethics after Moore*, eds. Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons (Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2006), 209-232.

² Russ Shafer-Landau, "Ethics as Philosophy: A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism", in *Foundations of ethics : an anthology*, eds. Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Malden: Blackwell Pub., 2007), 212.

³ Similar questions are also suggested by Bernard Williams. See Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the limits of philosophy*. London: Fontana, 1985, 1-21.

⁴ Russ Shafer-Landau, "Ethics as Philosophy: A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism", 213.

(3) Shafer-Landau fails to aware that an essential motivation of putting ethics under philosophical inquiry. That is, philosophy can significantly further our study of ethics by giving us more questions instead of merely giving us answers;

(4) There could be a possible challenge against ethical non-naturalistic realism from the perspective of moral epistemology, in contrast with Shafer-Landau's conclusion. Thanks to the parallel between ethics and other branches of philosophy, we should take all possible questions in epistemology into consideration. And epistemology involves the discussion of the nature of truth, as truth is a necessary condition of knowledge. Therefore, apart from the argument from moral disagreement, ethical non-naturalistic realists also need to explain why it is possible for one to grasp any normative truth. However, I argue it would be extremely difficult for them to provide a reasonable explanation.

Prototypic View of Moral Judgment

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Many philosophers have thought that both moral reasoning and moral emotions are important elements of moral judgment. Until today, however, there has not been any consensus on the relationship between moral judgment and these elements. What is the relationship between moral judgment and moral emotions? What role does moral reasoning play in moral judgment? These are fundamental questions concerning the nature of moral judgment.

Jonathan Haidt, one of the most influential psychologists today, argues that moral emotions play a critical role in moral judgment, while downplays the role of moral reasoning. According to his "social intuitionist" model, moral judgment is caused by quick moral intuition (including moral emotions). After that, moral reasoning justifies the judgment. Compared to traditional views which say that moral judgment is made as a conclusion of moral reasoning, in Haidt's model moral reasoning has a less important role. In this model, it seems that moral judgment is just a kind of cognitive confirmation of one's intuition (i.e. becoming conscious of one's intuition and taking the intuition seriously when s/he behaves). The most important factor in moral judgment is moral intuition, not moral reasoning. Basically, from Haidt's point of view, our moral judgment is caused by our intuition.

However, Haidt does not seem to say much about the nature of moral intuition except that culture largely influences its development. What is the nature of moral intuition? What mechanism generates moral intuition? Clearly, these are open questions.

To answer these questions, Paul Churchland's prototypic view of moral judgment is useful. In this presentation, I will integrate his prototypic view of moral judgment with the social intuitionist view. According to Churchland's view, moral judgment is categorization of a perceived situation to a certain moral category. Each category has a certain prototype at the center. In the process of categorization, similarity to such prototype is crucial. If a perceived situation is similar enough to a moral prototype, then it is categorized to the moral category.

In this integrated view, if a perceived situation is categorized into a moral category, this evokes certain moral emotions. For example, if I see a man kicking a sleeping cat, this situation is categorized as harm by my cognitive process. This evokes moral emotions like disgust. Immediately, I recognize the result of the categorization and the evoked emotions, in other words, become conscious of them. Consequently, a moral judgment is made. In this case, I feel that the man's behavior is morally bad. After that, as Haidt says, moral reasoning justifies the judgment.

In this presentation, firstly I will sketch how to integrate Haidt's and Churchland's view of moral judgment. After that, I will briefly argue that, adopting this integrated view, we can appreciate some roles of moral reasoning more precisely.

The Roots of Triangulation in the Proximal-Distal Debate: Davidson's Rejection of Quine's Dualism and the Problems of Error and Objectivity

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Late in his career, Donald Davidson introduced a model of communication involving two creatures interacting with each other and a mutually perceived object. My view is that Davidson's introduction of this triangulation model was occasioned by a long-running debate with his mentor, W. V. O. Quine. This debate concerned interpretation, a topic important to both thinkers. The focus of the debate was what to take as the stimuli that cause speakers to utter certain sentences about their environment. Quine favored the proximal cause, the stimulation of one's sensory receptors; Davidson favored the distal cause, the objects themselves. This paper concerns the proximal-distal debate and its role in motivating Davidson's introduction of triangulation.

While the proximal-distal debate concerns interpretation, I aim to make clear why Davidson came see the debate as a "minor corollary" of a more fundamental difference with Quine concerning epistemology. Generally, Davidson rejects Quine's epistemology as embodying an empiricist version of the dualism of scheme and content. In this paper, I intend to answer the following three questions: What are the relations among Quine's empiricism, scheme-content dualism, and the epistemic role he assigns proximal stimuli? What are the reasons for Davidson's rejection of Quine's notion of proximal stimuli, and in particular, how is that rejection motivated by Davidson's rejection of Quine's empiricist dualism? And finally, how does Davidson's rejection of Quine's empiricist dualism and of the role of proximal stimuli motivate the introduction of triangulation?

I answer these questions by arguing the following. Quine's motivation for taking proximal stimuli as central for meaning and epistemology derives from his epistemic project of accounting for our conceptual sovereignty in building conceptual schemes (and in particular, different ontologies) to match the input of our sensory receptors. Now, since radical translation involves the matching of *proximal stimuli*, Quine avoids the problem of error attribution; moreover, because proximal stimuli are *matched*, sentences conditioned to them can serve as objective checks on conceptual schemes. Rejecting scheme-content dualism in favor of the distal theory makes it difficult for Davidson to account for error attribution in the context of interpretation and objective truth in the context of epistemology. Indeed, for Davidson the problem of error is just the epistemic problem of objectivity seen in the mirror of meaning. I argue that triangulation is meant to address the problem of objectivity by accounting for our concept of error as arising *within* the context of two minds communicating about a shared world rather than by analyzing objectivity as an epistemic relation *between* mind and something external to it.

Epistemic Virtue, Luck and Knowledge

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Presenting a successful analysis of knowledge has been a difficult task. Pritchard (2011) argues that his theory, Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE), offers a successful analysis of knowledge, accommodating two master intuitions about knowledge. One is the anti-luck intuition: if S knows that p, then S's cognitive success is not a matter of luck. The other is the ability intuition: if S knows that p, then S's cognitive success is the product of S's (relevant) cognitive ability. In this paper, I argue that ALVE is flawed. After expositing Pritchard's theory, I present three arguments against ALVE. Firstly, the safety principle, which Pritchard takes as a necessary condition for knowledge, suffers from the generality problem: there cannot be a principled way to specify the 'in the same way' clause in safety. Secondly, the lack of a principled way to specify the safety condition entails that ALVE is not a necessary account of knowledge. I present my counterexample, POSTMAN, to demonstrate this point. Thirdly, ALVE is not a sufficient account of knowledge. My counterexample CONFUSED SCIENCE TEACHER shows that a perfectly safe and true belief as a product of a reliable cognitive ability may fail to amount to knowledge. In the last section, I unpack the implications of my examples. We have understood luck in epistemology in terms of reliability of a belief, but this should change.

Contextualism and the Problem of ‘Shared Content’

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There is a well-known objection to linguistic contextualism, according to which contextualism cannot explain the communicative success between speaker and hearer in different contexts given that it must deny the existence of ‘shared content’ between them in such cases. There is also a well-known reply from contextualists to this objection, the Similarity View, according to which it is only the similarity between the content uttered by the speaker and the content understood by the hearer that is enough to guarantee the communicative success. Cappelen and Lepore have recently criticized the Similarity View by arguing that it cannot explain our practice of indirect reports where we apparently distinguish between content identity and content similarity. In this paper, I argue that truth-conditional content is not transparent to us in general, and I develop a contextualist answer to Cappelen and Lepore’s criticism by showing that, given the non-transparency of truth-conditional content, there is a good reason to think that our practice of indirect reports regarding content identity is not reliable.

Need for a new, a Space Environmental Ethics

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The appearance of private space exploration projects like Mars One and SpaceX makes the problem of anthropogenic pollution and devastation in outer space more actual than ever. There is a need for a new, a Space Environmental Ethics. One major difference between environmental ethics on earth and in space is the expectation of preserving "wilderness." While our planet has already lost or degraded many wilderness areas by human interventions, Outer space still remains untouched. We have a chance of protecting space environments including planets other than earth. This is the reason why we should take space environmental ethics seriously and promote the protection of space environments.

In this talk, I will offer arguments for environmental space ethics. These include arguments inspired by pluralism of nature's value and virtue approach to environmental ethics. My conclusion is that the best possible way to promote protection of space environments is to show overlapping support for it, if none of the arguments are perfect.

How can Peirce's theory of mind be reconstructed in the contemporary context?

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This paper aims to provide a foundational scheme to reconsider C. S. Peirce's theory of mind in the context of the contemporary philosophy of mind. There have been a few studies on Peirce's theory of mind; Savan (1981) examines Peirce's semiotic theory of emotion; Colapietro (1989) makes clear Peirce's idea of the self, which is closely related to his "synechism"; Delaney (1993) points out Peirce's monism supposing that the mental world and the physical world are continuous and thus consciousness and physical entities are not completely different kinds of entities. These studies seem to suggest potentialities of Peirce's theory of mind even in the context of the contemporary philosophy of mind, but no sufficient study has so far focused on such potentialities. This is perhaps because while Peirce scholars tend to dedicate themselves to clarifying Peirce's thought as it was, researchers on the philosophy of mind have such specialised and established arguments, that none seem to care about the discrepancy between Peirce's thought and the contemporary philosophy of mind. However, this paper aims to remove or at least reduce this discrepancy by pointing out ideas that can be shared by both sides; this paper re-explains Peirce's theory of mind with language used in the contemporary philosophy of mind in the following way. Firstly, considering Peirce's trichotomic semiotics (namely, the three-term system of representamens, objects, and interpretants), Peirce's theory of mind can be construed as a kind of functionalism. Secondly, this review of Peirce's theory of mind as functionalism can be connected to arguments regarding propositional attitudes. The article then suggests a need to establish a theory of internal representational systems in the same way as Fodor (1978). Thirdly, Peirce's semiotics involves explanations about the way each semiotic process evolves and becomes established; these explanations can be applied to contemporary discussions about how each biological species has evolved its representational system. Thus, this paper concludes that Peirce's theory of mind is worth considering in the context of the contemporary philosophy of mind, and opens the way to more rewarding studies for both Peirce scholars and researchers on the philosophy of mind.

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Bio-Politics over Radiation: From Hiroshima, Chernobyl to Fukushima

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As the nightmare of a truly catastrophic scenario became barely overcome after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, heated debates over radiation issues have erupted in Japan. In this paper we shall first overview some of the central questions and problems coming out of these debates; that is, historical re-examinations, the collusion structure and econo-geographical disparities. Then, we bring into focus the risk of “internal radiation,” which is placing “natality” itself in peril. In the name of “natality” Arendt extolled the “human capacity to begin.” However, in order to protect the “miracle of natality,” we would have to come face to face with the reality of the “bio-politics over radiation risk.”

“Bio-politics,” according to Foucault, concerns the natural environment and bodies, which are both “ungovernable.” Problems regarding radiation risk are typical problems of “governability”; radiation can contaminate the whole environment consisting of water, air, and, eventually, can damage genes and destroy the self-reproductive capacity of biological bodies. Because “radiation” can be neither seen nor sensed, problems relating to the so-called “radiation exposure safety level” become political problems concerning “scientific construction of invisible reality” and “definition of its meanings for human health. Thus, we shed light on the concrete ways bio-politics operates in the nuclear age, running through from Hiroshima, Chernobyl to Fukushima, with an eye to “justice as the security of biological bodies.”

The impact of “internal radiation” has been grossly underestimated, or in many cases largely ignored, in assessing the damage caused by radioactive contamination. In this vein, the “Post-Hiroshima age” has a dual structure: while the devastating, visible effects of “external radiation” accompanying the immediate impact of the nuclear explosions are self-evident and indeed have provided strong impetus toward abolishing nuclear weapons, the insidious low-level “internal radiation” caused by the intrusion of residual, radioactive materials into human bodies has not been generally recognized until recently. Even in Japan, it was only several years ago that “internal radiation” came to be taken into consideration legally in the so-called “A-bomb disease class action lawsuits.”

Regarding the Chernobyl accident as well, the damage caused by low-level and internal radiation was grossly underestimated by WHO and IAEA. Their joint report of 2005 attributed only 43 deaths and 4,000 fatal cancers directly to the Chernobyl disaster. Obviously such underestimation derives from the need to keep the radiation risk “invisible” in order to promote the “peaceful” use of nuclear power. Furthermore, it has been reported that WHO’s section in charge of radiation effects on human health was abolished a few years ago, and, even before, there had been only several radiation-related specialists at WHO. Considering the number of nuclear specialists working for IAEA, these facts are all the more emblematic of the nature of the nuclear system in which we are living; we are living in a world which is, institutionally, very poorly equipped regarding radiation protection, though it has been intent on promoting nuclear power generation.

Not A Case For A Priori Deducibility

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Frank Jackson claims that if minimal physicalism is true, and so if our world is physical without remainder, then its physical nature necessitates its psychological nature. He further asserts that if our world's physical nature necessitates its psychological nature, then the necessitation is *a priori*. This is because he thinks the logical supervenience of the psychological on the physical implies *a priori* deducibility. He claims that we cannot *a priori* deduce the psychological from the physical. Therefore, minimal physicalism is false.

According to him, the psychological appears in the physicalists' account of our world if and only if the physicalists' account of our world entails the psychological account of our world in the necessarily-truth-preserving-sense of the term 'entail'. He knows that it seems implausible that the psychological facts are *a priori* deducible from the physical facts. However, if relevant contextual *a posteriori* information is given, he says, we can *a priori* deduce the whole story about the psychological way things are from a rich enough purely physical story.

Jackson presents a case for *a priori* physicalism; he tries to show how we can *a priori* deduce water facts from H₂O facts with relevant contextual information about the world. He considers an argument the conclusion of which is not *a priori* deducible from its premises, although the passage from the latter to the former is necessarily truth preserving. Then he introduces a relevant empirically true statement of the world as another premise which together *a priori* entail the conclusion provided that 'water is the stuff that plays the water-role' is *a priori*.

Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker point out that the uniqueness of the stuff that plays the water-role is important to the argument and claim that the need for uniqueness makes serious trouble for the argument. I refute the argument by showing that the hidden judgment that for all x, if x is the stuff that fills the water role, then x is water, is not *a priori* for another reason. I argue that the judgment that Jackson introduces to make the argument *a priori* deducible, is *a posteriori*. I show that if we accept Jackson's hidden judgment is *a priori*, then it leads us to two options, neither of which is satisfactory; we should accept either that an argument is valid in *a priori* deducibility sense but is not valid in necessarily truth preserving sense, or that necessarily, if XYZ covers most of the planet, then water covers most of the planet is true.

Jackson's explanation for arguments concerning *a priori* deducibility works for some arguments. It is because *a prioricity* coincides with necessity in those cases. However, as we learn from Kripke, 'necessary' and '*a priori*' are not coextensive. Thus, even though I accept that a rich enough purely physical story about the way things are determines the whole story about the psychological way things are, I deny that we can *a priori* deduce the latter from the former.

Towards a new ontology of Information

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Physical science has been the model for psychology for a long time. The paradigm for psychology as well as cognitive science is mechanistic. The mechanistic explanation of nature was proposed and developed by the early modern philosophers in the 17th century. For their view, the changes and movements in the nature were considered to be explained by linear causal relationship. Psychology has tried to understand animal's behavior as linear causal relationship between input/stimulation and output/behavior.

In this paper, I would like to hold from philosophical point of view that animal behavior is not a causal process, but semiotic process. In other words, the relation of animal behavior and the environment is not the dyadic causal relation between input/stimulation and output/behavior, but the triadic semiotic relation among the object, the representamen, and the "interpretant". What ties animals with their environment is information. In this sense, information concerns not only epistemology but also ontology. The ontology here is the philosophical conception of the nature of being, existence or reality. Information is, ontologically speaking, a power or a force; it should be considered as "formal cause" in Aristotelian terminology. The relations of in an ecosystem are made not only of causalities, but also of natural semiotic relation or information. Natural semiotic relation or information can be another ontological principle in addition to causality, natural laws, or energy transmission. It is information, not causes and effects, which are the building pillars proper to the ecological system.

Ecological relationship between animals and the environment is articulated in terms of the sign process whereby meanings are communicated in nature. The ideas of Peirce and biosemiotics, and ecological psychology of James Gibson would bring radical changes when they are introduced in psychology and cognitive science, as well as in ecology. For example, from their view point, perception should be interpreted as a triadic relation, not dyadic. There is also perception of semiotic relation such as a relation between fire and smoke, and also perception of affordances. Thus, perceptual world holds natural referential relations, so it is bestowed with full of meanings and values. If the basic unit of life is the sign, and psychology is to understand as human beings as active agents interacting with their environment, we need to establish a new ontology for psychology in place of the causal ontology that physical provides.

The new ontology must be the ontology of natural signs, admitting that sign process is not subjective, conceptual process, but natural, real process in the world. The presence of the sign process, triadic relation among sign, object, and interpretant, is the testimony of the existence of biosphere. The semiotic process is a necessary condition of the existence of living beings, and the ecosystems generates and develops thorough the process. The perceptual experience is the contact with this semio-biosphere by our own living body. Psychology should adopt this ontology of sign process as its basis on behalf of the causal ontology of physics. I will propose this new ontology of information in referring to James J. Gibson's concept of information and biosemiotics.

Aristotle on Blind Spot

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There has been heated controversy over Aristotle's theory of perception. In *De Anima*, Aristotle said that perception is a kind of alteration that occurs when a sense-object makes a change to a sense organ. There has been, however, little agreement as to what kind of alteration Aristotle had in mind. While some scholars think the change involves a physiological alteration dealt with in *Physics* (literalism), the others think perception does not involve any other physiological alteration than becoming aware of sense-objects (spiritualism). It is important issue not just for interpreting Aristotle's text correctly, but for examining a possibility to reinterpret Aristotle's theory of perception.

As I deal with the issue, I feel constrained to choose only one subject among relevant subjects because they are too many to be dealt with in a single paper. While the subjects can be generally divided into two groups, one group about the principle of perception (e.g. hylomorphism) and the other about concrete phenomena relevant to perception (e.g. afterimage), many scholars have focused mainly on the former. It is, however, important to look at Aristotle's entire perception theory from a viewpoint of concrete examples Aristotle uses. For this reason, this essay will deal with the issue in terms of concrete phenomenon: the sense of touch and its unique phenomenon, blind spot.

Blind spot is a phenomenon that a sense of touch does not perceive its object. Aristotle speaks of its cause in two statements. The first statement is that since an organ of touch is a body, its tangible quality can be equal to that of external object. The second statement is that perception is a kind of being affected. The first statement refers to the static condition of blind. The second statement gives a hint as to why the organ cannot perceive an external object when it satisfies the static condition. Aristotle says that the organ suffered blind spot does not undergo the transition or the actualization. What is important is to identify what kind of actualization does not occur in the case of blind spot. There are two explanations about that. (a) One is that because a tactile organ has been already actualized by something else, it does not transit to actualization. The other is that because the organ does not affected from its object, it does not perceive it. Furthermore, the latter is divided into two different explanations depending on what aspect of the organ is not affected: (b) a formal aspect or (c) a material aspect. First two explanations – (a) and (b) – belong to spiritualist interpretation and the last one – (c) – to literalist interpretation. I will argue that the literalist interpretation more properly explains blind spot phenomenon because it is in consonance with Aristotle's explanation of the sense of touch while two other explanation are disaccord either with the explanation of the sense of touch or with textual evidence. This conclusion promises a bright future for reinterpreting Aristotle from a modern viewpoint.

Creating New Waves in Philosophy of Trust

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Trust is studied in many fields of philosophy, such as ethics, epistemology, and so on, mainly because trust is regarded as a basis of our social life. The focus of study is usually on interpersonal trust, since it has been assumed in accordance with the traditional conception of society that our social life consists only in interpersonal relations. However, contemporary society does not only consist of people. It includes computers, cars, and mobile phones surrounding us. Our social life will rapidly increase interactions with artifacts, and it will be based on trust between artifacts and us.

Trust and related notions are also scientifically studied in other fields, such as economics, psychology, and computer science. The questions of how artifacts can be trustworthy and how humans can trust them are studied in some of these fields. In this paper, we argue that philosophical studies on trust must wide its scope and be interdisciplinary, in order to deal with trust in/by artifacts.

For this purpose, we show (i) that interdisciplinary studies on trust can offer a new perspective on the current studies in philosophy, and (ii) that they help to find hidden relations between trust and other relevant notions.

As for (i), current philosophical studies on trust focus on interpersonal trust. Some even deny the possibility of trust toward artifacts on the ground that trust is an attitude that we cannot have toward machines (cf., Jones (1996)). To object to this anthropocentrism, we have conducted a joint study with robotics engineers. In this study, a simulation in a game-theoretic setting is used to see how cooperation can emerge among rational non-human agents, given certain assumptions about trust. Interestingly, the result of the simulation shows that cooperation requires (or at least, is interpreted to require) a minimal form of reliance-responsiveness; this is a necessary condition of trust according to the major philosophical theory of trust. We expect that this and forthcoming results can greatly contribute to trust research in philosophy and elsewhere.

As for (ii), trust is related to many notions, including ones whose relationships with trust are hardly noticed. One example is the Japanese notion of *Anshin*. ‘Anshin’ is used to represent what is required for a technology to peacefully coexist with humans in robotics and related fields. It is controversial how a technology can obtain Anshin, partly because it is difficult to pin down what it is; for example, it is very difficult to translate ‘Anshin’ into other languages. Some even think that

Anshin is peculiar to Japanese culture. However, some psychological studies suggest that Anshin is a notion that is related to trust (e.g., Murayama et al (2007)). If this is the case, the question of how Anshin can be obtained may be answered by studying trustworthiness, and the apparent peculiarity of Anshin may be explained in terms of cultural difference concerning trust and trustworthiness.

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Murayama, Y., et al, (2007). "The Structure of the Sense of Security, Anshin," *Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security*, 83-93.

Dynamic Meinongian logic for descriptions

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The aim of this article is to present a formal language and a semantics for it which reflect two ideas expressed but not formally implemented in Priest's *Towards Non-Being* (2005). One is that a description can be evaluated in different ways depending on the speaker's intention, so that one and the same statement can be true on one evaluation and be false on the other. The other idea is that two different kinds of linguistic activities are involved in fiction, as well as in mathematics: characterising an object and inferring about the object thereby characterised. The language defined here is designed so as to conform to the ideas as naturally as possible. The resulting language and its semantics is Meinongian in that it assign every term a denotation, but also Russellian in that it treat existing objects as specially privileged.

Re-thinking Anthropocentrism in Japanese Culture: Non-anthropocentric Naturalism and Anthropocentric Communication with Nature

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From 70s to 80s, many theorists and activists in environmental ethics and animal ethics have tried to defeat anthropocentrism for relieving the friction between humans and non-human nature. At the same time, numerous theologians and philosophers have also struggled to demonstrate that monotheist anthropocentrism should be not the main reason of the friction. In these decades, the controversy about anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism seems to have been calmed down. However, it is not because anthropocentrism is defeated, nor is non-anthropocentrism dismissed. The people concerned just go their own way “pragmatically”. On one hand, Christianity seeks to find the reconciliation between humans and non-human nature based on stewardship ethics; on the other hand, radical ecologists and animal activists justify their excessive campaigns through their non-anthropocentric philosophy.

The situation in Japan is very similar. But in behalf of stewardship, the “tradition” of Japanese culture was brought into discussions. One of the typical cases is the whaling controversy. The anti-whaling camp attacks the people who are engaging in whaling physically and morally because they are presumed to be disregarding the inherent value of wonderful sea mammals, destroying their beauty, intelligence and life.

The pro-whaling camp in Japan, in order to justify their deed, often refers to Japanese tradition of whaling and sometimes the whole tradition how Japanese have been communicating with nature on many delicate ways. But it seems to need more theoretical sophistication. The tradition of fishers and the tradition of aristocrats are different. Furthermore, the fact that Japanese have a long tradition of whaling does not assure that they have rights without proviso to continue whaling in the present day. Japanese government has claimed that the whaling in Japan did/will not degrade the stability of the ocean ecosystem, but, as Kalland says, the focus of the anti-whaling camp is on the animal ethical problem of whaling, namely hurting and killing whales, rather than on the environmental problem. The pro-whaling camp did not provide enough persuasive justification for the ethical accusation on whaling, but only claimed that “it is our tradition/culture of whaling.” In contrast, the anti-whaling camp makes its claim based on non-anthropocentric philosophical concepts and theories, it sometimes argues like utilitarian and sometimes like deontologist. Despite its eclectic style, the anti-whaling campaign has gone well as far and gotten much support and sympathy widely.

In the current paper, in order to make the moral gap between the pro-whaling camp and the anti-whaling camp understandable, I will focus on the difference between non-anthropocentrism in West (I call it “post-anthropocentrism”) and “non-anthropocentrism” in Japanese culture. Through the articulation of the difference, one can realize the reason why Japanese are so “stubborn” about the whaling. This research is not only meaningful for the whaling controversy, but also for the understanding of the diversity of our moral thinking with regard to nature in general. At the end, I will demonstrate the potentiality of Japanese natural thought as environmental virtue ethics and illustrate the limitation as the ground for environmental regulations.

Situated cognition as socially distributed cognition

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Recently, cognitive scientists are increasingly interested in the *situatedness* of cognition, or the fact that our bodies and environments play certain important roles in our cognitive activities. The situated view on cognition emphasizes that our intelligent behaviors are not produced by our brains alone, but emerge from interactions between our brains, bodies, and environments. What does the situatedness of cognition imply about the *boundary* of cognition? Some theorists, such as Robert A. Wilson and Andy Clark, propose that we should understand cases of situated cognition as forms of *extended cognition* (EC): according to them, our cognitive processes are not always bounded by skins and skulls, but sometimes extended into environments.

I examine their EC thesis in term of the question ‘whose cognition is extended?’. Notice that EC theorists make two distinct claims: (1) there are extended cognitive processes; (2) (at least some of) these extended cognitive processes are *ours*; that is, they are attributed to individual human agents. I admit (1), but deny (2). I claim that there are extended cognitive processes, but none of them are ours. Our cognitive processes are not extended.

I propose that we should regard cases of situated cognition as forms of ‘socially distributed cognition (SDC)’, rather than EC. These two theses have usually been confused, since both of them admit that there are extended cognitive processes. However, EC and SDC are different in terms of *attribution* of these processes. While the former attributes extended cognitive processes to individual human agents, the latter attributes them to ‘socio-cultural systems’, which are constituted by multiple actors (including people and tools) and distinguished from our own cognitive systems. I argue that EC fails, but SDC succeeds, to capture the social aspect of our cognitive activities. We usually carry out cognitive tasks through cooperation with other actors. EC turns out to miss this fact by insisting that human individuals’ cognitive systems are extended.

Finally, I comment on what the reconception of situatedness suggests on *human nature*. EC overestimates human individuals’ cognitive capacities. We manage to produce rich cognitive achievements, not because each of us can extend its own cognitive systems and augment its own cognitive capacities, but because we can form socio-cultural cognitive systems together with other actors.

Distant Things: A Closer Look

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In 1909, Wilhelm Schapp, a student of Edmund Husserl's at Göttingen, defended a doctoral thesis, titled *Contributions to the Phenomenology of Perception* (in German). It is a phenomenological treatment of visual and other modes of perception. While Schapp's later work, notably in the philosophy of history, has received considerable attention recently, this cannot be said of his 1909 doctoral thesis. I will attempt to remedy this by providing a critical discussion of Schapp's arguments, as well as by highlighting the current relevance of Schapp's views, viz., by comparison with recent, interestingly similar views of Alva Noe's.

More specifically, I will argue against Schapp's central contention that we do not visually perceive distant things, e.g., a house far down in the valley. I will also argue that Schapp's discussion of such cases is nevertheless, in certain respects, more cogent than Alva Noe's arguments to the effect that we do not visually perceive distant objects like a far-away person or the stars in the firmament.

