‘The Metaphysics of Corpse and Practical Reasons’

Satomi Abe (Kyoto University)

Is corpse a dead state of a living person or something other than this person? This question on the relationship between a living human person and its corpse can be understood as a question on what death is: if our death is simple transaction from our living state to our dead state, we continue to exist after we die and if death is annihilation, corpses are quite different things from us. This issue also relates to the major theories on personal identity. A view which takes the essence of our persistence as having certain mental properties or some sort of psychological continuity implies that corpses cannot be ourselves. While, if we take a certain kind of biological approach and claim that the key of personal identity is historical link, our position implies corpses are our dead states.

E. Olson has elucidated that each metaphysical explanations of corpse based on the theories of personal identity have to face with serious difficulties and that it means these theories are problematic. Though we should struggle with this problem to achieve a coherent and plausible explanation on personal identity, I will put the focus of this presentation rather on Olson’s assertion that whether corpses are dead ourselves does not have practical significance. Most of us have preferences on the way in which human corpses are dealt with; we regard certain treatments of corpses as violation of the deceased or some people make a will that tells to scatter their cremains in their favorite places. My concern is whether we have reason to have such preferences. If corpses are our dead states, such preferences can be considered as metaphysically grounded and normatively relevant as such. It depends on what we mean when we say that we have reason to care about ourselves or other person.
This paper uses theories of justified defense and punishment to develop a comprehensive ethical framework for responses to lethal and sublethal cyberattacks. The first part outlines an alternative “information ethics” paradigm developed by Floridi and Taddeo, and argues that erroneous ontological assumptions undermine its validity. The second part argues that such an alternative framework is unnecessary because rights forfeiture and harm liability theories can provide the requisite guidance. My foundational assumption is that—consistent with the dignity of wrongdoers—liability to defensive or punitive harm is a function of the agent’s culpability and the response’s effectiveness, necessity and narrow proportionality. Accordingly, in cases of culpable lethal cyberattacks, the criteria of warfare ethics apply: if effective and necessary for defense, a lethal response would be narrowly proportionate and permissible; and lethal punitive harm would be impermissible because it cannot accomplish the legitimate consequentialist purposes of punishment—specific deterrence and reform. However, in (the more common) cases of sublethal cyberattacks, the fact that culpable wrongdoers are liable to only sublethal responses creates two additional possibilities: inflicting punitive harm that is effective and necessary for specific deterrence; and targeting indirect participants, including non-cooperative political leaders of the territory where a wrongdoer resides as well as civilian accomplices. Given the technologically-driven trends among developed states to both avoid legal thresholds for war and continuously harm adversaries in sublethal ways, the paper’s third part applies this account of justified responses to sublethal harms to additional scenarios such as election-influencing information operations.
If an individual is responsible for causally contributing to a grave wrong, then she forfeits her right against a proportionate attack necessary to avert the grave wrong. That is, the individual is morally liable to be attacked. This is a central tenet in reductive individualist accounts of war ethics (the chief exponent of which is Jeff McMahan). It turns out, on this view, that civilians are generally not morally liable to be attacked in war, regardless of whether the war is just or unjust, since their contributions are individually miniscule. I argue, though, that there is a second basis for liability to intentional attack. An individual who is responsible for benefiting substantially from a grave wrong thereby forfeits her right against a proportionate attack necessary to avert that wrong. As a result, an individual who has contributed virtually nothing to an unjust war can nonetheless be morally liable to be attacked, provided she has accepted benefits which that unjust war yields. I defend this view by arguing that a) unjust enrichment serves as a basis for compensatory liability and that b) compensatory liability can serve as a basis for defensive liability – i.e., liability to harms necessary to avert a wrongful attack. So, consider a civilian working for a defense contractor. Suppose the defense contractor enables the military to commit substantial unjust harms. But also suppose that our civilian occupies a causally distant, redundant, or peripheral role with respect to the harms that the defense contractor enables. It might seem that this civilian is immune to intentional attack since her causal contribution is otiose or negligible. But on the account I develop, the fact that she benefits from the wrongs which the contractor enables serves as a basis for liability: the greater the degree to which she benefits, the greater the harms to which she is liable – even if she makes no difference to the course of the war.
The increased use and seemingly limitless potential of health data analysis has, alongside praise and enthusiasm, also stirred worries – primarily in the form of concerns for individuals’ privacy. The problem often raised is the difficulty to obtain an informed consent from those whose data we wish to collect, transfer, analyse and act upon. In this paper I argue that although the requirement of informed consent indeed is difficult to apply – and in many situations it definitely should be applied – the bulk of the problematic situations in this area are cases where the data subjects would consent to the processing of their data. Yet we find these cases morally disturbing, and I propose that what is bothersome can best be explained in terms of exploitation.

Exploitation, as understood in this paper, has to do with unfairness of one sort or another, but not necessarily with lack of voluntariness. In rough outline, the unfairness can concern either the origin of the health data use, or the distribution of costs and benefits between the data subject (the person whose data is wanted for analysis) and the data processor (the agent who seeks to acquire the data). I will show how different types of situations where health data is to be used meet reasonable criteria for exploitation, tailored on the two types of unfairness just described. I will also discuss the implications of judging a case as exploitative. I argue that the fact that a case can appropriately be described as involving exploitation may motivate different kinds of interfering interventions, including non-interference.

Hence, the aim of this paper is to expose, help explain and differentiate between cases where health data is used and may be found morally problematic even though the voluntariness of those involved cannot be questioned.
Virtual reality (VR) has often been lauded as ‘ultimate empathy machine’: you can literally look through the eyes of another, literally stand in their shoes. This claim influenced many campaigners and charities to developed VR experiences: from the experiences of refugees to solitary confinement to dementia and autism.

I demonstrate that there is a lack of evidence to support this claim that VR induces empathy. Moreover, I argue that it might be dangerous to use VR to do so, because the ‘what it’s like’ experiences it is capable of providing are both incredibly compelling and incredibly misleading. It can make us think that this is really what it is like but it will always fail to capture essential parts: we can see and hear but we cannot feel, smell or taste and the experiences are almost always only minutes long, where afterwards you take the headset off and return immediately to your own world, your own shoes. It cannot convey the endless boredom of solitary confinement, the oppression of structural inequality, the trauma of physical abuse. And yet these experiences often leave an impression that makes us suppose that it can. Drawing on Rowan William’s critique of empathy as the fundamental basis of ethical insight, I show that VR makes it is easy to think that we understand much better than we do and to appropriate the experiences of others.

I conclude with my own proposal: that virtual reality can and should focus, not on empathy, but on sympathy. Sympathy makes you make no assumption that you understand someone’s experience as if you had experienced it too. I argue that this should prompt charities and developers to change the kinds of experience that they expose us too, ones that place us in the role of witness and humble interlocutor, not protagonist and ultimate subject.
Jean-Luc Nancy’s conception of being-with and being singular plural allows a rarely examined point of view on the term of identity in the discourse about technical modifications of the human body.

The implications of implants and transplantations are a current ethical issue of our time. Key questions point to the consequences of technical modification of the body for the individual and the community. The individual identity is often discussed in terms of the lived body as a medium of communication between an inner self and an outer environment. Nancy on the contrary broaches the body as a worldwide, open space (Existenz-Stätte) in an encompassing worldwide field of sound and vibration. Therefore, he considers the individual not to be an *individuum*, but a singularity that is plural at the same time.

Nancy defines the body, *corpus*, neither as an organism, nor as a chaotic and arbitrary arrangement of diverse parts. In fact, the body is a local, dynamic and vibrating agglomeration in this worldwide field. Yet, the body reacts with resistance when the intervention in its openness is disproportionately deep. Considering the transformation that might be caused by a deep intervention, Nancy speaks of a mutation and points to the necessity to act with discernment. Nancy’s radical perspective on identity and community intensifies the accountability of everybody as a part of the field, as the world is shaped by continuous iteration.

The elaboration of a term of identity that includes the being-with and has its origin in the body itself is the basement for further research concerning the term of freedom in ethics which has to be re-examined in the sense of being singular plural as well.
‘Making Ethics of Technology Relevant for Policy’

Philip Brey (University of Twente)

Ethics of technology, and applied ethics generally, often has an eye towards policy. If it is to be relevant beyond academic journals, one important way for it to be so is for it to be taken up by policy makers, including both public policy makers and organizational policy makers. In this keynote, I will discuss how ethics of technology can be made to be policy-relevant and how it can fail to be so. Ethics of technology is most policy-relevant when technologies are still emerging, as is currently the case, for example, with artificial intelligence, robotics, human genomics and nanotechnology. Policy makers are then confronted with policy vacuums that are in part ethical in nature. Using examples from recent emerging technologies, especially from the fields of AI, robotics and next-generation internet, I will discuss how the different ways in which ethics of technology can be policy-relevant.

I will discuss instruments like ethical guidelines, ethical guidance reports, ethical awareness raising, ethical impact assessment, ethical-legal analysis, societal readiness scales and ethical design approaches, and will assess how ethicists can utilize them to further policy goals. Part of my argument will be that policy-relevant research in ethics of technology has partially different aims and methods than academic research. It is therefore necessary to rethink the nature of ethics and technology, and the relation between its various instantiations. I will also discuss the kinds of institutional arrangements between universities, government and industry that are necessary for policy-relevant ethics of technology to be possible. I will use the recent European funding system (Horizon 2020 and its successor program) as an example. I will end up by drawing some general lessons for ethics of technology and for applied ethics as a whole.
‘Modulating emotions in moral enhancement’

Mary Carman (University of the Witwatersrand)

Arguing in favour of biomedical moral enhancement, Douglas (2008) proposes interventions that are aimed at attenuating certain counter-moral emotions, such as a strong aversion to certain racial groups. Harris (2011) finds issue with Douglas’ proposal on the basis that the direct modulation of emotion is problematic, an objection that Douglas later rejects in (2013). In this paper, I step in to adjudicate the disagreement by arguing that moral enhancement aimed at attenuating certain morally problematic emotions through direct modulation is not the way to go. This is because such an approach risks oversimplifying the role of emotion in human functioning.