A central claim of Schapp's is that the sense of sight presents "things" by means of color. In order to argue that color is needed insofar as it contributes an order, or a form of presentation, Schapp invokes cases where the requisite color phenomena fail to obtain, notably in the case of what we normally refer to as distant things. Since in such cases, we do not see color as ongoingly modulated in an orderly unfolding of a play of light and shadow, we do not, in fact, according to Schapp, see distant things qua things.

I will argue that distant things are perceivable even in the absence of such ongoing color modulation. We can have a sense of a certain order of color variation in an anticipatory, or "empty" manner, thus perceiving a thing as an identity in the projected unfolding of color variation and other perceptual variation. Schapp's contribution consists in clearing away scientific and other preconceptions, and raising questions regarding the givenness of distant objects, but his results can at best be accepted with requisite revisions.

In his recent book, *Varieties of Presence*, Alva Noe discusses the failure of visual perception on distant objects, from the perspective of his enactive view of perception. He argues that we fail to perceive a person far down in the street, and distant stars, as seen with the naked eye, because in these cases there occurs what he refers to as a breakdown in perceptual constancy. However, his discussion is rendered problematic by the fact that he uncritically shifts back and forth between the first- and third-person perspectives. Thus, he considers himself to have established the point that our sense of a constancy through perceptual variation breaks down, by arguing that the distant stars are just too far away for our perceptual systems to access, and to be impacted by them. The phenomenological rigor of Schapp's discussion, by contrast, steers him past such pitfalls, and sustains the relevance of his views today.

New Approach to Responding Modern Debates of Species Concept

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In *Species Concepts and Phylogenetic Theory* (2000), there are 4 major species concepts discussed thoroughly: “The Biological Species Concept”, “The Hennigian Species Concept”, “The Phylogenetic Species Concept” and “The Evolutionary Species Concept”. The debates of those different species concepts proposed have been regarded as the modern species concepts formed. Among them, the biological species concept (BSC) proposed by Ernst Mayr was one of popular species concepts in decades. Ernst Mayr has developed his own idea not only by modifying the BSC to more molecular evolutionary theories and phylogenetic concerns but also defending that the BSC is the only concept can illustrate the meanings of species referring to both species as taxa and the category species.

However, there are several critiques on the BSC, such as the concept of species will be limited in because the reproductive isolation mechanism will fail to identify species in evolutionary process. Although the BSC is accepted as focusing on the ontology of species, the concept lacks a coherent epistemology because it is untestable for allopatric populations. Furthermore, when Mayr claims that Phylogenetic Species Concept is simply failed because of basing on a degree of phonetic deference, the BSC is also criticized that the concept is based on arbitrarily selected degrees of difference among populations. On the evolutionary biological opinions, the BSC is both a relational and a non-dimensional concept poses several difficulties, and the non-dimensional property ascribed to the BSC one of the most curious of its property to be not the concept on the integration of systematics and evolution because it cannot serve as a conceptual basis for the mapping function to integrate the tokogenetic and phylogegetic aspects of evolution. Nevertheless, the most critical point was admitted by Mayr, the BSC obviously does not account for asexually reproducing organisms.

In my article, I would like to propose Neo-Biological Species Concept (Neo-BSC) with the communicative isolation mechanism, which is modified from the idea of reproductive isolation. The mechanism will not only try to answer the critiques above but also to solve the problem of applying the Neo-BSC on the asexually reproductive organisms. Just as Mayr’s claims in the end of debates, “...., since this is often misunderstood, that species taxa are multidimensional, but the nondimensional situation is required to determine the crucial biological properties of the species concept”, my work is trying to continue to develop the BSC consummately.

On the Location of Domain Restriction Variables

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Quantifier domain restriction has been considered to be a case of context dependence. One influential theory of this phenomenon is Stanley and Szabó's Domain Restriction Theory(DRT), according to which domain restriction is due to unpronounced domain variables in the syntactic structure of a sentence. One controversial issue in DRT is to find where domain variables are located. In the literature, they have been mostly associated either with a determiner or with a noun. I argue that each claim faces serious problems, and then motivate what I call Adjunct Restriction Theory by showing that it could avoid all the problems raised so far. I further argue that domain variables constitute prepositional phrases. This would not only provide evidence for Stanley's project that all contextual effects on semantic content could be reduced to a small number of sources, but also help avoid some intractable philosophical problems.

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BERKELEY ON CONTINUOUS CREATION: OCCASIONALISM CONTAINED

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Most readers agree that Berkeley was an occasionalist of *some* type. Exactly what type has recently been a matter of some debate, a debate to which I myself have contributed.¹ In this essay, I hope to pursue this question somewhat further, but with a different focus: how we might best understand Berkeley's occasionalism in light of certain theological commitments he expresses and the actual arguments he gives in his published works?

Since "type" can mean many things, I should begin by a clarification: by "type of occasionalism," I am mainly concerned with, first, the scope of the occasionalist thesis, that is, whether the occasionalist thesis is intended to hold for all created entities or whether it is restricted to a particular subset; second, what motivations there are to hold the occasionalist thesis; and, third, how the occasionalist thesis actually is argued for. These three factors, obviously, are related, and I am interesting in distinguishing the various types of occasionalism along these lines, because I believe there are interesting connections between these factors, which help to reveal the contours and crevices of the positions held by the various occasionalists of the late 17th and early 18th centuries. A key instance can be found in the works of Berkeley.

Consider, for instance, Berkeley's endorsement of the traditional theological thesis that "conservation is but continuous creation". Nicolas Malebranche, the most prominent occasionalist of our time period, provides his strongest argument for occasionalism on the basis of this thesis. We also know, however, that Malebranche was an occasionalist of broad scope, holding that both bodies and souls lack genuine causal powers. And Malebranche pivots this "global occasionalism" on the very thesis that conservation is but continuous creation.

In contrast, Berkeley held a different view with regard to the causal powers of finite souls. That finite souls are exempt from occasionalism and possess genuine causal powers is critical for Berkeley in many respects. But given Berkeley's commitment to the continuous creation thesis and given that his acquaintance with Malebranche's views, a puzzle then arises: "How does [Berkeley] resist an across-the-board occasionalism, given his across-the-board endorsement of continuous creation?"²

I will argue that we need to reconsider Berkeley's overall commitment to the continuous creation thesis. I will also go on to suggest that it should not be surprising if Berkeley's commitment

¹ Cf. Lee, Sukjae, "Berkeley on the Activity of Spirits," *The British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 20:3 (2012), pp. 539-576.

² Kenneth Winkler provides this very apt way of putting the question in his "Continuous Creation", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* (Special Issue: Early Modern Philosophy Reconsidered), 35 (1), Dec. 2011, pp. 288.

is weaker than Winkler had envisioned, since a weaker commitment would be consistent with the restricted scope of Berkeley's occasionalism, an "occasionalism contained," as it were. In so doing, I will question Winkler's thesis that Berkeley endorses the continuous creation thesis "across-the-board." Furthermore, I will argue that, unlike Malebranche, Berkeley takes a route that does not put too much emphasis on continuous creation to establish his occasionalist thesis. Thus Berkeley's occasionalism, I argue, is more a product of accommodating divine causality within his immaterialist metaphysics than a structuring of his metaphysics on the foundation of principal theological considerations.

Swedenborg's Influence on Kant's Theory of Time and Space

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Kant has received many kinds of influences from other philosophers though he turned them into a unique creation and formed his own critical philosophy. He seemed to properly acknowledge the credits he received from such as Hume and Newton in his works. However, he purposely omitted one very important influence whom he seemed to owe much for the construction of his philosophical system. That person is Emanuel Swedenborg. Kant seemed to inherit many ideas about time and space, the spiritual world as the noumenal world, imagination, and the idea of God. In this article I'd like to focus on Swedenborg's influence on Kant's theory of time and space.

Kant, for the first time, in his Inaugural Dissertation suggested that time and space be regarded as a priori forms of intuitions, which are within the subject, rather than as self-subsisting forms. I'd like to pay attention to the year Kant published his ID, which was 1770. Kant was known to purchase and read Swedenborg's first theological works, *Arcana Coelestia*, which were published in eight Latin volumes between 1749~1758, though not sure how many volumes out of 8 Kant read. *Arcana Coelestia* is considered as his most inspirational and rich theological works among Swedenborgian scholars. We read in *Arcana Coelestia*:

"..man cannot possibly think without the idea of time and space, which idea adheres to almost everything which he thinks; if idea from time and space were taken away from man, he would not know what he is thinking; and scarcely whether he is thinking" (AC 7381:3).

Kant described his understanding of space and time in a similar way:

"Space is a necessary representation, a priori, which is the ground of all outer intuitions. One can never present that there is no space, although one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it" (A 24).

"Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions. In regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time " (B 46).

Kant is known as the first philosopher who took seriously time and space as the form of our intuition. Swedenborg's idea about space and time inspired Kant that they are necessary bases for human to sense and to think the objects. While Swedenborg didn't go further from describing time and space as the necessary base to think things, Kant developed Swedenborg's fundamental ideas

into a systematic theory in his bigger system. They are also distinguished in the possibility whether we could think or not without time and space. Swedenborg thought it is impossible to think separated from them at least in the natural world, however Kant seemed to accept the possibility to think without time and space, but he questioned about the legitimacy of such thoughts. So the contents of this article will deal with the influences mainly from Swedenborg and from other philosophers. I also explore and posit the important position of his transcendental aesthetic in his critical philosophy.

Two Truths, Dependent-Arising and Logic in Bhāviveka's Madhyamaka Philosophy : A Study Focusing on Chapter One of Prajñāpradīpa

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Nāgārjuna's statement in the *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, "Without depending on conventional truth, the significance of the ultimate cannot be taught" has inspired numerous interpretations. This paper will investigate the reasons for these differences, determine the appropriate way to explain the relationship between two truths, and decide whether these differences are related to exegetical assertions on epistemology or ontology. While using Bhāviveka's commentaries as the main source, I will also contrast Candrakīrti's work to clarify Bhāviveka's point. Moreover, since when discussing the relationship between two truth, the relationship between dependent-arising and emptiness cannot be ignored, this paper will focus on Chapter One of the *Prajñāpradīpa* as the core text and illustrate how the meaning of emptiness is settled under Candrakīrti and Bhāviveka's interpretations of the Two Truths. In addition, the passages in the *Jewel in the Hand* (*Karatalaratna*, preserved only in the Chinese edition) which states, "Conditioned things are empty according to the ultimate truth, because they are produced by causes and conditions just like illusions," employ the qualification of "from the viewpoint of ultimate truth" to explain the relationship between dependent-arising and emptiness. In order to determine whether this is logically appropriate, I will look into the background and motivation of the application Buddhist logic. In sum, this paper will clarify Bhāviveka's assertions on Two truths, Dependent-Arising, and the uses of Buddhist logic while contrasting Candrakīrti's different views on these topics.

Keywords: Bhāviveka, Prajñāpradīpa, Two Truths, Dependent-Arising, Candrakīrti, Buddhist Logic

Frege's Paradoxical Conception of Begriff

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Frege's *Begriffsschrift* is the symbol of the birth of modern mathematical logic. And 'Begriff' (concept) is the cornerstone of Frege's logical system. This paper mainly focuses on Frege's conception of Begriff. First, it discusses how Frege regards concepts as functions, that is, a concept is a function whose value is always a truth value. Then, the question of 'what is a concept' is divided into two further questions: (1) How to guarantee the existence of concept; (2) how to give the identity criterion of concept. This paper argues that the existence of concept is related with substitution rule (which is equivalent with second order comprehension axiom), and that the identity criterion of concept is related with Frege's infamous Axiom V. Second order comprehension axiom says that any expressible formula asserts the existence of a concept. Axiom V says that the extension of the concept F is identical with the extension of the concept G if and only if F and G are equivalent (that is, for any object x , if x falls under F , then x also falls under G , and vice versa). However, Frege's conception of Begriff involves internal conflict, since comprehension axiom is inconsistent with Axiom V, that is, comprehension axiom and Axiom V lead to Russell's Paradox. In fact, Frege himself is already aware of such conflict, and he ascribes such conflict to the misguidance of natural language.

Conditional Probability, Conjunctive Probability, and Defective Truth Table

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In psychological studies of probability of indicative conditionals, three significant results emerge. First, most people believe that the probability of an indicative conditional is the corresponding conditional probability, or $P(A \rightarrow B) = P(B|A)$, which we call “conditional probability hypothesis”. Second, not a few people believe that the probability of an indicative conditional is the probability of the conjunction of its antecedent and consequent, or $P(A \rightarrow B) = P(AB)$, which we call “conjunctive probability hypothesis”. Finally, most people have a defective truth table for indicative conditionals, with three truth values instead of two. But these three results cannot be all true. Most psychologists try to defend that $P(B|A)$ is the probability of $A \rightarrow B$, and they try to explain away why not a few people take conjunctive probability view about the probability of $A \rightarrow B$.

This paper argues that another direction is more plausible. We defend that conjunctive probability hypothesis is correct, and try to explain away why people take conditional probability view. We give two reasons to support our claim. First, conditional probability hypothesis cannot be correct because of triviality results. Triviality results have told us that $P(B|A) \neq P(A \rightarrow B)$. Second, based on defective truth table, we propose a 3-valued semantics for indicative conditionals which implies conjunctive probability, and we show that $P(B|A)$ is the fair betting quotient of betting on $A \rightarrow B$, provided that $A \rightarrow B$ is a simple indicative conditional. We conclude that though $P(B|A)$ is not $P(A \rightarrow B)$, it guides us how to evaluate a simple indicative conditional.

The Relationship between the Dao and De in the Dao De Jing: A New Look at Virtue

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Traditionally speaking, much research has been conducted on the meaning of Dao in the Dao De Jing. But as the title of Lao Zi's work includes the notion of De (usually translated as virtue). I would like to propose a mutual relationship in the Dao De Jing between the Dao as principle and the De as manifestation. I would like to take a closer look at the relationship between the Dao and the De and perhaps shed some light on a possible new hermeneutic based on a finding in the ancient Chinese dictionary the Shuo Wen.