The underlying thought is this: emotions and emotional dispositions are not discrete elements of our human psychologies. In fact, current research on emotions across disciplines suggests that emotions are intricately tied to our thinking and decision-making, influencing the way we function as rational beings (see Lerner et al. 2015 for a review). As such, we cannot target only an emotion without serious overflow effects on the person as a whole. With this in mind, we just do not have a complete picture of the role of emotion in our rational lives and, until we do, we need to exercise caution. However, I also argue for a stronger claim: the complexity of emotion in our mental lives means that moral enhancement aimed at attenuating single emotions can be expected to have repercussions on our rational functioning that could seriously undermine the putative moral benefits. The direct modulation of emotion, on my proposal, is thus problematic because it fails to accommodate the complex interactions of emotion. More traditional non-biomedical interventions have the advantage in that they are holistic: bringing about emotional change at the same time brings about other changes. They should therefore be favoured over the direct modulation of emotions.
In the era of globalization, many health issues are not confined by national boundaries, but also problems for the whole world. One of the most important questions in global health ethics is about the ethics of human rights to health. Some people question that human rights to health have no correlative perfect obligation and these rights are impossible to be satisfied in the current conditions of the world. In addition to these questions, another controversy is the conflicts between human rights to health with other human rights, such as human rights to privacy. In this big data era, when the information of our health may be found on the internet and revealed to others without our consent, government and other organizations may use our information for many good or bad purposes. How to handle and balance the conflict between human rights to health and human rights to privacy is a big topic that everyone should think about. And it is important for philosophers to provide an analytical and moral framework to solve such a conflict.

My research project seeks to investigate such a framework for the ethics of human rights to health and privacy in the big data era. Particularly, this project aims at seeking out a non-utilitarian consequential evaluation for these human rights by evaluating and comparing ideas from Allen Buchanan, Amartya Sen, and William Talbott. In the presentation, I argue for the following positions. First, the conflict seems unsolvable because many people wrongly assume that these human rights are traditional moral rights. If we follow Buchanan’s idea, which has correctly pointed out that international human rights do not necessarily mirror traditional moral rights, then the conflict is solvable. Second, Buchanan’s pluralistic justification of international human rights is better supported by Sen’s consequential evaluation framework and also some ideas from Talbott’s consequentialism. Third, based on such a consequential evaluation of human rights, we can explain the conflict between human rights to health and human rights to privacy in the big data era, and which of them have priority depends on the situations and a list of basic goods. Although one presentation cannot answer all questions in the project, at least some preliminary but important philosophical investigation and practical issues will be addressed in the presentation.
Due to some rapid changes in its social setting, there are a growing number of people in Japan who pursue their careers in social work related to caring for elderly people. Consequently, a need for having plausible professional ethics in social work has emerged though we have not yet gained such thing except the code of ethics proposed by Japanese Association of Certified Social Workers.

Despite the situation in Japan, there is a good amount of work already done for establishing such an ethical framework for social workers in the field of professional ethics. An example is the series of work produced by Sarah Banks (1998, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2012). One potential problem with her work which opposes to the more traditional principle-based approach in professional ethics is that her account might be unable to answer the basic question a body of professional ethics is supposed to provide: the question of how people in each profession ought to act in relevant hard or dilemmatic cases. Another potential problem is that her account does not pay enough attention to the role played by personal commitments held by social workers. Mike Martin (2000, 2002) gave an argument for the importance of personal commitments within professional ethics. Martin’s argument and its implication need to be assessed carefully if one attempts to establish a framework for professional ethics in a relevant field.

Setting up this theoretical background, in this presentation I shall consider the implication of Martin’s argument for social work ethics, particularly the implication in the Japanese context. My assessment of Martin’s argument reveals that there is some social pressure put on social workers in the Japanese society, and such pressure could weaken the conclusion Martin’s argument was originally supposed to defend.
There are two areas in which a right to conscientious refusal is recognized in almost all Western societies: the healthcare professions and the military. There has long been a widespread, unstated assumption, in most Western societies, that these are the only areas in which a right to conscientious refusal should be recognized. University lecturers, lawyers, police officers, and most other professionals, are not entitled to conscientiously refuse to perform work duties without also resigning from their jobs. But, this assumption has recently been challenged. In the US States of Texas and South Dakota legislation was enacted in 2017, allowing workers in foster care and adoption agencies to conscientiously refuse to place children with gay or unmarried parents (Vertuno 2017). Legislation has also been enacted recently in the Netherlands enabling civil registrars to conscientiously refuse to conduct same-sex weddings (Derks 2017).

I argue that there has never been a logically coherent basis for restricting conscientious refusal to the military and to healthcare. The reasons for enactment of legislation allowing conscientious refusal in the military and in healthcare are pragmatic ones. Enacting such legislation allowed governments to head off political crises. I also argue that we now have good reason to find a principled way to rein in the expansion of conscientious refusal across the professions. If we don’t then the availability of many professional services will soon be compromised. I argue that the need to defuse a political crisis is a legitimate justification for the recognition of a right to conscientious refusal within a particular profession, and that a need to avoid triggering new political crises is a legitimate justification for continuing to retain some current entitlements to conscientious refusal. However, we can and should seek to restrict the entitlement to conscientious refusal to this limited range of cases.

References.


Though there is no knowledge of the future, engineers do plan and many, especially civil engineers, plan for decades, and a few for even longer. —For example, the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository was to have been designed to store nuclear waste safely for between ten thousand and one million years. —The planning engineers do would not be philosophically interesting were it not in general so often successful, much more successful than the gambles of ordinary life. So, I think we should consider how such planning is possible—and what its limits are. Is one million years beyond the limits of what engineers as such can plan? Is a thousand years? Is a hundred years? Is there an nth generation for what engineers can plan? The answer I want to defend is that engineers can plan only as far into the future as they can reasonably expect engineers to be present. Of course, humans can plan for many thousands of years, as the ancient Egyptians seem to have done, however high the failure rate may be; but engineers as such should be less daring. Engineers should not only take into account costs (the limits of their resources), as the ancient Egyptians no doubt did, but also apportion costs and benefits fairly between generations, something the ancient Egyptians do not seem to have even considered. The great pyramid at Giza burdened the builders’ generation with an enormous cost, with little benefit to them, while allowing the next hundred and fifty or so generations to benefit from the almost maintenance-free but unexpected tourist attraction that pyramid became. That was not a fair apportionment of costs and benefits. My point is not that the government of ancient Egypt did something morally wrong when it built the great pyramid. That is a subject for political philosophy. My concern is engineering. The engineers of ancient Egypt would have done something morally wrong if, but only if, there were engineers in ancient Egypt. Whether there were any engineers in ancient Egypt depends in part on what “engineers” means in the assertion that there were (or were not) engineers in ancient Egypt. That is a subject that I have written about before. I will assume that answer and see what follows.
‘Transparent Nudges in Biobanking and Learning Healthcare’

Vilius Dranseika (Jagiellonian University)

Threat of manipulation and loss of autonomy is perhaps the most important argument for the position that (covertly) nudging (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) people – usually by employing defaults – to take part in a variety of minimal or less-than-minimal risk activities in the field of biomedical research, such as donating leftover biological tissue to research biobanks (as well as in public health surveillance programs; or learning activities in Learning Healthcare Systems (Faden et al. 2013; Kass et al. 2013; Foley and Fairmichael 2015)), is unethical. This threat can be eliminated or at least severely lessened, however, if, instead of covert nudges, transparent nudges were employed. Such transparent nudges can involve disclosure of information on the potential influence of the nudge, its purpose, or both. Available empirical literature in behavioral sciences on effectiveness of transparent nudges supports the position that transparent nudges are as effective or almost as effective as covert nudges (Loewenstein et al. 2015; Kroese et al. 2016; Steffel et al. 2016; Bruns et al. 2016). These empirical results – even if presently very limited in scope – help to neutralize one of the main reasons (or perhaps the main reason) to think that nudging in such contexts is unethical (as long as nudges are transparent rather than covert). Furthermore, the element of disclosure inherent in transparent nudges helps to alleviate some of the ethical concerns about opt-out policies and ‘presumed consent’. In addition to theoretical analysis, I will present the results of my ongoing empirical research on effectiveness of transparent nudges in Learning Healthcare Systems.
Ever since the International Summit on Human Genome Editing held in Washington D.C. in 2015, some scientists and bioethicists have repeatedly been calling for society not to move forward with any clinical use of germline genome editing (GGE) until a “broad societal consensus” about the appropriateness of such interventions has been reached (in addition to uncontrovertially asking for adequate evidence of safety and efficacy). I will argue that while these authors are right to caution against letting policy on such matters be decided by experts without oversight by the general public, what this shows is the need to ensure democratic governance of GGE – but not necessarily broad societal consensus, assuming the latter requirement is more demanding. Françoise Baylis, one of the few supporters of that requirement who have taken steps to articulate it more precisely, thus makes it clear that it would not be satisfied by simple majority rule, and suggests instead that it involves a state of affairs in which no one would feel that their moral integrity had been undermined by participating in the consensus-building process.

Striving to foster consensus on this issue and encouraging an inclusive public debate are worthwhile efforts that deserve our support. Nonetheless, I shall argue that in pluralistic societies in which citizens hold substantially different conceptions of the good, demanding broad societal consensus before authorizing any clinical application of GGE likely amounts to imposing a form of naysayer’s veto incompatible with democratic principles. I will also show that this requirement cannot be justified by appeal to the idea that we all have a stake in shaping the human genome’s future, or to the potential impact of GGE on vulnerable groups. Absent an alternative justification for that requirement, the debate on GGE should focus instead on the conditions needed for global democratic governance.
This paper explores the relationship between two central topics in moral and political philosophy: political authority and killing in the war. Each of these has been extensively discussed in isolation, but there is relatively little work about the implication of legitimate authority for permissible killing in the war. In particular, reductivism, defended prominently by Jeff McMahan (2009) and Cécile Fabre (2012), has been the prevailing position in the field of the ethics of war. Accordingly, a combatant’s killing should be justified on the basis of the interpersonal morality governing defensive killing between individuals. That is, the moral justification for killing in war is completely reductive to the authority-independent reasons.

David Estlund (2007) and Jonathan Parry (2017) are welcome exceptions. For example, Parry focuses on Raz’s account of authority to claim that his service conception of legitimate authority can affect the moral status of combatants’ acts of killing. While my paper partially builds upon Parry’s discussion, I point to the inadequacy of such an instrumental reason to justify legitimate authority in context of waging and fighting wars. After that, I defend two related arguments: (1) under certain conditions, the command issued by legitimate authority can provide combatants with a moral justification for killing, even in cases where the killing both transgresses rights of others and fails to bring about goods sufficient to override those rights; and (2) a combatant’s having an authority-based justification for killing does not, by itself, raise the justificatory burden on defensively killing this authorized combatant.

In other words, an authoritative command gives combatants a sufficient reason to commit an act of killing that would otherwise be unjustified on the basis of authority-independent reasons, but this justification is entirely separable from the moral status of opponent’s defensive killing because of authority’s scope.

Over the past decade social media platforms and various online chat rooms have provided people the world over with the opportunity to interact with each other. Websites like Facebook and Twitter have allowed for people to interact with people they never likely would have met offline including celebrities, distant relatives, and political figures. While this perceived increase in social connection through faster means of communication might be seen as a good thing, there have also been more negative developments as a result of the nature of these digital interactions.

For instance, in most cases these social media platforms and online message boards provide for users to construct alternate identities or even remain anonymous in their activities. This anonymity allows for anyone to partake in online social spaces in ways they often wouldn’t if their actions could be traced back to them. In many cases this allows for socially destructive behaviors such as the rapid spreading of false information or various forms of online harassment (doxing, cyber bullying, etc.). Anonymity also allows for the construction of online hate groups where the words and actions of individual members are not met with the same condemnation as they would be in a physical public setting.

The nature of these online spaces and the social interactions that take place within them are vastly different than those in more personal, physical spaces. Due to these differences I believe that the various character traits people express and cultivate in online spaces are different than those in physical spaces, that the development of anonymous online personas allows for socially destructive words and actions to pass by unchallenged by the wider physical community, and that actions taken under the cloak of anonymity negatively affect how people interact with each other in physical spaces. Due to these developments, I argue that online social spaces ought to be changed to suit the cultivation of more socially beneficial character traits within those who partake.
Japan is famous for its robotics and corresponding policy making (currently Society 5.0). Several accounts seek to locate the reasons for these phenomena in certain cultural features. However, due to numerous counterexamples from other cultures, the cultural-anthropological viewpoint provides only limited evidence into the specifics of robotics and related policies in Japan. Based on several years collaborative research with Japanese roboticists, occasional observations and interviews, and the study of policy-related documents, I analyze the vision of the future role of robotics (the so-called “robot society”) from a “cognitive design” viewpoint. The guiding question is: What are the Japanese specifics for implementing human-machine relations?

First, I will sketch the approach to Society 5.0 as as a heterarchic or socio-technological conception of human-machine relations: humans and machines are basically seen as interaction partners with priority of the human. Opposed to hierarchic or techno-technological conceptions that depart from a clear and irreducible distinction between the human agent and the machine, Society 5.0 conceives machines as a natural part of human agency. This approach is exemplified with regard to Cybernics.

The final question of whether this is a proper and beneficial research agenda turns attention to the feasibility of the proposed technologies and the related gap between vision and implementation. Furthermore, the future viability of a “robot society” and the vision of a smart society depend on the question how human society should develop. Here, the Japanese agenda could be more specific in terms of what “well-being” means, and which needs should be satisfied. Finally, considering the prospects of robotic/AI development, the vision of a Society 6.0 with need-based human-machine interaction addresses the issue of self-dependency and therefore human dignity more directly.
Mobile health (mHealth) technologies are gradually becoming a more integral part of health care. How will the use of these technologies shape the lives of future generations? This paper will interrogate ethical and social implications of mHealth technologies from a patient-centered public health perspective. In particular, I will investigate whether and under which circumstances the use of mHealth technologies can be expected to 1. improve public health outcomes and 2. empower their users in a healthcare context.

The incorporation of mHealth technologies into the daily lives of ‘health consumers’ is increasingly being promoted as an avenue to strengthening patient autonomy and improving population health outcomes. Advocates for the routine use of mHealth technologies argue that these interventions facilitate better-informed health choices and provide access to healthcare to a wider patient cohort at lower costs. They predict that through the implementation of mHealth technologies, healthcare systems and caregivers will be able to monitor and diagnose patients without face-to-face visits, while patients’ self-management will enhance preventative to post-operative care.

However, the emphasis on self-management implicit in mHealth technologies raises ethical concerns. The implementation of technologies that require patient self-monitoring can intensify the perception of health outcomes as an individual responsibility and shift attention from broader socio-political and economic factors that shape individual and population health. This might have negative impact on patients’ lives. Some mHealth technologies also raise concerns regarding data security and algorithmic bias that can exacerbate patient vulnerability. In my paper, I will explore the risks and benefits associated with mHealth technologies in depth and interrogate their implications for future generations. I will build on theoretical insights generated in the research group “META – mHealth: Ethical, legal and societal aspects in the technological age” at the Institute of Ethics, History and Theory of Medicine at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich.
What is fair use of predictive analytics? Predictive analytics applies what I will call a predictive algorithm on a dataset to make predictions about the future, e.g. recidivism predictions of criminals and health risk assessments. Developments in computer science and statistics together with growing access to large sets of data have vastly improved the power of predictive analytics, which implies that its value and usefulness rapidly increase. Predictive analytics is already used, for instance, in healthcare systems to predict health risks, and in the criminal justice system in the US to predict the likelihood of recidivism. We have good reason to believe that it will influence many other areas of our society. However, it has recently been proved that unless the algorithm provides perfectly accurate predictions or the probability for each element in a domain to have the relevant property is identical, the predictive algorithm will violate at least one of three fairness axioms. Either (i) the algorithm correctly identifies the relevant property (e.g. recidivism) more often in one subgroup (e.g. people of color) than another (e.g. white people); (ii) the algorithm produces more positive false findings of the property for one subgroup; or (iii) the algorithm produces more negative false findings for one subgroup. This paper outlines different responses to this problem: should we abandon predictive algorithms, compromise on equality in correct predictions across subgroups, or accept inequality between subgroups with respect to false findings? The paper presents three ethical principles that can be universally applied to promote algorithmic fairness: transparency, dominance and priority to the worse off. Yet, it concludes that all-things-considered judgments about the fairness of predictive algorithms are context-dependent. They depend on the what is predicted, and what the negative consequences of false findings are.
Global Burden of Disease (GBD) Study is the most comprehensive health dataset that helps to guide the global health policy and priority-setting in resource allocation. One of the philosophical criticisms levelled against the current practice of GBD is the causal attribution by counterfactuals. More specifically, according to the criticism, GBD is susceptible to the well-known problem of overdetermination. In this talk, I will attempt to defend the causal attribution by counterfactuals from this philosophical criticism. My argument runs as follows. First, I will argue that the disvalue of premature death has no temporal location. Second, I will introduce the alleged problem of overdetermination in the context of population health measure. Third, I will show that the problem of overdetermination arises when and because the goal of GBD is misunderstood. Some philosophers understand GBD measures the overall disvalue of mortality and morbidity that exists in the world. This is a mistake. It merely measures the disvalue of mortality and morbidity in terms of risk factors.
With the advance of AI technology, it seems that robots are able to take over decision making from humans in many aspects of daily life. For humans to accept that development, nevertheless, it is urgent that the decisions robots make must be morally acceptable. A natural thought—witnessed by the increasingly popular application of the trolley problem to autonomous cars—is that robots should be taught how to apply moral reasoning as humans do. In other words, robots should act as moral agents like us. I oppose this view. More specifically, I argue that we should reject the following principle:

(1) If φ-ing is morally permissible for humans, then it is permissible for robots to φ-ing.

While (1) seems plausible, (1) is false in some situations. For example, suppose that David stands on Brooklyn Bridge and is preparing to kill himself by jumping off the bridge. Consider two situations: in both situations, it happens that someone passes by before David jumps off, but in the first situation it is Mary and in the second a robot. Seeing Mary (or the robot), David shouts, “Don’t stop me! I am determined to die!” Should they stop David killing himself?