Key Words: Dao, De, Shuo Wen, Bestowal, Obtainment

Meaning and Duality: A Quantum Look at Searle and Prior via Dummett

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There are two sorts of conceptions of meaning: the one with reference to the world outside language and the one placing emphasis on the intrinsic structure and autonomous nature of language detached from the world. In this talk I aim at elucidating manifestations of this duality of meaning in the contexts of philosophies of mind, language, and logic, or John Searle, Michael Dummett, and Arthur Prior. To this end, I shall rely upon ground-breaking insights from recent developments of information-theoretical and category-theoretical foundations of quantum physics. This talk basically builds on my recent papers [1] and [2] below.

The Chinese room argument by Searle is prominent not only in philosophy of mind, but also in artificial intelligence and computational linguistics, which are attempts to capture the meaning of language in transparent, computational terms, thereby diminishing the magical mystery of meaning; it is a sort of demythification or disenchantment. Less known is his later argument featuring the idea that computation is relative to observers; I call it the observer-relativity argument. In this talk based on [1], I revisit the observer-relativity and Chinese room arguments, shedding light on contemporary implications of them in relation to ontic pancomputationalism in general, and in particular, the quantum informational view of the universe as advocated by David Deutsch and Seth Lloyd. Searle's external realism, as opposed to Wheeler-style informational antirealism, plays a crucial role in the discussion, and I argue that Dummett's principle of manifestation on linguistic understanding leads Searle to semantic realism, thus characterising his position as external semantic realism.

Dummett's antirealist philosophy of logic and language has eventually ripened and culminated in developments of what is now called proof-theoretic semantics as opposed to model-theoretic semantics, such as that advocated by Donald Davidson. A major issue in proof-theoretic semantics is the paradox of Prior's tonk, and the long-standing question on which there are still on-going debates is this: what is wrong with tonk at all? Dummett coined the term "harmony" for the key concept to tackle the question; different conceptions of harmony in logical inference have been sought for thereafter. In paper [2], I introduce the principle of categorical harmony, and explicate what is wrong with tonk on the basis of it: that is, the problem of tonk boils down to a problem of equivocation. Yet another novel insight obtained after [2] is that nothing is wrong with tonk in terms of identity of proofs: although tonk trivialises the consequence relation of (classical, intuitionistic, and any other well-known) logic, nonetheless, logic with tonk can allow for meaningful identity of proofs, if not propositions. In this talk, thus, I present semantics of proofs for

Prior's tonk, and elucidate its tight connection with categorical quantum mechanics initiated in the Oxford Quantum Group.

[1] Y. Maruyama, "AI, Quantum Information, and External Semantic Realism: Searle's Observer-Relativity and Chinese Room, Revisited", accepted for publication in Synthese Library's volume "Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence", 2014.

[2] Y. Maruyama, "Categorical Harmony and Paradoxes in Proof-Theoretic Semantics", accepted for publication in Springer's anthology "Advances in Proof-Theoretic Semantics", 2014.

Leibniz and Philosophy of Biology

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The last universal genius and one of the great Metaphysician in 17th century, G.W. Leibniz wrote up his “Monadology” just 300 years ago. And in recent Leibniz study, here only referring to works of Duchesneau, *Leibniz le vivant et l’organisme* in 2010 and Smith, *Divine Machine, Leibniz and the Sciences of Life* in 2011, not only this enigmatic piece but also the whole of his ontology has been increasingly reread from the view point of “philosophy of biology.”

This trend is naturally motivated by the rise of bioscience and philosophy of biology in general in our time. However the problems of life and the philosophy of “biology” were as a matter of fact essential and crucial for Leibniz who stood in the Cartesian mechanist era long after Aristotle in the antiquity and still before Darwinian revolution in 19th century. In this circumstance we can remind of his status quo by a few remarkable historical episodes concerning Leibniz such as his “rehabilitation of substantial form” against Cartesian natural science or his admiration at the “discovery of cell” by microscope and his deep interests in the debate of genetics about preformation versus epigenesis. In this context Leibniz discussed about the methodology of biology or medicine with G. E. Stahl. These all together would be a sort of philosophical jam or chaos.

In this paper we focus on a unique view for and against the biological “reductionism” of life in the context of Leibnizian “biology” and monadological ontology, by showing his pass of “mereological” thinking about beings, from the concept of “organic body” to that of Monad as “true atom in the nature” through reformation of “substantial form,” to ultimately shed light on an aspect of the categorical heterogeneity of life. The paradigm of this consideration is the ontological solution of the traditional puzzle of “the ship of Theseus”, discussed since Hobbes to Van Inwagen, in Leibniz about the persistent identity of material beings including living bodies as “organic” against their fluid states.

For Leibniz organic body is “natural machine” that is essentially not different from artificial one except for its infinity as divine machine given by God. And Leibniz himself consistently claims to explain all phenomena of living things mechanically. However he ultimately introduces the concepts categorically distinct from extension and matter such as “substantial form” or Monad which are ontologically simple and constitutive at the same time, into the explication of the biological nature. For, mereologically speaking, living things does not solely consist of aggregates. On the contrary, according to his monadology our universe is full of lives from one end to the other. These metaphysical views of life seem to be conflictive at least in the systematic coherence. Nonetheless, this tension can be released positively from an interpretation of a set of his concepts, “seeds”, unconscious memory, “co-requisites of each other” of simple substances and dominant monad, so as to suggest an illuminative possibility of philosophy of life for us.

Skilful Reflection as a Virtue: Epistemic and Moral

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In this paper I will argue that skilful reflection is a virtue, epistemic and moral. I will do so by clarifying what reflection involves, in both system one and system two processes, and granting to reflection's critics that there are grounds to be sceptical of claims that mere reflection makes a positive contribution to epistemic goods and moral goods. I will argue, however, building on the clarification of the processes involved in reflection, that reflection may be skilful. Furthermore, I will also argue that reflection may be skilful in such a way as to make a positive epistemic and moral contribution to our epistemic and moral standings. More specifically, I will argue that skilful reflection can help us do better with regard to the truth goal and understanding. I explain how it can help in these regards and in the philosophical domain in particular.

The Return of the Dad **—On Millikan-Brandom debate about the legacy of Wilfrid Sellars**

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‘The Father, the Son, and the Daughter’ is the title of an essay that Ruth Millikan published in 2005. As the subtitle—“Sellars, Brandom, and Millikan”—reveals, the “Father” refers to Wilfrid Sellars, the Son is Robert Brandom, and the Daughter is Millikan herself. In the paper, Millikan talks about a family story, focusing on what the two scions owe to their father.

The configuration of names—Millikan and Brandom with Sellars as *via media*—might evoke one philosophical backdrop: the now well-known division of Sellarsians into a right and left wing. Roughly, right-wing Sellarsians are those who read Sellars as a scientific realist, taking the dictum of *scientia mensura*—“in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not”—to be the core of Sellarsian enterprise. In contrast, left-wing Sellarsians are those who read Sellars as a social pragmatist, taking his attack on the Myth of the Given and the accompanying idea of inferential role semantics—knowledge is inseparable from our social practice—to be the core of his philosophy.

Offhand, as some of the literature point out, it might seem that this demarcation between right and left wing would apply to Millikan and Brandom (to which possibility alludes Millikan herself in the opening paragraphs of “FSD”). However, once you begin to dig deeper, this first impression soon disappears. As Brandom rightly says, “There is something right about this opposition [among the Sellarsians], [b]ut ...in our case the left/right division does not seem to cut at the joints. [Millikan] has sketched a different context, one that is much more helpful”.

That said, how are we to understand the sibling relationship? As we saw, the discrepancy in this case should be mapped from a different perspective than the traditional right/left division. Then, where precisely is the point of their bifurcation to be located? In my talk, I will first delve into the details of the debate and make explicit where the difference between the two Sellarsian thinkers lies.

Consideration about the issue above brings us to the next terrain to be explored. How would the Dad respond to the sibling dispute, were he to know about it? Would he regard one of the siblings to “have abandoned the faith”, calling him or her an apostate? Or would he admit there’s a crack in his own position, saying it’s just that the scions have “driven a wedge” into the crack of his own? Or, would he show up with an irenic verdict, telling the son and the daughter that the schism is to be bridged? The aim of the latter half of my talk will thus be to reconstruct the adjudication of the Dad himself, in the hope that the fundamental characteristic of Sellars’s philosophy would be brought into sharper focus.

The Philosophy of Ignorance: as the starting point of “Applied Philosophy”

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When dealing with knowledge or information as a problem of “applied philosophy”, what needs to be considered first and foremost is the fundamental problem of “ignorance”. Despite starting from the deep cave of Socrates’ “ignorant wisdom”, Philosophy has taken great pains to perfect, epistemologically above all, the “method of justification”, which is usually based on the classical definition of knowledge as “justified true belief”. This is the great tradition of “justifying knowledge”, brought about for example, by “intellectual intuition”, “phenomenological reduction” or the “possibility of empirical verification” etc.. There are indeed a number of exceptions, and the tradition of scepticism has existed since ancient times. But even this approach (despite the differences in the strength or the width of application of its variants) denies the possibility of “basing one’s true convictions on the method of justification”, and in this sense, scepticism and traditional theory of knowledge form two sides of the same coin. However, philosophical examinations of ignorance itself are thin on the ground. Within traditional philosophy, ignorance was always a negative state of affairs which would rightly be eradicated in one way or another. To be sure, there have been many contemporary attempts to refute or refine the definition of knowledge, beginning with Edmund Gettier’s counter-example famous in Anglo-American analytic philosophy. But even those which to a degree extricate us from epistemological tendencies, remain undeniably within the tradition of a “theory of knowledge”.

In this talk, I would like to approach “ignorance” a little more directly, whilst paying respect to these new kinds of workings of “pure philosophy”. I will argue about the theories of Friedrich August von Hayek and George Lakoff. Although these two scholars are not “pure philosopher”, they could be recognized as great thinkers of ignorance who provide us the starting point of applied philosophy. The starting point of applied philosophy should be to revisit the meaning of ignorance and the question of how to “tame” it. I will show an example of this by illustrating some issues on environmental ethics.

Persona, Another Aspect of the Concept of Person

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In this presentation, I am going to propose the concept of “persona,” a human relationship based concept of personhood, which is in sharp contrast to the concept of “person” characterized by self-consciousness and rationality. Family members of a brain-dead patient sometimes believe they are able to have a dialogue with something which appears on the body of their beloved in front of them. I want to call this something “persona.” A persona is not self-consciousness or a soul lurking inside the body, but instead it is something which emerges out of human relationships between a brain-dead patient and his/her family members or close friends. We cannot directly see, touch, or hear a persona itself, but we can perceive its existence with our whole body and we can communicate with it without language. A persona has alluring power to prompt us to begin communication with it. A persona can appear not only on the brain-dead body, but also on the body of a living healthy person. A persona could even appear on the body or the face of a doll, or that of a robot. This line of thought will lead us to a kind of animistic worldview in which everything in the universe could have its own persona. This perspective might provide us with an important understanding that helps protect a new type of human dignity that has not been frequently discussed in applied philosophy. I believe we will be able to shed new light on the other mind problem in contemporary philosophy and the structure of the I-Thou relationship.

An Evolutionary Theory for Science and Technology

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In this presentation, I propose a theory for theory changes. I call this theory Evolutionary Theory for Science and Technology (ETST). ETST is a framework that can be used to describe historical developments of scientific activities. Thomas Kuhn tended to describe scientific activities within one discipline and nearly ignored interactions among different disciplines. ETST is a framework that can deal with these interactions.

Let me explain some details of ETST. I define a theory structure ($TS = \langle TH, > \rangle$) as a consistent linearly ordered set of sets of sentences. The relation $>$ expresses the reliability order. $T_i > T_j$ means: T_i is more reliable than T_j . TS can be represented as $T_1 > \dots > T_n$, when $TH = \{T_1, \dots, T_n\}$. A research group is defined as a social organization whose members share the same TS . A scientific community in a discipline in time interval t includes all research groups in the discipline in t . I interpret the historical development of scientific activities as an evolutionary process. A TS corresponds to a genome; a research group corresponds to a living thing; a scientific community in a discipline corresponds to a species. The fitness of TS s is evaluated based on three criteria, namely accuracy of the prediction inferred from TS , expressibility of TS , and coherence of TS . These three criteria are combined with three views, namely internal, external, and overall view. The technology belongs to an environment of scientific activities. Researchers may use available technologies for their research activities and engineers may use available scientific theories to develop new apparatuses.

Let us take a historical example from the 16th and the 17th century. In the beginning of the 16th century, the Aristotelian dynamics (AD) and the Ptolemaic astronomy (PA) were dominant. Suppose that TS of PA can be expressed as $T\text{-}AD > T\text{-}GU > T\text{-}PA+$, where $T\text{-}AD$ is the theory for AD, $T\text{-}GU$ is the hypothesis of the geocentric universe, and $T\text{-}PA+$ is the rest of PA. TS of the Copernican astronomy (CA) can be represented as $T\text{-}AD^* > T\text{-}HU > T\text{-}CA+$, where $T\text{-}AD^*$ is a modified AD, $T\text{-}HU$ is the hypothesis of the heliocentric universe, and $T\text{-}CA+$ is the rest of CA. Because $T\text{-}AD$ is inconsistent with $T\text{-}HU$, we need to modify $T\text{-}AD$, so that TS of CA remains consistent. TS of the Keplerian astronomy (KA) could be captured by $T\text{-}KD > T\text{-}HU > T\text{-}EL > T\text{-}KA+$, where $T\text{-}KD$ is the Keplerian dynamics (KD), $T\text{-}EL$ is the thesis that orbits of the planets are elliptic, and $T\text{-}KA+$ is the rest of KA. PA, CA, and KA are mutually inconsistent, but they share some parts of their TS s. With respect to the internal accuracy, KA is superior to PA and CA. However, the internal coherence of KA is rather poor, because KA includes some claims of AD. Eventually, after the Newtonian dynamics was proposed in the 17th century, AD and PA disappeared from the active field of scientific activities.

Naturalism and structuralism in philosophy of mathematics

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Naturalism and structuralism are two of the main positions in contemporary philosophy of mathematics. And, not a few authors commit themselves to both. In fact, such prominent structuralists as S. Shapiro, G. Hellman, and M. Resnik are also naturalists in some sense and to some extent. Structuralism, I think, is a good line along which naturalism should go. However, to my eyes, the prevailing versions of structuralism could not be successful as programs of naturalism. In the presentation, I will discuss the reason of this after analyzing some positions of structuralism and naturalism. Then, I would like to suggest a more promising way of naturalistic structuralism.