Intuitively, stopping David is permissible for Mary, despite against his will. It’s tempting to think that the robot can follow suit. I argue that the robot should not violate David’s autonomy to save his life. Based on P. F. Strawson’s insight in “Freedom and Resentment”, I argue that we accept other people interfering out lives because we participate in meaningful personal relationships. But since robots—presumably being not persons and having no intention—cannot build genuine personal relationships with us, there are somethings that humans can do to us, but robots cannot. Robots should not be treated as moral agents equally to humans.
‘Buddhism and Epicureanism on the Ethics of Eating’

Soraj Hongladarom (Chulalongkorn University)

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the attitude toward eating and consumption in general in Buddhism and Epicureanism. The reason why we should be talking about one major religion and one ancient philosophy, comparing one with the other, is that in today’s world there is a tremendous pressure of the capacity of the world and its environment to sustain the ever-expanding consumption and utilization of natural resources by human beings. Our age has been called the ‘anthropocene’ age, implying that human beings are now having the capability of permanently altering geological conditions, resulting in permanent and perhaps irreversible changes. Human beings have increased in number, but more seriously they have greatly expanded their rate of consumption of whatever offered by nature their sustenance. This means that eating itself has become important. It is through eating food that contributes very greatly to the environmental damages that are going on at the moment. Instead of eating ‘lightly’, not leaving a too great footprint on the environment, the pattern of consumption nowadays encourages more and more eating, in addition to “better quality” eating through consumption of high-cost food such as beef. I propose that we turn back to Buddhism and Epicureanism for an insight on how we should avoid this pattern of overconsumption. For Buddhism, this is quite straightforward, for Buddhism is known for their teaching of austerity. For Epicureanism, however, this may seem a little strange, because the word ‘Epicurean’ is usually associated with overeating and overindulgence. However, I show also that that attitude is mistaken and we can indeed learn from Epicureanism a way not to damage the environment through overconsumption. The insight obtained from Epicureanism in this regard thus complements that of Buddhism in helping understand why it is that we need to revise our attitude and our pattern of eating so that nature can continue to help us and our future generations continue to live well.
The main presupposition in my study on possibility of large-scale manned space exploration or space colonization is; under liberal democratic regime and morals, we have almost no reason to prohibit large-scale space emigration project itself. So main problem is not whether we should run such project or not, but whether we would be motivated to do so or not. I myself am skeptic about it, because there seems to be little need for large-scale manned mission for future space exploration and development. I have a very similar type of skepticism about AI and robotics. If we develop human-level machine intelligence (in the sense of Bostrom[2014]) in liberal society, we (liberal) human society cannot help but treat them as a kind of "persons" with a set of "human rights", as agents having moral status. So, my main concern is not whether we should treat human-level AIs and robots as "humans" or not, rather, whether we would be motivated to develop such machines or not. And I am skeptic about it again, because, when we need full-fledged human-level intelligent machines, we can employ natural persons, no artificial ones. If we ought to treat artificial and natural persons equally, there might be not so much comparative advantage of the former to the latter.

There is a kind of structural similarity between these problems. It looks like a circular argument. Argument (a) is: "The feasibility of space colonization might be relatively high in a society that accepts remodeled humans and autonomous robots as ordinary "humans", and (b) is: 'Human-level autonomous robots with “strong AI” might be demanded on large scale if there is a huge market for space colonization enterprise".
‘Science and Engineering Ethics for Future’

Hidekazu Kanemitsu (Kanazawa Institute of Technology))

Ethics education is crucial for engineering education. In fact, ethics education is introducing into engineering education in many countries. The important objectives of ethics education is to let students realize that ethical judgment ability is essential in their professional activities, and to let them acquire skills to act ethically.

Although this importance should persist over time, the situation surrounding engineering or technology changes with the times. In this panel, we would like to discuss the future of science and engineering ethics. In the first part of this session, we will talk about past and present of science and engineering ethics. And based on this discussion, we would like to discuss the future of science and engineering ethics in the second part of the session.

The main purpose of this session is to clarify the problems or new task of current science and engineering ethics and to find a solution or strategy to the problem through the discussion. So, all participants are expected to discuss each other and to exchange their experiences and views frankly, although we have three discussants, namely Michael Davis (Illinois Institute of Technology), Philip Brey (University of Twente) and Hidekazu Kanemitsu (Kanazawa Institute of Technology).
‘Science and Engineering Ethics for Future’

Hidekazu Kanemitsu (Kanazawa Institute of Technology)

Ethics education is crucial for engineering education. For that reason, ethics education is being formally introduced into engineering education in many countries. The most important objectives of ethics education are 1) to help students realize that ethical judgment is essential in their professional activities and 2) to help them acquire the skills to act ethically. Although the importance of these objectives should persist over time, the situation surrounding engineering and technology changes with the times. In this panel, we would like to discuss the future of engineering ethics. In the first part of this session, we will briefly discuss the past and present of engineering ethics. Then, based on this discussion, we will try to sketch the future of engineering ethics. The main purpose of this session is to clarify the problems (or new tasks) of current engineering ethics and to find, through dialogue, a solution or strategy for solving those problems. So, participants are expected to engage in a frank exchange experiences and views. The discussants are: Philip Brey (University of Twente), Michael Davis (Illinois Institute of Technology), and Hidekazu Kanemitsu (Kanazawa Institute of Technology).
While biological reproduction may be a natural phenomenon, the fact that biological parents are responsible for raising their children is not. It is a matter of convention that our social and legal institutions are designed in such a way that a person has a right to parent the child they cause to exist. Concerns for the interests of children may lead to the question, as explored by Brighouse and Swift (2006), of whether children would be better-off if they were routinely re-distributed away from their biological parents to better parents. While there may be a fundamental right to parent, the re-distribution proposal can only be rejected if a fundamental right to parent one’s own biological child is established.

Advances in biotechnology have led to the development of ectogenesis, whereby a fetus undergoes gestation in an artificial womb. In this paper, I will argue that ectogenesis offers a way of revolutionizing biological reproduction such that the right to parent one’s own biological child can be defended. Currently, the female undergoes pregnancy during biological reproduction. Without pregnancy, the female’s greater causal role in the creation of the child would be eliminated. The rights of biological parents would be equalized, given that each parent contributes a complementary gamete which join together to form the fertilized embryo.

In this paper I will argue that in the context of ectogenesis, a father would have the right to request that the mother undergo fetal extraction so he may be a parent to the child even when the mother is unwilling. Given that conception is a foreseeable risk of sexual intercourse, a person’s right to their genetic material only allows them to opt-in our opt-out of parenting the child, and forfeiting one’s right does not automatically forfeit the other biological parent’s right.
‘Three Theories of Human Rights to Democracy’

Kosuke Kiyama (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science/ Doshisha University)

Recently, vigorous debate concerning the question whether there is a human right to democracy has emerged in the field of the philosophy of human rights. This paper aims to examine some of the influential theories in the debate: the function-based argument, the instrumental argument, and the intrinsic argument. The function-based argument envisages human rights as rights that are firstly to be achieved domestically, secondly to be a trigger of international actions when domestic achievement fails. In the argument, the existence or nonexistence of the human right to democracy is argued by reference to domestic or international conditions. The instrumental argument argues for (or against) the human right to democracy by ascertaining whether democracy can contribute to certain values or objects of values. In the intrinsic argument, the human rights to democracy is argued for or against directly from the interests that all human beings possess in virtue of their humanity.

This paper examines them respectively. First, by analyzing the function-based argument two features are pointed out; it relies on a conception of rights that sees human rights as imperatives that social arrangements should fulfill at the present conditions, and it relies on the implicit assumption of the importance of urgent interests of every person that should be protected. The paper argues that the first feature should not be endorsed and the second feature gets more clarity if it is replaced by the intrinsic argument.

Second, by investigating the instrumental argument, it is argued that the argument cannot stand except the prior conception of the right to democracy typically shown by the intrinsic argument.

Third, based on the examinations above, this paper sees the intrinsic argument as most promising. It, then, inquires into the question whether “equality” or “fairness” can be a grounding value in the intrinsic argument. This paper answers “yes” to the question.
A new iteration of the preconception sex selection technology (SST+), under development in the Netherlands, promises a cheap, near-to-certain and non-invasive means to select a sex of one’s future child even in the setting of one's home. This paper explores the normative challenges such a material change in the sex selection practice may bring. The study indicates how the new technologies, such as SST+, may not only challenge existing ethical concerns we have regarding them, but also may change the evaluative standards with which we want to assess these technologies. Although sex selection has been available from 90s, it is heavily regulated and available predominantly for use in medical cases. Non-medical sex selection is banned worldwide, with a notable exception of the US and a few other countries. This paper explores how an introduction of SST+ can mediate the norms and values of people, and what possible societal changes this could entail. The paper will present the findings of the twofold analysis: an empirical exploratory study, with the help of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis; intertwined with a postphenomenological philosophic analysis, relying on the theory of technological mediation. The paper aims to understand how people appropriate the possibility of a new sex selection technology, making sense of it within their lifeworld and existential concerns. Philosophically, the study helps to contextualize the existing ethical debate on sex selection technology, predominantly focusing on the hard rhetoric of risk, and the cost-benefit analysis. Exploratory by nature, the study is non-exhaustive and does not aim to generalize the findings. Nonetheless, the micro-perspectives, situated in the rich lifeworld of people confronted with the new technology, help to foreground novel normative concerns and substantiate the previously existing ones, thus forming a nuanced background for informed decision-making regarding SST+.
‘Understanding Emerging Forms of Dissent: Civil Disobedience or Uncivil Action?’