The word ‘naturalism’ has a wide range of meaning. Here, I bear two claims in mind: first, anti-revisionism, i.e. the claim that philosophy should not overthrow mathematics at present; second, that philosophy should make use of science and could be criticized in terms of science.

Structuralism is a view which regards the subject of mathematics not as objects with the intrinsic nature but as structural relations holding among objects in each system of a certain kind. In a naturalistic point of view, structuralism has a virtue in that it need not take numbers, sets, etc. as individual objects existing *per se*. If these were such genuine platonistic objects, as P. Benacerraf points out, it would be hopelessly difficult to give ‘natural’ epistemology to them because they are abstract and causally inert. Apparently, structuralism can eschew this difficulty by treating mathematical objects just in relation to other objects or to the whole structure containing them. And also, structuralism is a common methodology in mathematics itself. When mathematicians start their study, they do not go gathering objects they want to examine but, typically, characterize the relational structures of objects in terms of axioms. In this sense, too, structuralism may be seen as a ‘natural’ position in philosophy of mathematics.

In philosophical literature, there are some mutually different versions of structuralism. The most prominent ones systematically discussed are Hellman’s modal structuralism and Shapiro’s *ante rem* structuralism. Hellman makes use of the system of modal logic in order to eliminate the reference to and the quantification over actual objects. Shapiro, on the other hand, views places in mathematical structures as *bona fide* objects, and forms what he calls ‘structure theory’ as a metatheory used in philosophy of mathematics. In this theory, it is claimed what structures exist.

Although Hellman and Shapiro are naturalists in some sense, I do not think their versions of structuralism successful as programs of naturalism. This is because they are, as well as platonism, epistemologically untenable, i.e. it is quite difficult to give them ‘natural’ account of knowledge after all. In my view, the root of failure is in their tendency to formulate philosophical theory in mathematical form. Hellman’s or Shapiro’s formulation may be useful in some sense, but could not be philosophically sufficient. I think philosophical theory should be scientific, not mathematical.

Truth and sub-logical pluralism

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According to moderate alethic pluralism, truth is both one and many. Truth is one because there is a single truth property—truth-as-such—applicable across all truth-apt domains of discourse. Truth is many because truth-as-such may be grounded in different ways. Propositions concerning medium-sized dry goods might be true in virtue of corresponding with reality while propositions pertaining to mathematics might be true in virtue of being superassertible. Recently Michael Lynch has suggested that moderate alethic pluralism supports logical pluralism, understood as the thesis that there are several equally legitimate notions of validity. The path from moderate alethic pluralism to logical pluralism is meant to go through Generalized Tarski's Thesis (Beall and Restall, *Logical Pluralism*, Oxford University Press, 2006): an argument is valid_X if and only if, in every case_X in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true. Lynch's basic argument is this: different ways of being true go with different types of case. This delivers different equally legitimate notions of validity. This paper takes on two tasks. First, I argue that there is no path from moderate alethic pluralism to logical pluralism via Generalized Tarski's Thesis. On the moderate alethic pluralist's view, there is only one truth property, truth-as-such. Accordingly, if cases and validity connect with truth—as opposed to the properties that ground truth—there is only one kind of case and one notion of validity. Second, I present my own view. I draw a distinction between the logic of truth-as-such and the logic of properties that ground truth-as-such. Call the former “logic” and the latter “sub-logic”. I suggest that moderate alethic pluralism goes with the combination of logical monism and sub-logical pluralism. There is one notion of validity for truth-as-such. However, different truth-grounding properties yield different notions of “sub-validity”. For example, it might be that the transition from $\sim\sim p$ to p is sub-valid within domain D1, but fails to be so within domain D2. What this amounts to is the idea that, for D1, $\sim\sim p$ having the truth-grounding property guarantees that p has that property too, while this is not so for D2. I discuss two commitments of my proposal. The first commitment is that, assuming that the logic of truth-as-such is weaker than the logic of at least one truth-grounding property, there may be domains for which certain arguments are logically invalid, but sub-valid. The second commitment concerns topic neutrality. A standard conception of logic is that it is topic neutral: what arguments are valid does not depend on the topic—or subject-matter—of its constituents. This conception cannot be applied at the level of sub-logic. I offer an explanation. Whether an argument is sub-valid may depend on the domain of its constituents because, on the moderate alethic pluralist's view, different domains may have different truth-grounding properties—and, in turn, these properties may have different logics.

Experience as Knowledge: a Reply to the Knowledge Argument

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I propose a new response to the knowledge argument in the spirit of physicalism by arguing that experience is knowledge. According to this proposal, when Mary is released from the black-and-white room, she does learn something new but her new knowledge is nothing but her new experience of red.

I would first argue that experience is representational and therefore has representational content. Experience, if veridical, carries correct information about the external world. This would give us the right reason to view experience as knowledge about the external world.

Then, I would argue that Mary's new experience of red is the new knowledge she acquires: by having this new veridical experience of red, she comes to know red or what red looks like. I would further show that this claim is the correct interpretation of our knowledge intuition.

The Third Man, or the Universal Slayer: Why Should Universal Realists Take the Infinite Regress Seriously?

SAIJO, Reina

The Third Man argument, which was famously argued by Plato and Aristotle, is considered as a serious objection to universal realism. In general, universal realists like Armstrong (1978) commit themselves analyze the objective similarity between *x* and *y* by sharing the same universal: *x* and *y* are similar to each other in being *F* if and only if both *x* and *y* instantiate the same universal *F*. It is the analysis that is the target of the Third Man who shows that it produces an infinite regress as follows:

- (1) The universal *F* is *F*. (Self-predication)
- (2) A universal is not an instance of itself. (Non-identity)
- (3) If the universal *F* is *F*, there is another universal *F'*: the universal *F* is *F* if and only if *F* is an instance of the universal *F'*.
- (4) The universal *F'* is *F'*. (From 1)
- (5) If the universal *F'* is *F'*, there is another universal *F''*: the universal *F'* is *F'* if and only if *F'* is an instance of the universal *F''*.
- (6) The universal *F''* is *F''*. (The same applies hereinafter)

The regress is a sufficient symptom to reject universals. That is because it means failure to end up analyzing the objective similarity by universals.

The aim of this paper is to defend the arguable premises in the Third Man argument and to argue that it remains effective against universal realism. The first part explores the structure of the Third Man argument and shows why it is a serious attack against universal realism. The second part examines the criticisms of the argument and concludes that they are not critical.

The three criticisms that we consider are respectively set for premise (2) Self-predication, (3) Non-identity and premise (4). When it is said about premises (2) and (3), they may look like questionable at the first glance. Both, however, should be plausible. In the case of (2), we defend it by arguing that the instantiation relation implies that the instantiated are similar to the instantiating in some regard. Hence it is natural to think that if an object is *F*, the universal *F* itself must be *F* too.

We also defend the premise (3) by considering the asymmetry of instantiation: if *x* instantiates *F*, then *F* does not instantiate *x*. Supposing that the premise (3) is false. It means that universals can instantiate themselves, but it is incompatible with the asymmetry. Therefore (3) should be true.

Finally, we examine the argument against premise (4) by MacLeod and Rubenstein (2005). They argue that premise (4) should be dismissed when universals are immanent, that is, only exist in their instances located in the physical world. That is because being *P* of the immanent universal *P* is analyzed by being *P* of the concrete instances where it presents. Opposing to them, we show that the immanent universals are subject to Third Man argument.

Hence we can conclude that universal realists should take the infinite regress seriously.

Defusing the Triviality Objection against Presentism

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Very roughly, presentism is the thesis that only the present exists (or equivalently, everything is present), whereas eternalism is the thesis that past, present and future things are all equally real. The dispute between presentism and eternalism thus described is purely ontological. Crisp (2004a and 2004b), Ludlow (2004), Meyer (2005), Mozerkey (2011: sec. 1) and other philosophers, however, have discussed the so-called triviality objection, which allegedly shows that the presentist ontology is either trivially true or obviously false. If the argument succeeds, presentism cannot even get off the ground.

In this paper, I try to respond to the triviality objection on behalf of presentism. In Section 2, I will examine how the argument proceeds and offer what I think is its plausible reconstruction. Following this, I will reflect on a more accurate formulation of presentism in Section 3, then consider some apparently reasonable reactions from presentists and point out its flaws in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, I will show that, strictly speaking, presentism and eternalism are not logically incompatible when they are seen as purely ontological theses. This also suggests a way for presentists to avoid the triviality objection without begging the question.

William James's argument on the Ethics of Belief

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In this presentation, I will address a few of the many questions concerning “the ethics of belief”. The central problems of the ethics of belief are following. Whether is it always wrong to hold a belief on insufficient evidence? Or for some situations, are we permitted to form belief on insufficient evidence? Or In some cases, are we obliged to form belief on insufficient evidence? And in such a case, is it wrong to do otherwise? As a starting point of this presentation, I will focus on the origins of the discussion and explain the content of their argument.

William Kingdon Clifford told the following story as an example of his claim in his essay “The Ethics of Belief” (1877). Once upon a time, a ship owner wanted to sell as many tickets for his ship’s voyage as he can. At the same time, he found his ship was in need of repair to guarantee safer voyage and he knew that repairs would be costly and cause delay of the voyage. And he ended up setting these concerns aside and managed to form the sincere and comfortable conviction that his ship was sufficiently safe for the voyage. In the end, his decision leaded to tragedy. In light of this story, Clifford argued that it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence. He asserted that his doctrine is applicable to human life in general as a moral rule. So even if we feel strong temptations to believe a hypothesis, we should not agree to it as long as evidence forces us to do.

William James responded to Clifford’s argument in his essay “the Will to believe” (1896). His alternatives to Clifford is that even if we don’t have sufficient evidence for a hypothesis and we can’t hold it as a certain knowledge or even if we know that we don’t, there are some contexts in which we can demand our right to believe it by will. In that case, on the contrary, if we have an attitude that the hypothesis concerning some fact should be rigorously tested with doubt and hostility, we might ruin all chance of understanding of the fact. As an example of such case, James discussed instance of religious belief and argued that these cases should be treated in a different way from beliefs in cases of science.

Over their arguments about the ethics of belief, there are many interpretations and many discussions. Among these, the debate between evidentialism and non-evidentialism is a typical topic of the day. I will pick up some of them and attempt conceptual examination to the extent necessary to discussion and consider the conditions under which James’s pragmatic position to the ethics of belief is plausible.

Sensitizing Reasons by Emulating Exemplars

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The fostering of rationality has long been endorsed as an educational ideal by some philosophers (cf. Bailin 1998; Siegel 2003); in recent years, whereas some have argued for this ideal, others have challenged it, particularly within debates relevant to the study of critical thinking.¹ Harvey Siegel, who has spelled out the philosophical theory of educating for rationality, not only has defended his view from such challenges but also has been deepening his thoughts regarding how rationality can be fostered (cf. Siegel, 1988; 1997).

This presentation centers on the cultivating of sensitivity to reasons in the fostering of rationality by critically examining and extending Siegel's arguments concerning the notion of what he calls "felt reasons." By clarifying the notion of felt reasons, I will argue for two ideas: first, teachers, parents, and fictional characters in media such as novels and films can be seen as exemplars that manifest rationality; second, the emotion of admiring exemplars may act as a motivating force for children—including small children who are still not sensitive to reasons and thus are not moved by reasons—to be critical thinkers.²

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¹ See Bailin et al. (1999) and Bailin and Siegel (2003) for a general overview of the studies of critical thinking.

² As will be shown, in order to corroborate the second argument regarding the emotion of admiration, I will draw on relevant empirical studies (e.g., Algoe and Haidt, 2009; Haidt and Seder 2009).

Comparative study: The Panopticon effect and modern day surveillance technology

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Introduction and objectives:

This research paper questions the use of new technologies as tools of modern surveillance and tries (a) to contribute to the previous research done by Michel Foucault on the panoptic techniques of surveillance and dominance; and (b) give new insights on the way we use new surveillance technologies in violation of democratic principles. I analyze Jeremy Bentham's "Panopticon model" in relation to the revelations by Michel Foucault on the expansion of the Panopticon scheme as a model of modern day democratic institutions. The aim of this research paper is (c) to shed new light on the various ways the deployment of new technologies reinforces the Panopticon model; and (d) to analyze the effects produced by the emerging modes of surveillance that empower various new mechanisms of domination and control of individuals.

Methodology of research:

I am using comparative genealogical critique as a proper methodology for doing research on technology. In the first stage of research, (a) I will address the problem of institutional practices and techniques of domination over individuals. Through the prism of Foucault's discourse on "techniques of governmentality" I will attempt to uncover the operational mode and structure of these organized practices aimed at subjugating individuals to accommodate certain types and modes of governance. Next, (b) I will demonstrate how the use of these techniques becomes device that throttles social struggle and change (e.g. such as modern day surveillance techniques and abuse of power by democratically elected governments in restricting individual rights, use of torture etc.); finally, (c) I will argue the urgency of reconstructing modern political discourse in order to better serve the purpose of reducing institutional violence and promote individual freedoms in relation to the ongoing technological transformation of democratic society.

Conclusion:

This research paper seeks (a) to question how and to what extent technology influences the course of our social, political and behavioral changes; and (b) to evaluate the transformation of democratic institutions and practices based on the widespread use of modern communication tools and technologies.

Both public and private spaces are being gradually invaded by modern surveillance modes of control. The urban space has become a new kind of technologically driven Panopticon where CCTV cameras are installed everywhere, internet and phone call communications are under permanent surveillance etc. The Panopticon model has transformed itself into an increasingly fragmented, disseminated and ubiquitous device of power and dominance.

Two types of value judgements concerning risk and valid risk assessment in democratic decision-making

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In this presentation, I will examine Shrader-Frechette's view that there are two types of value judgements concerning risks, which she developed in her renowned book *Risk and Rationality* (1991), and propose my idea for valid risk assessment in democratic decision-making.