Manohar Kumar (Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology)

There has been a growing resurgence in the debate on civil disobedience in recent times. While on the one hand new and emerging forms of dissent like hacktivism, whistleblowing, unauthorized economic migration, covert action have tried to gain legitimacy by claims of civil disobedience, skeptics argue that such claims are mistaken as they do not fulfill the demanding requirements of civil disobedient action. Skeptics also argue that using categories such as civil disobedience might not be beneficial for the causes that the authors of such dissenting action espouse. They claim that rather using such a demanding category such forms of protest should be seen in their own right as making legitimate claims for attention towards purported wrongs. In this paper I take contention with the latter argument asking whether or not civil disobedience represents a legitimate category that can encapsulate new and emerging forms of dissent. Contrary to the skeptical point of view I argue that certain new forms of dissent do represent forms of civil disobedience on a thin reading of the concept. The confusion I believe arises due to a thicker notion of civil disobedience that is quite demanding for forms of dissent that though being democracy enhancing need not demonstrate features similar to classic forms of civil disobedience. Such deviance is not always a product of a lack of sincerity and seriousness on the part of the disobedient agent but rather can be constrained by the demands of the specific situation, the changing nature and forms of political engagement and governance, and a personal regard for individual circumstances.

A thinner concept of civil disobedience is thus contextual constrained action that is tolerant to the burdens faced by individuals in real world circumstances rather than exposing them to unfair burdens that makes action costly for the agent. When societal conditions and law is unresponsive to genuine acts of dissent then the right course of action is to act rather than not act. In such circumstances any covert forms of actions or adherence to limited forms of violence rather than being signals of infidelity to law or uncivil forms of resistances need to be rather read as civil disobedient action.
The rapid development of fully autonomous weapons (FAWs) has created a great academic divide on the desirability of such technology being developed and eventually used for combat. One point of contention is the capacity of FAWs to behave ethically within an armed conflict, which is subject to fundamental standards of humanity as prescribed by International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Opponents argue that FAWs by definition are inhumane and therefore can never achieve the level of ethical conduct a human soldier can, while proponents of FAWs have rejected this position and argue that ethicality can be programmed into the FAW through an ethical governor. More extreme advocates have put forward the conviction that FAWs are a positive development precisely because they lack certain human qualities which have caused many war crimes in the past, such as fear, anger and revenge, making them more ‘ethical’ than human soldiers. This article argues that from the perspective of IHL, the protection of civilians and those hors de combat, and increased respect for fundamental principles of IHL, should be the dominant considerations in determining the desirability of introducing new means and technology of warfare. It is therefore prudent to examine whether the claim that FAWs can surpass human ethicality is justified. This article accomplishes this through a study of historical precedents and records of war crimes caused by human error or emotion on the one side, and an analysis of to what extent FAWs, both by their nature as computers and through ethical governors, can improve the battlefield situation. By doing this, an objective standpoint is formed on the debate concerning the ethicality of the use of FAWs in armed conflicts, and a broader recommendation is made to either prevent or endorse the development of FAW technology.

Keywords: fully autonomous weapon; war ethics; human error; international humanitarian law
Modern warfare sees the decline of traditional form of warfare where armies face each other on the battlefield over a defined period of time. As instead, military force is increasingly being used on smaller scale and over a sustained and extended timeline. Some scholars refer to this form of force as ‘force short of war’ (FSoW from here on). The term was first coined by Michael Walzer in his preface to the 4th edition of *Just and Unjust Wars*. In it, he uses the case of the containment regime in Iraq from 1991 to the Second Gulf War to describe what he terms ‘measures short of war’ (Walzer, 2006: xiv). The containment had three elements. The first was an embargo intended to prevent the importation of arms. The second was an inspection system organised by the UN to block the domestic development of weapons of mass destruction. The third was the establishment of no-fly zones in the northern and southern parts of the country. Walzer goes on to argue that these elements all ‘involved the use of force… but it is common sense to recognise they are very different from actual warfare’ (Walzer, 2006: xiv). In this paper, I unpack this phrase and explore, if whether, FSoW should be considered a distinct category within just war theory – the domain which includes *jus ad bellum, jus in bello* and *jus post bellum*. 
‘Intergenerational Ethics as the Basis for a Comprehensive Model of Aesthetic Sustainability in Urban Environments’

Sanna Lehtinen (University of Helsinki)

The convergence between ethical and aesthetic values in relation to urban environments has become especially topical in the contemporary world. Complex ecological problems and global challenges such as urbanization and mass migration call for a deeper understanding of how urban environments should, could and will look like. Aesthetic sustainability is a concept developed in order to assist in assessing current aesthetic values as they become manifested in urban environments, specifically from the perspective of future generations. In this paper the aim is to show, how aesthetic sustainability is strongly indebted to a selective notion of intergenerational ethics. The focus is also on understanding how this relation between the two concepts encourages to speculate about the possibility of an intergenerational aesthetics in general. Aesthetic sustainability as a core concept in urban aesthetics does not aim merely at assessing urban planning trends, smart city ideology or architectural ideals as such. It deals, more importantly, with uncovering the patterns of how our currently prevailing and evolving aesthetic values are built in close interaction with the growing and changing knowledge about the complex phenomena that point towards rethinking human activity on an unforeseeably large scale.
‘Human uterus transplantation: Deepening the socio-moral critique’

Mianna Lotz (Macquarie University)

Human uterus transplantation [UTx] – the most radical and experimental of all current forms of assisted reproduction – gives rise to a range of complex ethical questions, including those related to individual safety, risk and informed consent. I have proposed elsewhere however that the wider social impacts and implications of UTx provision must also form part of a comprehensive ethical analysis. In a recent series of discussions in *Journal of Medical Ethics*, Stephen Wilkinson and Nicola Williams respond to my socio-moral critique of UTx provision, offering a number of defences in relation to concerns I raise. In this paper I examine some of those defences. These include that UTx provision would address harms and needs that already exist and as such have priority; is fully compatible with needed reform of the procreative context in which it would be offered; would not necessarily involve legitimation or endorsement of what are widely agreed to be problematic pronatalist or geneticist norms; and is required as a matter of justice and consistency with other practices. Importantly, Wilkinson and Williams are not proposing a *ceteris paribus* justification of UTx provision; nor do my responses to their arguments represent comprehensive opposition to UTx. Rather, my more limited purpose here is to show that whatever other defences may be given of UTx provision, the specific ones raised by Wilkinson and Williams do not ultimately succeed and therefore do not allay the concerns underpinning the original socio-moral critique.
‘Causality and Responsibility— a multiple approach from the viewpoint of applied ethics and philosophy’

Matsuda Tsuyoshi (Kobe University)
Fujiki Atsushi (Kobe City College of Nursing)
Kira Takayuki (Utsunomiya Kyowa University)

1. The “Gradualism” of the Causation and its Significance for the Responsibility

Matsuda Tsuyoshi

The aim of this session is to examine the problematics of the ontological and normative connectedness of causality and responsibility from the viewpoints of philosophy of science, applied ethics and the philosophy of law. For explicating the backgrounds of the philosophical discussion, Matsuda, as organizer of this session, first sheds lights on the “gradualism” of the causation of Christopher Hitchcock (2003, 2015) in contrast to the “monistic” philosophy of causality such as Humean “constant conjunction” (or regularity) and David Lewis’s logical understanding of “counterfactual dependence”, and the other related trends of the causal pluralism of Psillos influenced by later Wittgenstein or Anscombe. In this context, the “gradualism” of the causation can be featured as a good alternative for a more plausible explanation of the actual or singular events in ethically and legally conflictive cases that we encounter in our society, by encompassing the human factors such as will or values in its model or framework for the causal ascription.

By confirming this validity of the claims and arguments of the “gradualism” of causation, we will appropriately place the theoretically interesting and normatively significant phenomena such as “preemption” (prevention or intervention in other words) and “omission” as its opposite case in the individual actions and social or collective activities on the networks of the various phases of causation, without excluding them in the rigid sense, as a type of physicalism can be indicated in the conception of the Michael Moore’s Causality and Responsibility (2008). Some cases will be briefly referred to from the corporate management for the safety and the law building in connection with it for the ethical and legal responsibility, in order to show the necessity of the precautionary attitudes of the production and its governance.

2. Reconsidering precautionary attitudes toward the omission from some cases in environmental health

Fujiki Atsushi

According with the interest of this session, Fujiki will especially focus on the normative aspects of the problems of “omission” from the viewpoints of applied ethics. Concerning this “omission”, Fujiki makes explicit the points of the moral responsibility of the corporate management for the safety of various stakeholders, to show the
necessity of the precautionary principles or attitudes of the producers and policymakers. Asbestos issue is the typical examples of omission. For instance, on October 9, 2014, the Supreme Court held in the Sennan Asbestos case that the state was liable for failing to promptly issue the ministerial ordinances to regulate asbestos based on the Labor Standards Act and the Industrial Safety and Health Act [Okubo, 2016]. As shown by European Environmental Agency, there are many similar cases that we were supposed to take actions to prevent human health damage and harmful effects on environment [cf. EEA, 2001; EEA, 2013]. However, now we face an urgent need to cope with another kind of problems caused by emerging technologies, such like geoengineering and gene drives as one of derivations of the genome editing technology. These two technologies still have been controversial because the influences of them are planetary-wide and uncertain. Geoengineering could become a powerful tool for solving the climate change, but it might also bring us undesirable results no one can predict in advance. Gene drives could eliminate public health pests or invasive species efficiently, but they might disrupt an existing ecosystem. To make matters worse, it is almost impossible or extremely hard to roll back the consequences of these emerging technologies. Whatever the consequences, if we fail the management of these technologies, our descendant will complain of our serious judgment error or negligence. As a proverb appropriately says, “there is a sin of omission as well as of commission”.

3. On legal philosophical issues on long-term causation and intergenerational allocation of responsibility

Kira Takayuki

According with the interest of this session, Kira will especially focus on normative issues on long-term causation and intergenerational responsibility from the viewpoints of legal philosophy. In legal issues, the relation of causation and responsibility is so close. But as is often the case, because the precise confirmation of them is difficult, lawyers tend to treat it in their own manner, not necessarily “scientific” one. Hart and Honore (1963) argued that lawyers have traditionally understood the legal causation in reference to their common sense. Thus, as Hans Kelsen (1950) indicated, confirmation of causation in legal issues may be moral problem closely related to allocation of responsibility, rather than scientific problem. This characteristic of legal reasoning will be more problematic when long-term causation and intergenerational responsibility are at issue, for example, reservation of fossil fuels, management of radioactive waste, and so on. In order to treat such issues in legal manner, Kira will investigate two legal philosophical standpoints: (1) intergenerational communitarianism assuming the existence of the past, present and future generations, and (2) present-centrism reducing the intergenerational responsibility only to the existing people. These extreme standpoints have demarcation problem in common, and we should find some criterion in relation to our moral and/or scientific knowledge.
The economics of asteroid mining are problematic because of the enormous start-up costs and the expense of returning any materials to Earth. Nonetheless, a heavily subsidized system might work. Talk about the ethical dimensions of such mining is not, therefore, silenced by appeal to the impracticality of the exercise. There may also be at least some ethical advantages to asteroid mining. This paper will, however, focus upon two overlapping concerns: *problems of justice* and *problems of containment*. The former arise, in part, because of differences in levels of access. Some nations have access to asteroids, others do not. This is likely to remain the case during the economically crucial early phases of mining. What is less obvious is that there may also be long-term sustainability problems associated with large-scale mining. Even if it is carried out in the Main Belt where asteroids seem abundant, and even if the growth rates for asteroid mining are historically typical (i.e. around 3.5%), future generations could still be left with a legacy of social requirements for growth which they are unable to satisfy. This is a concern about justice which prompts a question containment: is there an upper limit to the portion of the Main Belt that we should allow ourselves to mine because of concerns about the future? Issues of containment also arise because of the impact of mining upon bodies which are good candidates for environmental protection: the largest bodies in the Main Belt (Ceres and Vesta, Pallas and Hygeia) and also Mars. Any extensive system of Main Belt mining will initially need at least one suitable base of operations with a gravity well shallow enough to reduce energy costs, but deep enough for any required human habitation. Mars is the obvious candidate.
Internationally, the consumption of alcohol during pregnancy is increasingly recognized as a significant public health concern, since alcohol is known to cross the placenta and can have significant teratogenic effects on the developing fetus. Indeed, prenatal alcohol exposure is now one of the leading causes of preventable birth anomalies and can have life-long negative consequences for the child of that pregnancy. There is a growing bioethical discussion of the ethics of the maternal consumption of alcohol, and of different strategies for preventing such consumption. This paper contributes to this by considering the issue of moral responsibility and blameworthiness in pregnancy.

In this, I challenge the argument made in recent discussions of maternal consumption of alcohol and fetal alcohol spectrum disorder that legal interventions to prevent harm to a future child are justified, irrespective of the moral status of the fetus (eg. Wilkinson et al). I show that these rely on an overly individualized conception of gestational responsibility that fails to take account of the ways in which structural exclusions and social vulnerabilities contribute to harm to future persons. As such, the preventative interventions they propose risk reiterating social exclusions and vulnerabilities broadly associated with class and race, and which, in several contexts, intertwine in complex ways with the history of colonialism.

Instead of this approach, I draw on recent work on marginal responsibility and moral disorientation to sketch an approach to gestational responsibility that takes account of the embodied relationship entailed in pregnancy, as well as the ways in which social and subjective vulnerabilities may shape blameworthiness.
‘Carbon Majors and Corporate Responsibility for Climate Change’

Jeremy Moss (University of New South Wales)

Much of the discussion concerning the responsibility for addressing climate change centres on the duties of states, and for good reason. But attention is increasingly turning to the contribution that corporations make to climate change and what this ought to mean for how climate duties are divided. This is particularly the case for fossil fuel producing corporations or ‘carbon majors’ (CMs) who contribute to climate change in two key ways: by directly producing and supplying the fossil fuels that result in emissions and by influencing the climate related policies and actions that states and other actors adopt. This paper will consider the level of responsibility that CMs have for climate harms in light of these two types of contribution and argue that CMs have a significant degree of moral responsibility for the harms to which they contribute. Yet if CMs do bear moral responsibility for their contributions to climate change it is not obvious what actions they ought to take in response. In the second part of the paper I will argue that there are three main types of duties that corporations ought to take: disgorging their profits, lowering their direct carbon emissions and phasing out their fossil fuel related activities. However, these duties are not necessarily compatible. For example, a duty to compensate those who have been harmed by climate change may conflict with a duty to cease producing fossil fuels. I will offer a framework for deciding which of these duties it is most important to discharge.
Resource-intensive consumption is one of the major threats to the sustainability of human civilization. Consumption of this kind at the global scale largely occurs is very abstract. Therefore, it is difficult for us to make sense of these macroscopic trends and their impacts on the future. Neurologists such as Sharot and Sapolsky point out that human beings are biased, in that we are overly optimistic and creatively limited when thinking about the future. It can be argued that if we do not feel a connection between the object of concern and our daily lives, it will not be deemed relevant no matter how important the issue may be. Is there an approach or mechanism through which this gap between subjective and objective importance may be surmounted? Where do issues of the science, the technology and the future meet our everyday? What is our "enough", "moderate" and “desire”? This panel focuses on the power of our dining table to bridge these gaps. We argue that food consumption is an effective pedagogical lens through which everyday concerns and future concerns are more easily linked, and a food system that support strongly sustainable society can be envisioned.

Kazuhiko Ota (Research Institute for Humanity and Nature) talk about classifying and mapping key concepts to create a theoretical framework for considering them.

Nobutsugu Kanzaki (Nanzan University) talk about a concept of how we should examine the science, technology, politics, and future options of choice, as we meet unknowingly.

Soraj Hongladarom (Chulalongkorn University) talk about the way of ethics of food consumption in the 21st century with reference to the history of philosophy including Buddhism.
‘An Existential Argument Against Human Genetic Tailoring’

Regina Rini (York University)

Until the Enlightenment, people in Abrahamic civilizations broadly accepted that individual lives received purpose and direction from a divine plan. In recent centuries, as many have lost faith in this model, we have had to navigate new existential challenges. Humans in secular societies have been forced to adjust their conception of a meaningful life, from one inscribed with divine purpose to one constructed in radical individual freedom. The coming availability of inexpensive genetic selection and editing threatens to imbalance this cultural shift. Genetically tailored generations will once again face the idea that many of their important traits were chosen for them by another intelligence. But, unlike pre-Enlightenment believers, they will not benefit from faith in the wisdom of their creators; they may reasonably resent the arrogance of their fallible predecessors’ making such decisions on their behalf. Further, this asymmetry between generations will pose a serious challenge to the existentialist ethical ideal that all humans might find solidarity in the struggle to create shared meaning through radical freedom. These are strong reasons to minimize the use of genetic tailoring of future generations – or at least to begin preparing for its existential consequences.
Philosophical investigations that explicitly concern sustainable development have largely been conducted separately from work within population ethics, and vice versa. In this paper I suggest that taking the idea of sustainable development (as expressed in the Brundtland report) seriously can provide important insights for population ethics, i.e. for the question of how to account for the value of future populations. I argue that a common sense intuition in line with the sustainability idea points in the direction of the so called average view within population ethics, a view that nowadays has rather few adherents and is generally considered deeply problematic for several reasons. This common sense intuition can be roughly expressed as follows: It is good if people in the future live good lives, irrespective of who they are and how many they are, and it is bad if they live bad lives. A way of capturing this thought is via the claim that it is better the higher the average well-being of these people is, which is the core idea of the average view. This view can be contrasted with the major alternative within population ethics, the total view, according to which it is better the higher the total well-being in the world is. This latter view seems to rhyme badly with the sustainability idea: at least prima facie it seems to speak in favour of increasing the human population, whereas sustainability is usually taken to point in the opposite direction. I show how a version of the average view based on the common sense intuition expressed above, and informed by philosophical theorizing about sustainability, can be construed so as to avoid the problems usually taken to be devastating for it.
‘How could Robots have the Standing to Blame?’

Taku Sasaki (Kanazawa University)

The impressive development of robotics and artificial intelligence (AI) makes robots much more human-like ever before in the cognitive and practical faculties as well as their shape. And the expectation of shifting to the robot-coexistence society drives urges us to discuss the personality of robots and AIs. Although this is the corporate one, we will surely have to consider moral one sometime soon. Then, it is necessary for us to deliberate robots’ moral responsibility. However, the concept of moral responsibility is so vague and ambiguous that it is hard to understand what it is like to hold robots responsible.

In this paper, I consider robots’ competency in terms of blame, which is more familiar and understandable affair to us than holding responsibility. I especially focus the standing to blame on because it makes robots’ agency clearer. How should we take it when we were blamed by robots. Through thinking of this question, I explore some conditions to account robots responsible being.

However, robots must be able to blame before assessing their standing. Can robots blame? To answer this question, I appeal to T. M. Scanlon’s theory of blame which rest blaming on a relationship. According to the theory, blaming is the reactions for impairment of relations, and the subsequent modification of intentions and expectations toward the blamed on the part of the blaming. The theory makes room to take robots’ blaming genuine since robots could satisfy the conditions of taking part in moral relation.