In reality, her discussion includes many types of value judgements concerning risk, however two of them are particularly important. The first is epistemological value judgements. This type of values plays an important role in defending a epistemic viewpoint located between naive positivists and cultural relativists. Naive positivists is wrong because they think risk assessment is value free. Cultural relativists is also wrong because they think there can be no objective solutions in risk assessment. Shrader-Frechette proposes scientific proceduralism as the middle way. In my view, scientific proceduralism can be summarized into three tenets: (1) risk assessment should have a rational goal of seeking higher explanatory power which can be tested by prediction, (2) therefore experts in risk assessment should use epistemological value judgement for achieving this sort of goals, (3) non-epistemological values should be taken into account by both experts and citizens criticizing the epistemological value judgement.

The second type is ethical value judgements. In her discussion, lay citizen's views of risk are not always misperception of the "correct" risk which only experts can assess. Rather, they are functions of ethical beliefs. This claim is supported by a study of risk perception by Slovic. His study showed that lay people have different way of perceiving risks and risks perceived by them do not depend on, for example, estimate of annual deaths but rather on qualitative aspects of risks such as dreadfulness and inequitableness.

Given that risk assessment includes two types of value judgements, what does validity of risk assessment in democratic decision-making consist in? If we take the concept of risk to be totally descriptive one, there might be no room for citizens' contribution to the process of risk assessment. However, if we take the risk concept to be at once descriptive and ethically value-laden, lay citizen would be able to contribute the process of assessing risks by projecting their ethical values to scientifically assessed risks. In the latter case, will have the question how validly we can project ethical values to scientifically assessed risks. I will propose an idea to do such projection.

The origins of technique and relaxation time

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In recent years, Gilles Deleuze's research progress until to some extent, and the range to study has spread even among the philosophers who affected him. This study considers theory of technology by thinking over again from a viewpoint of information. The purpose is to overcome a diagram called a confrontation of machines and human beings (or culture).

The optimism about technology, i.e., merely admiring technology bring society various bad influences, and it may lead to involving society in one sense of values. On the contrary to it, the human alienation by technology is sometimes feared, i.e., pessimism. Just in this, Heidegger considers technical essence. Nature and even human beings drive to usefulness, and they are collected. That is 'Ge-stell'. Surely, the reflection to such technology leads to reconsidering the technical purpose and social values. However, it is as the same as nothing has answered about the problem which technology has only by claiming considering in the various directions.

To this diametrically opposite optimism and pessimism, Simondon considers technical essence to be a tendency, and topicalizes time theory peculiar to technology. Simondon has had big influence on the theory of technology of Bernard Stiegler and the 'machinisme' of Deleuze and Guattari. However, in this research, it notes the information system theory of Simondon whom both do not deal with, and asking the generation of the information itself. Thus completely different directivity is shown.

First, it starts with clarifying the difference in the information concept of cybernetics and Simondon. Simondon's information is that of tense relations which works on parts. If regulation goes by man adjusting combining parts well, it goes to harmony. Man tends towards to understand a machine by an idea, or to adjust with the relation which man gave beforehand to the machine. This is that explains the machine in one structure. However, if one structure explains, man cannot understand the tense relations.

Simondon considers technology as what is progressing continuously dynamically. One structure cannot explain a machine. Though various directivity is open, there is a tendency converged on somewhere because parts harmonize. It is the following things that man has to do. It should participate to the dimension of the surface which a relation peculiar to the machines works. Especially in there, parts actually harmonize. The more machines becomes large and becomes complicated, the more how to combine parts is also various and becomes complicated. By the concept of information, various parts are mediated regardless of size. Various parts have its own origins of technique. There, the technical series has twined in the shape of a network through the surface of the machines. Furthermore, it is the purpose that it shows how it develops by a time theory peculiar to Simondon. It makes the completely convergent tendency ease. This is relaxation time. Man and technology do an interaction and develop a social ideas and values. The axiological values in society are seriously taken in this study.

Ryu YeongMo's Interpretation of "God"

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The purpose of this paper is to introduce who Ryu YeongMo called Daseok is and share with Asian colleagues what he as philosopher talked about. For there are many things in his works which make rich useful discussion in philosophy.

The presenter will focus in particular on philosophy of religion to which, he believes, Daseok contributed very much. The subject under consideration at the moment is what "God" is: the concept of God which has been used in Christianity so far is not satisfactorily understood by believers in Him even though they think in principle He is omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient. However, they are unhappy in failing to find their own context of usage practically. On the other hand, following western Christians' theological patterns they copy the westerners' hitherto narrowly categorized concepts, they fail to perceive rich capacity of God.

The presenter will seek to show how, using eastern ancient classical, Daseok talks about God in the sense that God is so powerful and great as He is found in the Bible. Daseok does, as it were, succeed in understanding Him closer to the extent that the text exactly says: as a Korean philosopher of religion calls God 'non-existent god'. The presenter believes that this attempt leads us to deepen and widen understanding Christianity which otherwise will make us feel it strange and uncomfortable. On the final stage, the presenter will show how this talk will contribute to our further discussion.

The Ethical Implications of Human Nature and the Prospect of Posthumanity

SHIN, Sangkyu

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Transhumanism is thought to encourage human enhancement using cutting-edge scientific technology. In an article contributed to *Foreign Policy*, Francis Fukuyama claimed that transhumanism is one of the most dangerous ideas in the world. In his previously published book, *Our Posthuman Nature: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution*, he had provided various detailed reasons why he thought so. His central worry for transhumanism is that human enhancement by applying scientific technology, especially the new biotechnology, may threaten to alter or to violate human nature so that the conditions for our moral status shall be compromised.

The purpose of my presentation is to evaluate the plausibility of the claim that the alteration of human nature through cutting-edge technology will result in the desecrating moral values including human dignity. For this, I first clarify the meanings of human nature and then inquire how human nature is related to the realm of ethical values including human dignity. I distinguish 3 different ways in which human nature can be involved in the ethical discourses. Human nature can be thought of as conditions of practical rationality and moral agency (HN1), as a feasibility constraint on morality (HN2), and as a constraint on the good for humans (HN3).

I argue that there are partially good reasons to object to human enhancement that are deducible from each of (HN1)-(HN3). However, none of them can offer a sufficiently good reason to object to human enhancement in general. Also, I note that the characteristics of the reasons drawn from each case vary somewhat. In case of (HN1) and (HN2), what matters is the “production of unintended bad consequences.” However, in this case, the demonstrative power of (HN2) is subordinate to that of (HN1). On the other hand, there is more possibility that (HN2) will be used as a part of positive arguments in support of human enhancement. Hence, the role of (HN2) in anti-enhancement arguments is the most limited. The case of (HN3) presents a different problem from (HN1) or (HN2) in relation to the question of which virtues or values we want to preserve. An interesting fact that we can point out here is that trans-humanists usually support human enhancement from the aspect of (HN2). However, what has more probability to damage human dignity would be aspects of (HN1) and (HN3).

Phenomenology of Intuitions of Skilled Experts

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The theme of the presentation is a phenomenological analysis of the intuitions of skilled artisans (often called “Shoku-nin” in Japanese tradition). It is sometimes said that they have special abilities in their expert fields and, in particular, that they can “see” things that non-experts cannot “see.” Normally, such abilities are regarded as being beyond any academic inquiries. The purpose of the presentation is to show how we can analyze such intuitions of skilled artisans using phenomenology as a philosophical tool. I present some interviews and recorded video. Analyzing them with phenomenological tools, I show how we can interpret the special intuitions of skilled experts as a change of perceptions mediated by expertise.

First, I show a preexisting philosophical analysis of skilled artisans and explain how we can use phenomenology as a tool. In Japanese tradition, skilled workers in some fields, that is, traditional handicrafts, working in small factories, etc., are often referred to by the special term (“Shoku-nin”). It is sometimes said that not only can they craft products very skillfully but also that they can intuit something that non-experts cannot. However, few philosophers have studied such intuitions in the working practices of skilled artisans. One important preexisting research is the work of Tetsuro Nakaoka, a Japanese historian and philosopher of technology. In his book, “Philosophy of Factories (Kojo no Tetsugaku),” he describes how experienced skilled workers in factories grasp what they are doing. Interpreting his descriptions phenomenologically, I explain how we can use phenomenology as a tool to analyze the intuitions of skilled experts. By “phenomenology,” I precisely mean what has recently been called “post-phenomenology,” a new movement in the philosophy of technology proposed by Don Ihde and Peter-Paul Verbeek. I modify their framework slightly to analyze the intuitions of skilled experts.

Second, I analyze some concrete working practices of skilled artisans to show how the modified post-phenomenological tool can be used. I take as examples artisans of Buddhist altars (Butsu-dan) in Yamagata and experienced workers in metal-casting (Imono) factories in Aichi. Both are regarded as Japanese traditional industries supported by Shoku-nin workers. After presenting some interviews in which they explain their work and recorded video of them working, I analyze their explanations and working practices. Based on the analysis of their working practices, I show how their intuitions play important roles in their working practices. And, by analyzing their explanations I show that their special intuitions can be interpreted as a change of perception. In conclusion, I postulate that the changes of perception of skilled artisans are mediated by their skilled expertise and the mediating expertise consists of the way how they use their tools.

The Mathematical Representation of Moral Structures

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Our judgments about these two values [virtue and desert] have a mathematical structure, and I want to show that, with one exception, the two structures are the same. (Hurka, Thomas. (2001). "The Common Structure of Virtue and Desert." *Ethics* 112(1) : 6-31, 7-8)

It appears that when ordinary people think and converse in moral terms, they do not take themselves as talking about something representable by mathematics. However, in economics and normative ethics, specialists have become increasingly more prone to describe moral structures mathematically. Perhaps this phenomenon has started when Jeremy Bentham introduced utilitarianism under the slogan "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Utilitarianism, as a version of consequentialism, makes the permissibility of an action a certain increasing function of the happiness that it and its possible alternatives would respectively bring about. The second example of mathematical formulation is various criteria of economic inequality. For example, Gini coefficient is defined as follows: $G = \frac{1}{2n^2\mu} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n |y_i - y_j|$, s.t. $y_1 \geq y_2 \geq \dots \geq y_n$ (y_x : the income of an individual x ; n : the number of people; μ : the average income). The third example is cost-benefit analysis, where risk is defined as expected utility, i.e., the product of the utility of an event and its probability. Even as to other moral structures, for example desert and virtue, mathematical formulation is suggested (see the above quotation from Hurka).

This presentation considers the methodological and metaphysical bases of the introduction of mathematical formulation into ethical theories. There are a few reasons for this introduction. Even though ordinary people might not take morality to be representable in mathematics, they often use quantitative expressions to talk about morality. For example, we often suggest that one situation is better or more equal than another, and even talk about how much better or more equal the former is. And the introduction of mathematics to represent moral structures is natural in that, intuitively, many moral terms are necessarily related to one another, and that moral principles, which connect certain moral property with non-moral properties, are supposed to be necessarily true. Furthermore, since supposedly we can calculate mathematical functions *a priori*, the mathematical formulation of moral principles vindicate the intuition that moral answers are *a priori* knowable, to the extent that if you know the formulation and the values of the variables, you can work out moral answers *a priori*.

However, it seems that because the meanings of ordinary moral terms are not determinate, its mathematical formulation is always the regimentation of original terms. While this enables people to answer moral questions determinately, these questions become slightly different from original questions couched in ordinary moral terms. Furthermore, it is not always clear that something real can enter the mathematically represented relations. For example, the standard version of consequentialism assumes that goodness allows for cardinal representation. It is not guaranteed that something in the world admits cardinal representation while holding other credentials of goodness. This presentation considers these issues comparing the mathematical representation of structures in ethics with that of structures in science.

Logic of Qualitative Conditional Probability and Nonstandard Probability

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That $A|B$ is not an event (proposition) is one of the most delicate problems of qualitative conditional probability theory. So qualitative conditional probability theories adopt a quaternary relation $A|B \geq C|D$, which means that A given B is at least as likely as C given D . Numerous studies have been made to axiomatize this relation (e.g. Koopman (1940), Luce (1968), Domotor (1969), and Suppes and Zanotti (1982)). Domotor (1969) gives necessary and sufficient conditions of \geq for the existence of a conditional probability measure on the finite space. Suppes and Zanotti (1982) use indicator functions to axiomatize this relation. These indicator functions, however prevent us from logicalizing this quaternary relation as a sentential operator. On the other hand, Narens (1974) shows necessary and sufficient conditions of \geq for the existence of a nonstandard unconditional probability measure without the limitation of the size of the domain. The aims of this paper are (i) to prove a new representation theorem for qualitative conditional probability relation without the limitation of the size of the domain and without using indicator functions on the basis of techniques of Domotor (1969) and Narens (1974), and (ii) to propose a new version of complete logic of qualitative conditional probability---qualitative-conditional-probability logic (QCPL)---the model of the language of which enables QCPL to describe reasoning in the two-dimensional geometric probability, for example, of picking a point from the diagonal D_1 (D_2) of a rectangle, given that the point is on one of D_1 and D_2 , equals $1/2$ under nonstandard infinitesimal probability theory and equals $0/0$ (undefined) under Kolmogorov probability theory.

The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we prove a new representation theorem for qualitative conditional probability relation without the limitation of the size of the domain and without using indicator functions (Theorem 1). In Section 3, we define the language L_{QCPL} of QCPL. In Section 4, we define a structured model M of L_{QCPL} , provide QCPL with the truth definition at w in M , define the truth in M , and then define validity. In Section 5, we provide QCPL with its proof system. In Section 6, we touch upon the soundness and completeness of QCPL (Theorem 2 and Theorem 3). Our proof of the completeness of QCPL is much simpler than Segerberg's proof (1971) of the completeness of a similar logic to QCPL. For our model has no limitation of size of the domain and so we do not rely on filtration that makes his proof complicated.

What does "industry prepares experiment" mean? ; its content and implication

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It is evident that industry affects experiment. For example, accelerators cannot be constructed without technological cooperation of industry. However it is not sufficiently evaluated how and to what extent industry affects experiment, and what impact it has on our views of experiment and on philosophy of science.

In this presentation, I examine contents and implications of the opinion that “industry prepares experiment” based on some case studies. First, it is pointed out that the view leads to a methodology of experiment. Next, it is showed that we can develop a bottom-up view of science from a viewpoint which focuses on resources. And what implications “industry prepares experiment” has on philosophy of technology and science is investigated.