Then, what we need to consider is how we react to blame by robots. What is it like to impair the relation between robots and us? What does it mean that robots change their intentions and expectations toward us? Answering these question and considering the circumstances in the robots-coexisting society, I will show some conditions which are needed for us to ascribe robots the standing to blame.
‘Space age embryos: are individuals harmed by a lack of genetic relations’

Olivia Schuman (York University)

Technological advancements often generate new ethical questions—particularly in the area of reproduction. It is already possible to create individuals from frozen embryos. In the future, it might be necessary to create individuals from embryos created decades or centuries earlier, for the purposes of space exploration and colonization of other planets. My focus in this presentation is whether the resulting individuals would be harmed 1) by a lack of genetic relatedness to their social parents, or 2) by a lack of genetic relatedness to any living individuals.

I explore these issues by first looking at anonymous gamete donation— a practice where individuals are deliberately created without a genetic link to at least one of their parents. A well known rejection of gamete donation has been espoused by J. David Velleman, who has argued that gamete donation is wrong because the offspring of these practices lack the tools they need for adequate “self knowledge and identity formation” that is usually gained via an “acquaintance with people who are like them in virtue of being their biological relatives” (2005: 365). Therefore, he concludes, “children should be raised by their biological parents” (2005: fn362).

I analyze this issue by asking: what is the value of direct acquaintance with genetic relatives and what kinds of genetic relatives matter most? I then explore what effects my conclusions will have on the frozen embryos case. Will the resulting individuals be harmed by the absence of a genetic link to others? Could these harms be mitigated by ‘producing’ genetic relatives, or is a particular uninterrupted ‘family lineage’ necessary for flourishing? Could these harms be prevented by improved data collection or more in-depth genetic testing?

References
The world’s population is aging at a rapid pace. It is estimated that by 2050, the number of the elderly people who are 65 or over will be doubled worldwide. The emergence of an aging population puts strain on society in various ways; most notably, the filial relation between adult children and their parents. As many of the elderly parents will suffer from some kind of chronic disease, adult children can experience pressure as they are to provide long-term support to their parents. How far does morality require adult children to sacrifice for the sake of their parents? In this paper, I will discuss this question from the perspective of Rule-Consequentialism.

Rule-Consequentialists evaluate the principle of action according to the amount of aggregate benefits which is generated when this principle or code is accepted and followed in society. Some Rule-Consequentialist, such as Brad Hooker, will pay attention to the costs of internalization for children of different generations to get inculcated with the moral codes. Bearing in mind that children are naturally partial to their own interests, a demanding set of moral codes may not be worthy of promoting because it would be costly for children to accept those codes.

However, filial obligations are different from other forms of obligations because they are about the caring of one’s own parents. The internalization costs of a stringent form of filial obligation would not be as costly as those of impartial obligation. As a result, in an aging population, as there is a great number of elderly people to receive the benefits, it makes sense for Rule-Consequentialism to prescribe a stringent form of filial obligation to adult children. I will, in my presentation, raise some concerns in regard to the soundness of this prescription.
Despite the advent of CRISPR, gene editing for human enhancement remains well beyond our current technological capabilities. For the discussion about enhancing human beings to be worth having, then, we must assume that gene-editing technology will improve rapidly. However, rapid progress in the development and application of any technology comes at a price: obsolescence. If the genetic enhancements we can provide children get better and better each year, then the enhancements granted to children born in any given year will rapidly go out of date. Sooner or later, every modified child will find themselves to be “yesterday’s child”. The impacts of such obsolescence on our individual, social, and philosophical self-understanding constitute an under-explored set of considerations relevant to the ethics of genome editing.

**Keywords:** ethics, enhancement, human enhancement, genome editing, gene editing, genetic modification, obsolescence, CRISPR.
In my paper, I discuss what Samuel Scheffler calls ‘the potential congruence’ of morality and self-interest in his *Human Morality* (1992) and “Potential Congruence” (2008). Scheffler notes that the degree of conflict between morality and self-interest is often exaggerated (Scheffler [1992] 116). Suppose that you face a choice between two options. And suppose that one of them is supported by some moral consideration about the duty to keep one's promises or to assist those who are in need. Nevertheless, that option would undermine some personal project or relationship that you value. Scheffler argues that this characterization rests on the implausible assumption, excessively narrow construals both of morality and self-interest (*Ibid.* 116-117). Moral norms ‘must be capable of being integrated in a coherent and attractive way into an individual human life’ (*Ibid.* 4). This characterization also based on a questionable model of the deliberative role of morality in which explicitly or paradigmatically moral considerations supports one of the two options. Scheffler argues that `powerful motivations that are responsive to moral consideration can also emerge during the course of an individual’s development, motivations deeply rooted in the structure of the individual’s personality’ and that ‘these motivations help shape the interests of those who possess them’ (*Ibid.* 4). He explains this point, referring to the claim of overridingness (CO), i.e. the claim that it never be rational knowingly to do what morality forbids (*Ibid.* 52). He argues against the idea that CO supports the authority of morality, giving a naturalistic account of the motivational authority (*Ibid.* 78-79). These considerations show that it becomes difficult to identify clear cases of conflict between morality and self-interest. I argue against such a potential congruence. In Section 1, I discuss Scheffler’s potential congruence. I explain what it implies. In Section 2, I examine Raz’s critique and Scheffler’s reply. In Section 3, I argue that his reply fails.
American philosopher and educator John Dewey wrote, “Democracy has to be born anew in every generation, and education is its midwife.” A century later, democracy in the United States and elsewhere continues to face challenges, and science and technology are foundational to many of the controversies. The drive for achievement and resulting successes in these domains have exposed deep rifts in societal values. It is no wonder. In the last century scientific and technological advancements have made a profound impact upon global societies and moralities, challenging philosophers and ethicists to keep pace. And, many of these same technologically-infused ethical issues stand center-stage in cultural wars that are raging in our midst and chipping away at the foundations of democracies across the world. Issues related to medicine, human enhancement, genomics, global politics, and climate change persist in the public discourse, and divisions may be seen along political lines with increasing frequency and ferocity. There are new decisions and decision points for age-old questions; however, the primary normative question for the professional remains the same: “What should I do?” For it is in the answer to this question that professionals come to uphold or break the bonds of societal fidelity and integrity. Despite the enormity of these issues, the sciences and accompanying disciplines have not attended well to areas where the public has difficulty answering novel moral questions. Who our students will be as professionals will result from the manner in which they are inculcated with professional identity as moral agents. And, who they are as professionals will inform what they do as professionals. This paper presentation will discuss the ways in which education in health, science, and technology, steeped in deliberation of attendant ethical issues, can fill these societal voids and deliver democracy to the next generation.
‘What kind of Moral Enhancement would be Effective?’

Yuki Takaki (Kyoto University)

Recently, enhancement by biomedical means is becoming a big issue in the field of bioethics. Generally, there are four kinds of enhancement: physical enhancement, cognitive enhancement, mood enhancement and moral enhancement.

In my paper, I will focus on moral enhancement. Moral enhancement was proposed by Ingmar Person and Julian Savulescu (P&S), and Tom Douglas\textsuperscript{1}. I will discuss what kind of moral enhancement would be effective, criticizing their view on moral enhancement. I will focus on the argument by P&S.

Talking about moral enhancement, we have to deal with the moral theory behind the discussion on moral enhancement. It is impossible to discuss “moral enhancement” without discussing and defining what it is to be “moral”. Even in the field of applied ethics, we cannot always avoid the discussion on normative ethics and meta-ethics.

P&S define the core of moral dispositions. They are altruism and sense of justice or fairness. I will clarify the idea of these dispositions and claim that they are some kind of emotion.

Then, I want to take up three main normative ethical theories, namely Utilitarianism, Kantianism and Virtue Ethics. And I will evaluate moral enhancement according to these theories. Then, would enhancing some emotion be counted as moral enhancement and effective according to these theories?

I argue that, as long as we do not accept emotivism in the wide sense, (1) moral enhancement by P&S is not always effective, although it is sometimes effective and that (2) it could cause even bad consequence. On the one hand, some emotion is sometimes useful as a means to motivate agents for morally good and right action. However, on the other hand, enhancing only some emotion could evoke even immoral action.

In the end, I will examine the ideal effective moral enhancement through finding out the reason for (1) and (2). The point will be moral truth and moral judgement. I claim that we need to enhance our capacity to recognize moral truth and moral judgement according to it, whichever normative theories we accept.

‘Preparing the Future for a World They Don't Deserve’

Allen Thompson (Oregon State University)

The international community is failing to prevent anthropogenic global climate change. Other and related anthropogenic environmental changes continue unabated, including ocean acidification, nitrogen deposition, directional ecosystem change, and steep declines in global biodiversity. It’s a safe bet the Anthropocene will exhibit widespread environmental degradation, at least when compared to conditions before the "Great Acceleration."

Much work in environmental ethics has sought to explain the morally problematic nature of these changes in terms of the loss of intrinsic value in nature. If a degraded world makes future human wellbeing more difficult, then perhaps this is our just deserts - the cost of committing such grave ecological injustices. More anthropocentric perspectives are concerned with environmental injustices regarding distribution: what, if anything, do we owe to future generations vis-à-vis the environment? Discourse here concerns economic discounting and weak versus strong sustainability.

Regardless of one's metric, conclusions tend to converge on the judgment that collectively we are not meeting our moral obligations regarding the environment and future generations. Then we are left only with admonishments to redouble our efforts. But it looks like we simply will not do what morally we ought to do.

This paper takes up the puzzling question of what members of the present generation ought to do for future generations given that we will not do what we ought to have done for them in the first place. Perhaps we should, for example, leave them with more human or natural "capital," but we won't. If we rightly anticipate such a collective moral failure, then is there anything left to the fabric of our moral relations with future generations vis-à-vis the natural environment, or has it all been ripped asunder?

I employ Jonathan Lear's notion of radical hope, along with ideas about emerging novel ecosystems, to outline a virtue theoretic approach to confronting the environmental future with something more than anticipatory grief. Along with cultivating resilient ecosystems, we ought to help foster a resilient environmental psychology of reconciliation, acceptance and forgiveness.
Innovation in agriculture brings about a number of positive and negative externalities. In this paper I will focus on one particular externality, which is how innovation affects the consumption of non-renewable or slowly renewable resources that are essential to be able to secure the human right to food in the future.

Nowadays a substantial amount of research in the life sciences is done for profit. This allows private companies to earn substantial revenues. The public benefits from such efforts by being able to access (provided they have the financial resources) a number of new objects of innovation. Such innovations are incentivized through temporary exclusive rights. Traditionally – that is based on Lockean property theories – ownership of the fruits of one’s labour is justified as researchers mix work with something that is essentially unowned and available in abundance. The reproduction and massive use of some these innovations require the right to destroy the effectiveness of resources that were not created by the inventor nor those buying the inventions. The use of pesticides leads to a loss of their effectiveness due to biological resistance, leading to the destruction of the resource (i.e. its effectiveness) and genetic pollution (i.e. an increase in resistant biological organisms). Similarly, the use of high-yield crop varieties leads to the loss of soil fertility. While the destruction of these resources is inevitable when using these inventions, there are a number of measures that can be taken to prolong the active life of these resources. Users of these resources can comply with strict usage regulations and the exclusive rights’ holders can assert substantial pressure to make sure users generally comply with these types of policies.
This talk aims to analyse the moral weight of the right to bequeath, i.e., a moral right according to which a testator should be legally able to dispose of her property by the terms of a last will. In some recent work on the morality of inheritance (Steiner, Haslett, Fabre, etc.), it has been argued that there is no such a thing as a morally justified right to bequeath. There is nothing morally significant in a bequest by which it should be legally protected. In this sense, society is justified to regulate the institution of inheritance in a way that protects and promotes the interests of the State.

Contrary to those views, this talk intends to provide a justification of the moral significance of the right to bequeath. Embracing the Interest Theory of Rights (Kramer, Waldron, Raz, etc.) and a particular notion of posthumous interests, I will argue that the deceased have a morally relevant interest in bequeathing since it protects her personal autonomy, acknowledge her moral status as a person with her own conception of the good, and allow her completing her life plan free from the interference of the State. Nevertheless, arguing in favour of the moral significance of bequest does not imply a legal unfettered right to bequeath. After analysing some arguments for the right of society to inherit, I shall conclude that when the interests of the dead undermine social justice, the interests of the living are morally superior.

My talk will finalise with a proposal for the resolution of that conflict: give greater weight to self-created property and consider establishing a quota (an accession tax) to the donee. In this way, I show that the recognition of the moral weight of the right to bequeath is not a threat for liberal egalitarianism.
Ritualizing Robots

Pak-Hang Wong (Universität Hamburg)

Robots are (or, will be) increasingly interwoven into the social fabric of our society, as the area and scope of application continue to expand. The introduction of robots to our social life could significantly alter existing human-human interaction (and, relations) as human interacting through and with robots, thereby supplementing or replacing existing human-human interaction with human-robot interaction. Philosophers and roboticists have raised concerns about the supplement and replacement of human with machines in various aspects of our life, e.g. in friendship and intimate relationship [1][2], in classroom [3], at home and work [4], etc; and, they have focused on the impacts of robots on specific values (e.g. friendship, care, authenticity, etc.), and examined whether the design and use of robots are ethically permissible and/or conducive to the good life [5]. These concerns, of course, are essential in informing us what ethically acceptable designs and uses of robots will be. Yet, there is one aspect of human-robot interaction that has not received sufficient attention in ethical reflection, namely the bodily dimension of human-robot interaction. It is worth reminding of the fact that human beings are embodied, i.e. our body and bodily experience affect the ways we perceive ourselves and our (social) world [6]. Since human beings interact with robots using their body, and robots elicit bodily reactions from human beings, e.g. [7], the bodily dimension should also be prominent in our understanding of human-robot interaction too. For ethicists, what should be of particular interest is the relation(s) between the body and morality. Proponents of embodiment have demonstrated that bodily experience affects our moral judgement and decision-making (e.g. through emotion, perception, etc.) [8]. Similarly, philosophers and developmental psychologists have recently re-discovered the importance of body in moral (self-)cultivation (especially through habits) [9]. Acknowledging the role of the body in human-robot interaction and in our moral life, therefore requires us to undertake ethical reflections on the bodily dimension in the design and use of robots. Drawing from the idea of ‘ritual’ (in Chinese philosophy), the aim of this paper is to make a case for the ethical significance of the bodily dimension of human-robot interaction.

Reference

‘Just War Tradition and Domestic Analogy: A History’

Riki Yamochi (Kyoto University)

Just war tradition has long been the foundation of argument of the ethics of war, especially in Western countries. The theory has largely been discussed from the legal perspective, since it has been a basis of the law of war. However, for two decades, the tradition has been subjected to harsh critique by philosophers. The philosophical approach to just war tradition is called revisionism, establishing a reputation as a nowadays major approach to the tradition.

Revisionists argue the morality of defensive war on the analogy of individual self-defense. However, arguing states’ international behavior by analogy with individuals’ internal interactions has earned unfavorable criticism in the realm of International Relations (IR). Hedley Bull coined a term “domestic analogy” to explain such an approach, which has prompted the debate against it. Why, in just war tradition, domestic analogy has been employed to account for a state’s right to resort to war, although it has often been denied in IR? In this paper, I will examine how domestic analogy has been handled in just war theory arguments.

Michael Walzer, in his nowadays classics of the ethics of war Just and Unjust Wars, adopted domestic analogy to derive states’ rights of self-defense from individuals’ rights to protect one’s own life and property against aggressors. Employment of domestic analogy for the theory of aggression has been major approach in just war tradition. Revisionists criticized this theory, arguing that the analogy does not explicate several cases of justified wars: defensive war that led to the threatening of the sovereignty of the aggressor state, and humanitarian intervention. While revisionists attack the defect of domestic analogy to draw state’s self-defense rights, they depend on the analogy when arguing the morality of self-defense. I argue that such a contradiction stems from the lack of broader view about domestic analogy; the arguments of domestic analogy by just war scholars have principally concentrated on a state’s right to war, lacking the viewpoint of states as actors in international society. Just war scholars must look to IR argument on domestic analogy.
Philosophy of peace vis-à-vis the just war theory (JWT) is a relatively new topic in the discourse of war and peace. In contemporary context, the idea of peace is very often associated with “pacifism,” a concept meaning an opposition to war, militarism, or violence. This paper attempts to elucidate some key arguments concerning war and peace from the perspective of Laozi’s Daoism. The discussion consists of two parts: The first part offers a general survey of the concepts of war and peace articulated by various philosophical schools in the Warring States period of ancient China, and then explicates the idea of peace (including its skeptical view on just war) in Daoism represented by the Daodejing; The second part focuses on the contemporary situation in China, critically examining the discourse of “China Dream” in terms of wealth and power promoted by the Chinese government. Obviously, the China Dream reflects China’s strategic culture that is future-oriented yet deeply rooted in the past, i.e. history, tradition, and self-image. Yet the concept of “China’s peaceful rise/development” advocated in past two decades by Chinese previous leaders has now given away to the idea of great-power politics, or realpolitik. The main reason is that China’s economic growth has altered the architecture of the international system that particularly increases the peer pressure of its neighboring countries. The paper shows that the “rejuvenation narrative” that generates Chinese nationalism and militarism can be potentially harmful both for China and the world from a Daoist vantage point.
‘The Axiology of the Cost–Benefit Approach to Rescue Medicine’

Tomasz Żuradzki (Jagiellonian University)

The aim of my paper is to discuss the axiology of the cost–benefit approach (CBA) assumed by many authors in medical ethics (e.g. Wilkinson 2009; Rieder 2017) to analyze rescue decisions when there are radically uncertain prognoses and a significant risk that, even if a patient (an infant or an adult) survives rescue procedures, her/his life will be full of suffering. I want to analyze how to weigh decisions made in the best interest of a patient who may not exist in at least one of the possible worlds depending on this decision; and what does it mean that death should sometimes be reasonably preferred in the patient’s best interest to severe and enduring morbidity. My hypothesis is that in rescue cases the very sense of using CBA seems to be undermined not only because the perspective must shift from an existing to a nonexisting person, which results in difficulty in providing a complete ranking of decisions, but also because different kinds of (dis)values seem to be attached to “likely harms” and “likely benefits” depending on whether a patient exists or no (e.g., comparative/noncomparative, individual-affecting/impersonal). I discuss some arguments from population ethics, e.g. the view that evaluation in such cases could be made only from the perspective of the world in which a patient exists (e.g. we could say that if a patient exists in a possible world A but not in a world X, then A may be better/worse for him than X, although X would not be worse/better for him than A, if X obtained, because a patient does not exist in X) (Arhrenius, Rabinowicz 2015). Finally, I argue that CBA in rescue cases should be understood metaphorically.

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