How to think about the paradox of Ushenko's picture "A New Epimenides"

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Andrew Paul Ushenko(1900-1956) presented the picture which leads to the liar paradox at 1937, and he called it "A New version of Epimenides".The picture like his Epimenides was already known in the Middle Ages, but little attention had been given to it.

Today, some studies have claimed that Ushenko argued whether propositions are the truth-bearer or not, especially the proposition expressed the sentence included his Epimanides.

The problem seems to lie in the fact that what is Ushenko intended to argue truly. It is important for Ushenko that the logic is a part of philosophy. Although the mathematical logic had been developed at that time, according to Ushenko that harms the philosophy of logic. He suggested "intuitionalist theory of logic" on which the logic is a part of natural language and he criticized the mathematical logician's view (called "postulationalist") can't express our logical thoughts perfectly. This is why he proposed his Epimenides.

Modernity and Cosmopolitanism

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The postmodern literature in general and Jean-François Lyotard in particular observes correctly that plurality needs to be protected from the threat of totality. However, the Lyotardian-postmodern argument for this position summons a critique of modernity (constellation of grand narratives) that champions the cause of incommensurable fragments (little narratives) undermining the possibility of cosmopolitan exchange between cultural orders globally conceived. In my remarks, I will argue on behalf of a cosmopolitan account of modernity which can withstand the postmodern trajectory of equating the modern with subversion of the plural. I will consider resources available in modern Indian thinking to facilitate my task.

On the Intuitionistic Background of Gentzen's Finitist Interpretation

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In this paper, we investigate into the semantical aspect of Gentzen's consistency proofs, by scrutinizing the intuitionistic background of his finitist interpretation. Specifically, we claim that an intuitionistic objection to the informativeness of classical arithmetic gave him a motivation for giving this interpretation, which is based on the concept of potential infinity and so admissible for intuitionism.

In the early 1920s, Hilbert, with Bernays, raised Hilbert's Program, which aimed to prove the consistency of arithmetic, analysis and set theory from the finitary standpoint. The finitary standpoint is, according to Hilbert, the standpoint that admits only the facts about manipulations of concrete symbols, and all mathematical and logical reasoning is based on this standpoint. The main method of Hilbert-Bernays' consistency proofs on the finitary standpoint is syntactical: these proofs, on the assumption that a proof-figure of a contradiction is given, show that it can be transformed into "normal" one with the same conclusion. They also prove that normal proof-figures of a contradiction cannot exist, so it follows that proof-figures of a contradiction cannot be given.

From the standard point of view, Gentzen's third consistency proof of classical arithmetic (1938) is also syntactical, and his consistency proofs have often been assumed to be merely syntactical because his third proof is the most known between his three consistency proofs. However, this assumption is not correct. His first and second consistency proofs (1935, 1936) are semantical ones: they show that classical arithmetic is sound on Gentzen's finitist interpretation of arithmetical statements. Since we can shed light on the semantical aspect of Gentzen's consistency proofs by scrutinizing his finitist interpretation, this interpretation have been widely studied from both historical and mathematical point of views.

However, the semantical aspect of Gentzen's consistency proofs remains to be elucidated from philosophical point of view. In particular, it remains to be elucidated whether his finitist interpretation has its own philosophical motivation that differs from the well-known foundational purpose. In this paper, we aim to answer this question affirmatively, by investigating into the intuitionistic background of his finitist interpretation. We will claim that Gentzen was philosophically motivated to give his finitist interpretation by an intuitionistic objection to the informativeness of classical arithmetic. Gentzen summarizes this objection as follows: for intuitionists, arithmetical knowledge can be hardly gained from classical arithmetic, since most theorems of this theory are without sense due to their non-constructive character. Gentzen aimed to answer this intuitionists' challenge by giving his finitist interpretation of all arithmetical statements, which is based on the concept of potential infinity and so admissible also for intuitionists. His finitist interpretation played also the role of verifying the informativeness of classical arithmetic.

**In Defense of Consumer-based Approach:
Criticism of Statistical Theory of Mental Representation**

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In the attempt to naturalize mental content, a variety of theories have been offered. In this paper I defend one of them, consumer semantics, which is proposed by Millikan, through comparison with, and criticism of, a rival theory which has recently been offered by Usher and Eliasmith. They claim that the content of mental representation can be specified by the statistical measure of mutual information. But I argue that their approach cannot deal with the problem of target fixation, which plagues causal/informational theories in general. In addition to this, mutual information theory seems to be unable to handle those situations properly where it is not the way mental representations are produced, but the way they are consumed that is crucial to their content. I show that consumer semantics is a better account in the sense that it can deal with these problems. In the above comparison I also discuss a fundamental difference in attitudes toward mental representation, that is, whether one is an internalist or externalist. Millikan's account is based on externalism in the sense that it regards phenomenology as irrelevant to the attribution of mental content. So I give some grounds for externalism to support her account.

How it is possible to have moral dispute in early Chinese thought?

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To account for moral variety and differences in moral judgments it is fundamental to have an adequate account of knowledge that is at work in moral discourses before we proceed to look into the nature and limits of moral knowledge.

Among analytic analyses of moral knowledge in early Chinese thought, Chad Hansen has exerted much influence in terms of how knowledge is to be construed in moral discourses. Hansen's account arises from a comprehensive interpretive framework in which methodology considerations are given to the context of epistemology and semantic inquiries. He contends that, due to the absence of theoretical distinction between 'knowledge' and 'belief' as well as no reference to epistemology counterparts such as 'belief' or 'merely opinion', knowledge in early Chinese thought is primarily pragmatic-oriented and can be best characterized as knowing-how as it is minimally involved with cognitive mental states. Correspondently, we do not find a parallel form of epistemology skepticism in Daoist critical attitude toward knowledge. He intriguingly argues that knowledge in Daoist thought is not denied but merely disapproved of.

When applied to issues pertinent to moral dispute, at a general level, I find his account unsatisfactory and in some cases incoherent for the following reasons: first, as far as how moral thinkers are disagreeing with one another is concerned, since differences and conflicts in moral judgments amounts to differences in performative capacities or clashes between competing ways of channeling our desires, an account built as such may threaten the prospects of making sense of shared meaning or shared subject matters. As a result, it remains unclear whether moral thinkers are having genuine disagreement; second, in terms of how Daoist thought is to be positioned, his account fails to adequately address the oddity arising from the tension between a standard relativist meta-ethical thesis and substantive skepticism he attributes to Daoist thought.

I attempt to remedy the above inadequacies by paying due attention to the way we raise questions. I suggest that two questions that are associated with moral dispute should be distinguished with care, i.e., 'whether there can be objective knowledge in morality' versus 'whether there can be an objective moral outlook'. The distinction is important as the former concerns primarily with epistemology whereas the latter leaves open the question of whether moral knowledge is or can be a proper object of knowledge.

Reason Holism, Individuation, and Embeddedness

TSU, Peter Shiu-Hwa
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According to Dancy's reason holism, moral reasons behave in a holistic way. By this, he means that a feature that is a moral reason in one context might not be so in another or might even be an opposite reason. In my paper, I will argue that Dancy's reason holism suffers from a problem of individuation due to a violation of what I call 'the embedded thesis'. According to the embedded thesis, the feature that serves as a reason in a context cannot be isolated from its embedded context. This, I suggest, provides a desiderata for theories of how reasons behave.

Ontology of Emergentism on Mind-Body Problem

TU, Chialin

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Emergentism, a belief in emergence between higher-level properties and lower-level properties, has brought up since the beginning of 19th century. Applying Emergentism on philosophy of mind, property dualists believe that the world is constructed by one kind of substance, physical substances, with two distinct kinds of properties, physical properties and non-physical properties. Non-physical properties (mental properties) supervene on physical substances but they are not reducible to physical properties. The most significant non-physical properties are qualia. Contrary to property dualism, physicalists insist on the ontological idea that everything is basically physical and causation is physically closed.

The common belief about mentality is that mental phenomena are higher-level properties regarding the supposition of multi-level world view. The picture of this world view indicates that the natural world is divided by “levels.” What are “levels”? What does it mean that mental properties are higher-level properties? What is the ontology of multi-level world view?

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the ontology of multi-level world regarding emergentism. Do mind and body belong to different levels, meaning that emergence works between higher levels and lower levels? The other consideration is that mind and body are different properties at the same level, meaning that emergence explains the function connecting mind and body. If we can get the idea of “multi-level world” clear, it will help us to understand “reduction” and “emergence” in a more proper way.

Keywords: emergentism, higher-level properties, lower-level properties, higher-order properties, lower-order properties, property dualism, physicalism, non-reductive physicalism.

Anti-Majoritarianism – Against Always Benefiting the Greatest Number

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One pressing issue in both ethics and economics is the fair and morally right allocation of scarce, indivisible resources. This paper criticizes the most prominent solution to a particular variant of this problem, namely when all potential beneficiaries of the resource each have an equally strong claim on an equal benefit from the resource, and argues that we ought to utilize a fairer, lottery based approach. By claim, I refer to a particular kind of reason, namely acts or goods owed to individuals or groups. Examples of this kind of scarce resource allocation are evident in many actual scenarios ranging from certain life saving organ transplantations to Olympic Games tickets. Many philosophical and economic theories, both utilitarian (e.g. Singer) and non-utilitarian (e.g. Kamm, Scanlon), mistakenly claim that in such cases, you always ought to give the benefit to as many people as possible. Call such theories majoritarian theories. I argue that acting according to majoritarian theories does not appropriately satisfy beneficiaries' claims and for this reason is both morally objectionable and unfair.

To this end, the paper is structured as follows. Section I will introduce important terminology and specify the kinds of distribution case this paper will focus on. Section II will provide general objections to majoritarian theories. Such theories lead to objectionable discrimination in iterative cases and forego an important aspect of fairness by only focusing on the numbers of benefits distributed. Section III presents and responds to Walden's (2014) new argument for the majoritarian view. According to Walden, all claimants have epistemically equal chances to be in the largest group of potential beneficiaries due to a 'natural lottery'. Walden contends that this 'natural lottery' is just as fair as a human run lottery and so it is both fair and right to benefit the largest group. I argue that this 'natural lottery' is not fair because (i) it does not satisfy beneficiaries' claims and (ii) there are other morally relevant differences between the 'natural lottery' and human run lotteries. I argue that there is a temporally based necessary condition for the satisfaction of claims – claims can only be satisfied by their corresponding duties after the claims come into existence. However the 'natural lottery' occurs prior to the claim's existence and so cannot meet this necessary condition. Section IV outlines my proposed weighted lottery alternative to majoritarian views.

Conditionals and Deliberations

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It is fairly uncontroversial that *backtracking* conditionals, the evaluation of which partially depends on preconditions or the backtracking grounds of their antecedents, are distinct from *non-backtracking* conditionals. While Xenon in (1a) engages a non-backtracking evaluation for the counterfactual under consideration, Yvonne in (1b) engages a backtracking evaluation for the counterfactual.

- (1) a. Xenon: This building is so tall, and there is no safety net below. So, *If you were to jump out of the roof, then you would be seriously injured.*
b. Yvonne: *No, I do not think so.* I am not suicidal. *If I were to jump, I would not be injured at all:* if I were to jump, I would have put up a safety net first, and it would break my fall, so I would not be injured at all.

Some philosophers reckon that, for conditionals to be properly employed for different deliberative concerns, backtracking conditionals have to be blocked. For example, Lewis (1979) and Woodward & Hitchcock (2003) suggest that causal deliberation must exclude backtracking conditionals, and DeRose (2010) in turn suggests that practical deliberation must exclude backtracking conditionals.

(Observation 1) Counterfactuals for causal deliberation cannot be backtracking.

(Observation 2) Counterfactuals for practical deliberation cannot be backtracking.

Given the seeming correctness of (Observation 1) and (Observation 2), it is natural to accept that, (a) backtracking counterfactuals are a special kind of conditional, or at least (b) some deliberative concerns prohibit the use of backtracking counterfactuals.

Our subversive thesis is that this distinction, though uncontroversial, is only apparent: all conditionals, counterfactuals or indicative conditionals, are backtracking conditionals, though they may rely on different modes of backtracking for their evaluation. We will first argue the following three criteria (taken from the literature) to identify the distinction between backtracking and non-backtracking conditionals fail.

(Lewis' Criterion) Backtracking counterfactuals are *unstable* and *non-standard*.

(DeRose's Criterion) Backtracking counterfactuals are *unassertable*.

(Woodward & Hitchcock's Criterion) The antecedents of backtracking counterfactuals are not brought about by *interventions* in a narrow sense.

Instead, a fine-grained distinction between two modes of backtracking will be further given, in terms of which some puzzles concerning the relations between conditionals and deliberations are resolved. We will argue that causal and practical deliberation may employ different modes of backtracking, that deliberation for betting/predicting reflects a further different sort of deliberation, and that counterfactuals and indicative conditionals have different types of pragmatic-oriented sensitivity towards two modes of backtracking.

Kim and Gordon on Action Explanation and Mental Simulation

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How do reasons explain actions? Or, as Davidson (1980, 3) puts it, “What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent’s reason for doing what he did?” Some simulation theorists try to answer this question by drawing on the idea that we simulate, rather than theorize, in interpreting and understanding others. Robert Gordon (2000, 2001), for example, offers a simulationist account of action explanation, arguing that mental simulation can provide more than a mere descriptive account of our folk-psychological practice. In a recent paper, Jaegwon Kim (2010) also provides a simulation-based account of action explanation, reconstructing William Dray’s model of “rational” explanation. In this paper, I argue that these accounts are both inadequate as an analysis of the explanatory force of action explanation. Specifically, I show that neither Kim’s nor Gordon’s account has resources to meet Davidson’s challenge to distinguish explanatory reasons from reasons the agent merely has for her action.

Epistemological Privilege of Caring Standpoint Theory (CST): Care-Laden Value as Strong Objectivity

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Ethics of Care and Feminist standpoint theory have been two of the leading feminist theories since 1970s and 80s, both of which are based upon women's marginal social positions as caretakers in the households and care-related works across all levels of society, and both theories have been challenging against mainstream (malestream) moral traditions, mainstream (malestream) scientific tradition as well, so as to make plausible an alternative moral and scientific research paradigm. Despite the efforts of the past three decades, care ethicists and standpoint theorists have been constantly taking upon critiques from all sides (feminists and non-feminists), and both theories have gone through major theoretical revisions to meet either internal external challenges. Until now, both theories are considered to be the marginal study relative to their research disciplines. Ethics of care is taken to be supplementary to virtue ethics, whereas standpoint theory is inclined to merge with feminist empiricism. As it turns out, two contemporary leading feminist theories, to my judgment, are gradually fading away from their distinctive voices in the dominant moral and scientific conceptual systems.

This paper aims at uniting ethics of care and feminist standpoint theory by cross referencing upon each other, and from there, I propose that the two views merge into what I will call Caring Standpoint Theory (hereafter CST). As I argue, CST is a distinctive model of scientific objectivity. In contrast to the top-down view hold by the orthodox version of knowledge, CST holds the bottom-up view that starts from women's marginal social places, where women's works incubate caring virtues (patience, humbleness, sensitivity, partiality, particularity, receptivity, and empathy) which, in turn, lead to moral virtues of moral endurance, open-mindedness, moral sensitivity, moral particularity, and empathy to the distant others, all of which, in turn, are conducive to the development of intellectual virtues, such as sustainability, sensitivity of the details, receptivity of different views, and above all, intellectual complexity particularly good for the quest of scientific anomaly.

The paper consists of two main sections. In the first section, I will explain briefly the characteristics of care ethics and standpoint theory, and followed by elaborating how and to what extent both theories can be complementary, despite they seem to share little common ground. In the second section, I will elaborate three characteristics of CST in order to explain epistemic privilege of the merged view. First, CST has distinctive epistemology to be understood as circumspective care-knowing. Second, CST is unique in its methodology of care-knowing resulting from the embodiment of caring practices. Third, CST provides virtue ground for the quest of knowledge.

Key Words: Care Ethics, Standpoint Theory, Epistemological Privilege,
Strong Objectivity

Extended abstract for "The puzzle of truth-aptness and the meaning of 'true'"

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In this paper, I aim to substantiate a neglected response to a familiar puzzle involving truth-aptness. In ordinary thought and discourse, we take many kinds of proposition to be true, including, for instance, the moral proposition that torturing the innocent is wrong. In these contexts, we accordingly take such propositions to be capable of being true or false, i.e. to be truth-apt. But upon reflection, it can come to seem quite plausible that moral propositions aren't actually truth-apt--because they are evaluative, because they are intrinsically motivational, or etc. The puzzle is that even when such arguments exert considerable pull, we also feel the pull of the assumption that moral propositions are truth-apt. What explains the persistent conflict between these pulls? Are we rationally compelled to resist at least one of them?

What this puzzle indicates, I argue, is that the word 'true' is context-sensitive. Specifically, I develop what John MacFarlane has called a non-indexical contextualist semantics for 'true.' According to this analysis, 'true' expresses the same concept--namely, a certain 'minimal' truth concept--in all actual contexts. But the extension of 'true' differs across contexts. The extension of 'true' in a context of use is the set of all propositions that (i) qualify as truth-apt, or representational, according to the standards for truth-aptness (aptness-standards) that are operative in that context and (ii) accurately represent the actual world in the sense specified by those standards. It's in this respect that 'true' is context-sensitive--its extension in a context of use is determined by the aptness-standards that are operative in that context.

The strictness of our aptness-standards varies across contexts. In ordinary contexts, we tend to use quite liberal aptness-standards. We're thus inclined in these contexts to count many kinds of proposition as truth-apt. By contrast, in more reflective contexts, we often use stricter aptness-standards, e.g. those which count only non-evaluative propositions as truth-apt. As a result, a moral proposition such as the proposition that torturing the innocent is wrong counts as truth-apt in many ordinary contexts, though not in certain more reflective contexts.

We thus speak truly when we deny in these reflective contexts that moral propositions are truth-apt. We also speak truly when we assert in an ordinary context that the proposition that torturing the innocent is wrong is true. According to ordinary-aptness standards, the proposition represents that torturing the innocent is wrong and indeed, torturing the innocent is wrong in ordinary contexts.

Still, it's understandable that we sense a tension between such an assertion and denial. What we must be careful to recognize is that although such an assertion and denial are inconsistent--given a particular set of aptness-standards--they are nevertheless consistent as typically performed--namely in contexts governed by different aptness-standards. The puzzle of truth-aptness, then, admits of a resolution that saves nearly all of the appearances and also explains away this appearance of incompatibility.

Process, Consciousness, and Self

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This paper concerns the subjective dimension of consciousness. Thomas Nagel (1974) characterizes this subjective dimension in terms of the phrase “something it is like for the organism” (436), and claims that it “is essentially connected with a single point of view” (437). This issue has been approached mostly from the framework of substance metaphysics. In this paper, I challenge this presupposition and propose an alternative based on the framework of process metaphysics.

One way to theorize about the subjective dimension of consciousness is to ask whether the point of view of consciousness has any connection to some kind of self. Is it the case that consciousness is necessarily for a self or from the self’s point of view? To answer this question, one needs to understand the relation between consciousness and self. I thus analyze possible kinds of self from the framework of substance metaphysics and show that none of them can be an adequate relation to ground the subjective dimension of consciousness.

Having shown that, I argue for an alternative according to which the point of view of consciousness is processual subjectivity. Processual subjectivity is a reflexive process, that is, a temporal occurrence that reflexively processes itself. I employ Georg Northoff’s (2013) neuroscientific research to ground my notion of processual subjectivity empirically.

Finally, I show how my theory of processual subjectivity opens up a new way of viewing the relation between consciousness and self. The idea is that kinds of self can be abstracted or constructed from processual subjectivity. I defend this idea based on a number of studies on demented patients.

A Critique of Non-egalitarian View of Buddhist Ethics

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The Buddha teaches us that all life is equal. However, what does it mean for Buddhist ethics? Since ethics has not been the cardinal concern in Buddhism, the Buddha's teaching has been neglected. This ignorance has led to a non-egalitarian view: there are degrees of seriousness in taking life, which is proposed by Damien Keown based on Buddhaghosa's critique of the *Majjhima Nikaya* and on the Western idea of sanctity of life.

This essay is to evaluate the non-egalitarian view by three steps: first, we articulate an egalitarian view of Buddhist ethics; second, we criticize the non-egalitarian view; third, we appraise the non-egalitarian view through five propositions: Proposition A "We ought to view and treat all living beings equally," Proposition B "There are degrees of seriousness in taking life," Proposition C "All life is equal," Proposition D "There are no degrees in Bodhisattva compassion," and Proposition E "All life is equal morally." In addition, since one of the non-egalitarian arguments is related to the Western concept of the sanctity of life, we will also have some discussion on that concept.

Keywords: egalitarianism, the sanctity of life, and Buddhist ethics

Truth, ω -inconsistency and Harmony

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Truth theories like FS have two rules, T-in rule and T-out rule, about introduction and elimination of the truth predicate [H]. They look like the introduction rule and the elimination rule of a logical connective. From proof theoretic semantics viewpoint, one might think that truth predicate is a logical connective which is governed by these two rules; this has been suggested some proof theoretic semantics people [Hjo].

From this proof theoretic semantics viewpoint, the nature of truth is like deflationist's nature of truth. Additionally one of the most important things is that the truth predicate does not disturb the traceability of the argument from the premises to a conclusion.

However, a crucial problem has been known: any criteria to be a logical connective, known as a "harmony" of the introduction rule and the elimination rule, is not satisfied because of the ω -inconsistency of FS. Such ω -inconsistency is caused by the fact that the truth predicate enabled us to define paradoxical formulae of seemingly infinite-length. These formulae can be regarded as coinductive objects in terms of computer science. The reason of the failure of the harmony is that these criteria is defined not for coinductively defined paradoxical formulae but for inductively defined formulae.

In this presentation, we examine how we can extend the criteria for harmony for coinductive formulae.

[H] Halbach, Volker, 2011, *Axiomatic Theories of Truth*, Cambridge University.

[Hjo] Ole Hjortland, 2012, *Harmony and the Context of Deducibility*, in *Insolubles and Consequences: Essays in honour of Stephen Read*, Catarina Dutilh Novaes and Ole Thomassen Hjortland (eds.), College Publications

Discovering Mechanism, Manipulative Investigation, and Data Model: An Example from C. H. Waddington's Work

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Many philosophers of biology have splendidly argued theoretical reductionism for about five decades (Schaffner 1969, 1974, 1993; Kitcher 1984; Rosenberg 1985; Waters 1990; Darden 1977, 1991). Lindley Darden and C. Kenneth Waters, in order to go beyond the old debate, independently pressed the argument close to biological practice and developed different perspectives. Darden, as the most important leader of the new mechanistic philosophy (Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000; Glennan 1996, 2002; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Craver 2007), claims that detailed description of mechanism is the most adequate biological explanation and suggests a set of strategies for discovering mechanisms (Darden 2000, 2002, 2006, 2013). Let's call it "Discovering Mechanism Approach". Waters claims that the adequate explanation must be generated from the interweaving theoretical explanation and investigation of new phenomena by manipulation (Waters 2004, 2008a, 2008b). Let's call it "Manipulative Investigation Approach". Two approaches effort toward different goals with different methodologies, and give different pictures of biological practice.

If we examine the historical trail, we will find that the difference between two approaches comes from different metaphysical traditions. The discovering mechanism approach receives and carries to the causal process theory (Russell 1948; Aronson 1971; Salmon 1908/1994a, 1984, 1994b; Dowe 2000, 2008), while the manipulative investigation approach continues and succeed to the agency/manipulative theory (Menzies and Price 1993; von Wright 1971; Woodward 2003).

In addition to the different causal insights which metaphysics brings about, some new opinions show the limits of the two approaches (Torres 2009; Menzies 2012; Moss 2012; Chen 2013; Woodward 2013). We try to point out on the one hand the first approach, compared with the later, is partial to mechanistic explanation rather the investigative interest from new phenomena, on the other the later approach is lacking the process of new phenomena into the mechanistic contents. So we propose an integrated approach that is composed of the discovering mechanism approach as an underlying system, the manipulative investigation approach as an effective tool to new phenomena, and the data model as a processor to transform phenomena to mechanistic contents. We believe that this will take all necessary elements in biological practices into consideration and can fit with biological practices well.

The aims of this paper are: (1) to point out the difference between two approaches comes from different metaphysical traditions; (2) to argue that in what sense the two perspectives are complementary each other even if there seems to be nothing in common between them; (3) to suggest an integrated approach that uses experimental data models to connect two approaches; (4) to take the forerunner in Evo-Devo, C. H. Waddington's works, as a case study to show that the new one can offer an real adequate explanation.

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Butler's Distinction Defended: The Nonindexical Contextuality of "Identity"

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In *The Analogy of Religion*, Joseph Butler made a substantial distinction between two types of identity: one in the loose and popular sense and one in the strict and philosophical sense. This distinction—I will call it "Butler's distinction"—seems to reflect our everyday talk, e.g. "This river is 'identical' with that river in which we took a dip last year. In one sense this is true, but they are not, strictly speaking, 'identical' with each other because they have different properties or components." However, there are the following three difficulties in endorsing Butler's distinction, especially with regard to identity in the loose sense:

- (i) Are there really two types of identity, namely loose one and strict one?
- (ii) How is identity in the loose sense compatible with the one in the strict sense?
- (iii) How can the propositions which are expressed by sentences including the expression "loose identity" have truth as truth-value?

In this paper, I want to show that Butler's distinction can be defended with least difficulty in terms of "nonindexical contextualism" (coined by MacFarlane (2009)), according to which an expression has the same intension in any contexts of use, while its extension is sensitive to circumstances of evaluation of the contexts. My claim is that if nonindexical contextualism is applied to the expression "identity", it follows that the three difficulties from (i) to (iii) are solved in an appropriate and intuitive way, so that Butler's distinction functions effectively as a fundamental framework for using the term of "identity". This leads one to valuable suggestions not only in the philosophy of language, but also in other areas such as metaphysics, since typical examples of "loose identity" are composition as identity in mereology and diachronic identity.

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Cognitive Penetration and Perceptual Justification

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The fear that Jack is angry at her causes Jill, when she sees him, to have a visual experience in which Jack looks angry at her. It may seem obvious that if the content of perceptual experiences is cognitively penetrable as in the case of Jill, those perceptual experiences can't provide justification for beliefs. If things look to one in the way one believes or hopes them to be, how can one's experiences provide a neutral ground for adjudicating one's beliefs? Despite the strong intuition behind it, however, the claim that cognitive penetration undermines perceptual justification is controversial. It is difficult to provide an adequate defense of the claim. I will come to this conclusion by discussing Susanna Siegel's recent attempt to show that cognitive penetration leads to "epistemic downgrade".

A Study on Political Implication of *sensus communis* in Kant's Aesthetics

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Hannah Arendt interpreted Kant's Aesthetics in respect of practical philosophy, coming up with her own distinctive political philosophy. The point of this interpretation is *sensus communis*(common sense) of Kant's Aesthetics. *Sensus communis* is to think in the position of everyone else, so it means communicability faculty of sensibility and feeling. It is premised faculty for communication among artistic, aesthetic subjects in Kant's Aesthetics; Yet Arendt political philosophically interprets it. That is, She regards *sensus communis* as community sense that means postulating existence of community and exhibiting itself from community. From this interpretation, Arendt draws pluralism called the most basic condition by suggesting not merely 'I' isolated from others but 'we' united with others, by judging not as a individual subject but as a community. But indeed is it appropriate interpretation that she regards Kant's *sensus communis* as community sense?

The main purpose of this paper is to study validity of Hannah Arendt's political philosophical interpretation, and to inquire into possibility of political philosophical implication in Kant's Aesthetics. Accordingly order of this paper is that first, mainly with pluralism that is core concept in Arendt's political philosophy, I'll summarize her political idea; second, by tracing Arendt's argument back, I'll prove that pluralism means community sense, and it is originated in *sensus communis*; third, I'll examine validity in interpreting *sensus communis* as community sense; finally by considering discussion overall, I study on political philosophical implications of Kant's Aesthetics.

